Aquinas
borrowed and transformed much from Aristotle in order to give a theological
picture of the nature of things.
Metaphysics and cognative psychology are worked out by him from
Aristotle and then applied to theological topics.
The
Life of Aquinas: He lived in the
thirteenth century. Born in Italy . He was a bright student at the University of Naples .
There he met the Dominicans. Like
the Fanciscans, the Dominicans wanted to go off their land and preach among the
people. Instead of living off endowments,
they would live off alms. Dominic
emphasized preaching, so study was important.
Aquinas prepared to become a Dominican, but his parents wanted him to be
a Benedictine abbot so they took him away from the Dominicans. But he returned to the Dominicans. He was sent by them to Paris
and made a professor of theology at the University of Paris . He did a term there as a professor, then went
to a Dominican study-house.
Structure
of the Summa Theologica: Question, Arguments Pro and Contra, Author's Response,
and Reply to the Initial Arguments. This
was a simplified format from that used in a Sentence-Commentary at the major
universities. He made a simplified
structure for the students in the outlying area after he left Paris .
Aristotle
held some views which contradicted Christian teachings. For instance, he believed that the world is
everlasting. Aquinas was called back to Paris for a second term as
professor to write commentaries on Aristotle.
The issue: where was Aristotle compatible with Christianity (and
incompatible). Aquinas wanted to show
that Aristotle could be used by Christians (directly and transformed). Aquinas integrated some platonic thought into
his own theology, so Aquinas was not just applying Aristotle to Christian
theology. Further, Aquinas displayed conceptual innovation on the work of
Aristotle. For instance, Aristotle believed that the soul is the form of the
body. So, the soul could not exist
without the body. Aquinas, wanting to
argue for the Christian theology of an after-life, argued that there is another
kind of form (of the soul) which can exist without the material body. He died in 1274. Once
when he was saying Mass, he had a vision and said that all his theology was
straw. Questios pale (as they are merely articulations on God) in comparison with an
experience of God. Controversial: was it a stroke? Later, he died. He left his
Summa unfinished.
Aquinas
believed that academic disciplines are not separate. It was a controversial position. He took many such positions.
9/18/95
Aquinas,
On Being and Essence: Being can stand
for the truth of a proposition or for a real thing, divided into ten
categories. Aristotle distinguishes ten
categories of real things: substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time,
being in a position, action, and passion.
Aquinas: each of these is a genus, to which differentia could be added
to get a species. For instance,
Substance: corporeal (v incorp.), animate (v. inanimate), moble (v.
immoble). These further differentia give
rise to different species. The whole
subdivided system is called Porphyry's Tree.
The species is defined by its genus and the differentia of the genus. A subspecies can become a genus to which
another differentia is applied to give rise to a new species. The tree goes
down to individuals which are not species. For Aristotle, 'substance' is the
main category; the other nine categories are accidents which depend on
'substance' for their being. Substance does
not depend on accidents.
An
essence is that through which and in which a thing has its existence.
We
don't predicate the parts by their wholes, but genus can be predicated by their
species. Sam is not his body but he is a
human. Therefore, genus does not signify
a part of a species or species of individuals.
To
relate being and essence to genus and species, Aquinas looks at the ways in
which being and essence are in the world by looking at substance and
accident. Aristotle took the hylomorphic
view: matter is formed, rather than the atomist (matter is made up of
atoms). Aquinas followed. Form gives one more explanatory power to
explain genuine beings than that of abstract atoms. Aquinas lost sight of Aristotle's 'stuff-thing' distinction. Aquinas uses 'act-potency' instead.
Matter
and form are theoretical entities.
Aquinas uses them to explain things and how they act.
Four
arguments (roles) of matter:
1.
From Logic: The being of a subject is distinct from the being of the predicate.
For instance, 'Socrates is white'. The
being of Socrates (subject) is distinct from Whiteness (predicate--a quality
and an accident). But, 'Socrates is
Man': the subject and predicate are not distinct in their being, so distinguish
prime matter from substantial form. These are the metaphysical principles that
constitute the power of a substance.
2.
From Physics: Aristotle--the substance properties endow something as capable of
functioning in certain ways. Only when
being capable of being modified is something changeable. Adams : this
works well for accidents, but what about substance? What of a substance persists through a
change? That which persists is prime matter (which takes on different accidents
in the change). In an Aristotilian
change, there must be something that persists through the change: prime matter
in a substantial change and substance in changes of accidents. Prime matter has potentiality (and actuality
only with forms). Aquinas: two counter-examples in his theology:
transubstantion and creation. To
Aquinas, creation is 'from nothing'. So,
Aquinas likes Aristotle's model here from Physics, but sees problems in
applying it to his theology.
3.
Matter and individuation: what
individuates? Not prime matter because
it is in every substance. Not quantity
alone because it is an accident and substance does not depend on
accidents. Matter signed by quantity is
responsible for individuation. Prime
matter with quanity is 'extended'. But,
this has an accident playing a role in a change in a substance, albeit the
substance (prime matter) is involved.
Form (extention) gives prime matter the capacity for individual. Also
problematic: quanity is just as indeterminate as the other accidents.
9/25/95
Substances
have a paradigmatic unity, so can't be composites(i.e. agn. atomism). Rather, there is one actuality component per
substance. Prime matter participates in
the actuality of the substantial form.
Matter is pure potentency rather than actuality on its own. Prime matter subsists through changes
borrowing actuality from substantial form.
Prime matter is potency: inbetween nothing and actuality.
God
is infinite actuality. Creatures
participate in it. Whereas God is simple
and One (neo-Platonism), creatures are composite of actuality received (the
essence) and the receiver of actuality(that which limits the essence--matter is
the ultimate limit here). Receiving is
potency-limiting act. Matter limits by
individuation. It limits the actuality
received of the essences from God.
Aquinas uses 'flowing' or 'emmination' language of the
neo-platonists. The recepticles are
defined by divine nature. Here, matter
is constricting the potency in that matter individuates.
So,
two notions of matter as potency that work side-by-side in his theory.
The
essence of a substance consist of both matter and form. Aquinas makes prime
matter pure potency and yet that which remains through a change (the substratum
of substantial change) in his argument
that a substance consists of both matter and form. These different usages of the role of matter
work in this context (argument) but not necessarily in others.
Aquinas
considered being and essence in relation to genus and species. He deals with the problem of universals in
this context. Essence in composite
substances can be considered as well as signified in many ways. First, as a part as distinct from that which
individuates the thing. E.g. Humanity. 'Precision' means excluding from the concept
of a subject. So, 'humanity' precinds that which individuates. So, it can't be predicated by individuals
unlike genus or species, so essence as a part can't be a genus or species. Second, essence can be considered as a whole
absolutely or as it exists in a particular individual(numerically multiplied in
many--individuated). In the latter, it
could exist 1. in the intellect or 2. in having accidents accompanying that
mode of existence or is equally predicable of many. Of the latter (has accidents), essence is
universal and thus as genus and species.
Essence
as a whole--e.g.: homo. In so far as
homo exists in Socrates, it is numerically one and many subjects can be
predicated by homo and has accidents.
Yet, genus and species are both common.
So, essence as a whole, because it can be individuated, can't be a
species or genus. Essence considered as
a whole and absolutely: the concept is not wholly determinateable--esp. as
pertains to 'one' or 'many' as well as being in reality or the intellect. It can pertain to existance in the intellect
or existence in reality--the same essence leading a double life. Its
ontological status is indeterminate. Genus and species are not indeterminate in
this sense. So, it is not genus or
species in this sense.
So,
essence is related to genus and species as it has accidents accompanying a mode
of existence or is equally predicable of many, but not as a part which is
distinct from that which individuates a thing or as a whole as an absolute or
in the intellect.
On
the Angels: They are not empirical
entities for us. There must be a reason
for positing their existence. What, for
instance, is their ontological status?
Aquinas' reason: God's primary reason for creation was generosity. Humans don't resemble God in being
incorporeal. If God is motivated by
generosity in creating, he wouldn't skip such beings. Angelic nature is not a composite of matter
and form. Prime matter is not divisible
without accidents added (quantitative dimensions). So, anything material has to be
corporeal. So, angels don't have
matter. Another argument: the created
intellect has to have some likeness item of that which it understands (e.g. the
species). When a form inheres in the
intellect, a concept exists. When form inheres in Prime matter with quanity,
the actual thing exists. These receiver
of an intellect of matter and form limit the intelligibility, so forms are
intelligible only separated from matter.
Angels have understanding as their principal function, so there is no
matter in angels. Their understanding
should not be limiting (because understanding is their prime function), so
their intellect is incorporeal. So they
could not be matter-form composites.
10/3/95
Soul/Body
Relations:
1.
The intellectual soul is incorporeal. He
assumes that understanding is the proper function of angels. Humans do it
too. Adams :
think of the nature of thoughts. He
claims that our intellectuals understand universal contents. The same form can exist in prime matter
signed by quantity and the intellect.
This is his Same Form Inherence Theory. Knowledge has the same form in
the mind as in is in the thing thought of.
This will only adhere if the intellect is not a matter-form
composite. Matter in the intellect would
inhibit the intelligibility of the forms known.
This is so because for Aquinas, knowledge involves the same form
existing in the knower and the known.
Matter is potency-limiting act. An idea has intentional esse rather than
actuality. He qualifies this, however, in stating that there are two ways for a
form to be in something: intentional esse and natural esse. Key: whether the form characterizes that in
which it is. Natural esse: yes. So, the intelligible form need not be the same
as that in the thing thought of but merely representative of it. Does this mean that the intellect can't have
matter?
Understanding:
forms out of accidents are picked up by the sense. Does the agent intellect abstract the
particular essence of the sensed object--the representation of which is the
form in the intellect. Also, he views
the agent intellect as light which contains the intelligible content.
The
formal argument on the incorporeality of the intellectual soul: Because the
intellect grasps universal contents, and knowledge involves the same form
existing in the knower and the known, and what is received is received after
the manner of the receiver, the intellect cannot include matter as a metaphysical constituent. Thus, the intellect is incorporeal. The key: what kind of subject can receive
universal esse. He argues that only an
incorporeal intellect can receive universal esse. It was not self-evident that only a
non-material subject could receive a non-material esse (e.g. an idea).
2.
The intellectual soul is incorruptible. To be corrupted means that a
matter-form content ceases to be--that the substancial form attached to the
prime matter signed by quantity ceases to be. The soul is not a matter-form
composite, so it can't be corrupted.
3.
The intellectual soul is subsisting. He assumes that a form subsists if and only if it has an activity
that its (actual or potential) subject of inherence (if any) does not share.
So, understanding is an activity of the intellectual soul that the body does
not share.
4.
The intellectual soul is the form of the body. Recall the doctrine of the
substantial forms. The soul is the first
cause of understanding only when it is adhering in matter because an agent is
in first potentiality with respect to sensation only if that agent has a
suitable organic body. The key: sensation is essential to understanding by the
intellectual soul.
Aquinas
does not believe in innate ideas or intuitive understanding. Understanding is via sensations.
10/9/95
Soul/Body
Relations:
4.
The intellectual soul is the form of the body.
Any connection here is for the sake of the soul. This is Aquinas' view of soul-body
relations. Understanding is a natural
functions of human beings. It requires
sensation, which in turn requires a body.
Thus, because the intellectual soul functions in understanding, a
suitable organic body is essential to human beings (because it is essential to
the soul). Specifically, having an
organic body puts one into first potentiality with respect to sensing. An organic body is the equipment that could
acquire the ability to sense. The power
of sensation gets sensation to second potentiality and first actuality. So, there must be organic body in order to
sense. Sensation is necessary for
understanding which is necessary for the soul.
But,
is human understanding from sensation?
If not, is the activity of the intellect able to be separate from the
body. Does the fact that the soul
subsists mean that it could exist without the bodily equipment?
Aquinas
is really committed to the claim that the soul needs the form of the body. God infused a corruption-inhibitor until the
Fall. The resurrection re-infuses
it. Even then, understanding will be
dependent upon sensation. We can't derive
abstract ideas apriori. The center of
Aquinas' philosophy: the soul survives death and it requires the form of the
body. So, bodily resurrection is necessary for the subsistance of the
soul. The soul is the only substantial
form of the human composite, so it is how that composite gets its esse. This stace is contrary to the Platonic idea
that the form is independent of materiality.
To
say that the soul is subsisting and that it needs the form of the body seems to
be saying contradictory things: dualist and non-dualist. They seem to be saying that the soul can
exist alone without the body and on the other hand that the soul requires the
body.
Averroes
was a heretic so Aquinas wanted to distinguish his position from that of
Averroes. Averroes argued that there is
an intellectual realm with a great chain of intellects. The human intellect is at the bottom of the
line. These intellectual beings are not
matter-form composites and they are not the form of any matter. They are immaterial by nature. Human beings are matter-form composites but
in which a high-grade sensory soul is most salient. The human being is a top-of-the-line sensory
soul from the stand-point of a hierarchy of matter-form composites. Averroes thought that humans do not have
intellects of our own but we have sensory souls. So, how can humans understand? The bottom-of-the-line separate human intellect
understands from the human being's phantasms intellible species. The same form exists in the intellect as in
the human matter-form composite. The
human intellect is coupled to the matter-form composite. So, he would reject the claim that the body
is suffcient for the intellect to understand in the first potentiality. The substances that do the understanding and
the sorting are separate but coupled.
Aquinas
wants to rule this coupling theory out to argue instead that the soul is not
separated from the body; that is, the soul and body are not coupled together
via a shared form, but are not separated.
The soul is the form of the body.
Aquinas states that Averroes does not have a good rationale for the fact
that Socrates thinks. In other words, to
Averroes, the human is just the instrument of the intellect. To Aquinas, the human being is not an
instrument of the thinking thing.
Further, to Aquinas, understanding is too incedental to the human
being. To Aquinas, it is essential
(internal to its being) that the human being thinks. Also, Averroes thought that the world is
eternal, so there is no first moment.
This went against the Christian doctrine of the creation of the world
and Aristototle's view that God is the first cause. Aquinas wanted to argue against this
too.
5.
The Individuation of Souls:
Each
of us has our own soul. How can this be
reconciled with the claim that the soul is subsistant? What individuates is an aptitude for adhering
in one chunk of matter rather than another. An individual form and matter constitute the
individual human being. When the soul
actually comes into being, it is made to adhere in a particular matter, with a
disposition to adhere in that matter.
This disposition can survive actual non-adherence. Key: the disposition to adhere in a
particular matter, even at death when separation occurs. Resurrection, because the soul has a
disposition to rejoin. This could only
happen by a supernatural cause. Nothing contrary to nature can be
perpetual. Further, ulimate human
perfection is not possible, given this disposition of the soul to a particular
matter clump, unless the body rejoin the soul.
Finally, the soul must rejoin the body so the individual can come under
Final Judgement.
It
is a relation to a particular matter, rather than actual adherence, that
individuates souls. It is the tendency
to adhere in a particular matter which individuates souls. It is not actual adherence or anything added
to the soul that individuates it.
10/16/95
Essence
and Being(esse): Their identity and
distinction.
Stage
I: the otherness (of essence and existence) claim. Concepts used for a thing's essence and
existence are different. Adams : so how could you get a distinction of a thing as
it is as itself? How could one know the
metaphysical composition of what is really out there?
Aquinas
premises that unless an essence is identical with its existence, the essence
can be understood without its existence being understood. But could not there be other elements in an
essence?
Stage
II: There is at most one essence identical with existence. So, other essences, such as under genuses or
species, are not identical to their existences.
He assumes that there are only three ways to multiply. None of them can result in something that is
simple (whose essence=its existence) because each of the three ways of
multiplication results in composites.
So, there can't be more than one thing whose essence is identical with
its existence. Adams :
this does not necessarily mean that there is one; only that there can not be
more than one. So, the existence of a
thing whose essence=its existence is not proven here.
Stage
III: a principle of sufficient reason.
There is an essence identical to its existence which is the first cause
of existence in all things. From a distinction of essence and existence in
creatures, the identity of them in the first cause (God). Adams : But
that there is a first cause has not been proven. Also, in other arguments, Aquinas argues from
the identity of essence and esse in God to their distinction in creatures.
So,
Aquinas assumes in some parts of his argument the existence of God. But this is what he is trying to prove. To Aquinas, the first cause (that which whose
essence is identical with its existence) is the pure act. Adams : the
existence of a series need not be assumed for this.
11/6/95
Aquinas'
Action Theory:
Aquinas
believed in agent, rather than event, causation. Every substance is an agent cause. Every agent acts toward a given end. This is a metaphysical basis. Every agent acts for the sake as an end,
because everything has an active power as defined by the objects. A nature is just a complex of powers. Nature-constituting powers constitute an
end. An agent moves only by determining an
end. A power is a power to do something
or be effected in some way. Powers are
aimed at their objects. The aim of a
power is its telos. Being aimed toward
an end is an internal structure or constitution of a thing. Nature is that
which has an internal principle of motion or activity. This is how all things are structured. Functional explanations are primary in
biology, so we need to think of biological beings as being constituted toward
an end. What of non-living things? Aris: the basic elements are not things but
are stuffs, but Aquinas doesn't use this distinction. So, non-living things are teleological. But, Aquinas distinguishes between agents
having reason and will and those that don't.
Rationality distinguishes those which order themselves to an end from
those that must be so ordered by others.
Necessary to conceptualize an end as well as the means thereto for one
to order oneself to an end. This
involves one to append universals, so only beings with reason can do it: be
self-legislators. Aquinas claims that
rational beings are self-orderers.
Rational agents are self-movers.
Other living beings are not self-legislating. In what sense are human agents self-movers
different from other living beings that can move themselves? Inward principles of motion vs. outward. This
is sloppy. Metaphysical natures apply to
all created natures. The difference
between self-movers and quasi-self-movers lies in rationality. Rational calculation is necessary to be
self-legislating. Basically, to be
voluntary is to do certain repetitive operations in response to rational
self-calculation.
So,
all agents act toward an end. Different
rationales according to the kind of agent.
The capacity for self-legislation makes one kind of agent more Godlike
than another. Rational agency is about
ethics. So, we should aquire virtues
that enhance our cognitive ability and thus make us more Godlike.
There
is unity of ends, rather than an infinite progression. God orders all to the over-all end of the universe. Infinite causal chains don't explain
anything. A sufficient explanation: the
principle of sufficient reason. There
must be a sufficient explanation of everything. Positing a first cause whose
existence and activity is self-explanatory would provide such an explanation;
an infinite series of causes would not.
On
there being one ultimate end: If powers do not essentially integrate to focus
on one object, then they do not constitute a nature. There is an integrated aim
at an ultimate end within each individual person. Humans are of the same nature
(a nature is simply an integration of powers focused on an end). So, things of the same species have the same
ultimate end. God is that ultimate
end.
This
is Aquinas' metaphysical framework.
Rational agents are not constituted by sufficient powers to be
self-coordinating. Customs suppliment
here. Virtues are examples.
11/6/95
Aquinas'
Action Theory:
Humans
are distinct in being self-movers from inward principles (intellect and will,
by reason). God is the first mover, so
every creature must involve some external principle of motion. 'Violent' motion is a movement contrary to
how the thing's inward principle of motion would go. It does not necessarily mean being moved by
an external object (eg. it could be gravity). That which is not contrary to
motion can be either with or without cognition.
God, on the other hand, has only its own internal principle. Humans are self-legislators, able to
distinguish and consider means and ends.
So, human voluntary action can't be violent.
Besides
ignorance, sensory passions can obstruct the ability to self-legislate by
abstraction or by affecting what appears good to reason. By abstraction, he means that passions and
reason come from the same energy source.
So, if the soul's energy is used up by the passions, then there will be
little energy left to calculate by reason.
Passions can cause us not to think straight. So, passion can interfere with legislation
and thus moral action. Ideally, passions
should be moderated by virtues (from Aristotle). Virtue also helps one to self-legislate in a
way in line with the ultimate end (God).
He wants the passions to get their proper objects that is done by reason
getting its proper sensory input. So,
Aquinas does not want passionless humans.
Habits enable one to coordinate the intellect with the senses and the
passions such that one can be self-legislative towards an appropriate end. A correct syllogism should go through your
mind prompt and easy.
Aquinas
claims that there are degrees of seriousness of sinfulness. Sins of ignorance and of weakness (from
passions) are less serious than sins of malice.
All natures and all natures-consituting powers aim at the proximate good
of the agent (being like God). So, even
sins of malice do not aim at the bad.
So, sins of malice, like the other two types of sin, are a distorted way
of aiming at the good. Sins of malice
are in terms of incomplete knowledge.
Sins of malice aim at a better-loved good, but secondarily at the cost
of doing the evil that accompanies it.
Long-range evil consequences are missed (ignorance). Even so, a more
complete knowledge is exercised here than in the case of the other two
sins.
For
Aquinas, Being and Good are indistinguishable.
So, is the will deficient in these sins to seek being? The will without will-power is deficient in
being in that it lacks certain accidents such as habits.
Isn't
Aquinas overly optimistic? Can't one will the bad for the sake of the bad? He thinks that this is metaphysically
bizarre. So, instead he has sinners
willing things apparently good (with evil side-effects). Our cognitive power
can be mistaken. In other words, he
won't admit that sinners want to do evil because of his neo-platonic
metaphysic.
Aquinas
sees sin as an offence against God as well as as an error. Error in relation to God and nature. Abalard and Anselm: the outward act does not
effect the moral evaluation. Aquinas:
the outward act is subject to moral evaluation just as the voluntary
action/intension.
11/27/95
Sin:
a deprivation in falling short of natural, artifactual, or moral functional
norms that are used for habits that are used in seeking God. This is a metaphysical and theological basis
of sin. Thus, sin is a defect or lack of
a good in something that properly ought (by nature) to have it. Metaphysically, sin is not something in a
positive sense, but is rather a deprevation of something else. Thus, one could not aim at evil; rather,
one's aim could be distorted from the good.
Created natures are ways of imperfectly imitating God by seeking
Him. A sin is a fault in the execution
of that search.
An
angel is an incorporeal intellectual/rational nature that can contemplate God
by power of its own nature but needs supernatural power to see God. The end of such natures is happiness.
The
intellectual/rational nature malfunctions due to mistaken estimates by the
intellect/reason or to the will's failure to follow them. Human reason can malfunction due to
invinciple ignorance, ignorance due to the passions, or to a failure to
consider factors relevant to the evaluation of the action in question. Aquinas: Angels malfunction by failing to
consider what they know: factors relevant to the evaluation. Unlike Anselm, Aquinas does not consider the
possibility that angels malfunction due to invinciple ignorance. Adams : a
weakness in Aquinas' system. To Aquinas,
the sin applicable to angels is limited to pride and envy.
Aquinas
wishes to distance God's responsibility of the fallen angels. God created angels happy as to their
natures(contemplating God) but not supernaturally happy(seeing God). The angels could not have sined in the first
moment of their existence because God cannot be the cause of sin, for a thing's
functioning at the first instant of its existence would be due to the cause
from which it derived its existence. But
God produces angels in existence and conseres creatures in existence throughout
their existence. But some angels willed
against their proper subordination to God, probably immediately after the first
instant of their creation, while most angels persevere in being oriented to God
as the object of their happiness.
Aristotelian optimism: because sin is contrary to natural inclination,
and natures function well always or for the most part, more angels persevered
than fell. This is not so for humans,
due to our composite nature (evil in most, good in fewer).
The
existence of angels: on the ground that they are what self-diffusing Goodness
would produce to fill in gaps in the Great Chain of Being and Goodness.
Human
nature: a hylomorphic composite and so numerically multiable, having corporeal
and spiritual levels. The Fall was not
necessary, but is punishment for Adam's sin. All human beings are descended
from Adam, and all of his descendents participate in the guilt of his first
sin. This a biological basis for the
spread of Adam's sin. But Adam's sin can't be morally imputed to his
posterity. But, many humans are counted
as one because they participate in or
share the same human nature. Just as
what the hand does can be attributed to human as a whole and so to its other parts,
so what Adam did can be attributed to other members of the human race. This is a metaphysical(Divine legislation)
rationale for the effects of Adam's sin spreading (damaged human nature). But what was lost (stabilizers) is a gift
lost from human nature, so how could human nature be impaired and thus damage
being passed on? So, Aquinas uses both
biological and metaphysical rationales for the spread of Adam's sin. Inconsistent?
In either case, the spread was done as a punishment for Adam's first
sin. God is punishing the human race for
Adam's first sin.
12/4/95
Christology:
The
incarnation is metaphysically possible, decent, congruous, and of
propriety. On its possibility, he
distinguishes essence taken as a whole in the intellect from essence considered
as a part. What is the relation between
the universal human nature (an abstract concept) and the individual persons who
are human? He argues against Aristotle's
claim that there is a one-to-one correlation between universal substances and
individuals. Aquinas: On the trinity, for instance, there is one substance and
three supposits. That substance is not
numerically multiplied by the three suposites. But, these three supposits share
the same essence, so there is not a one-to-one correlation. The supposits are
of a distinction of reason, rather than being a distinction in being.
On
the incarnation: the divine and human
natures, retaining their own essences and yet unified. For the Divine Word to assume the human
nature, it must be really distinct from that nature. Aristotle would assume a one-to-one relation;
the divine nature has only one assumed human nature. This is not so here; a particular human
nature is supposited by the Divine Word, but more than one particular human
nature could be so assumed. Being
assumed is a real relation of reason in the Divine Word; the particular human
nature assumed takes on the esse of one of the supposits of the Divine
Word. Divinity is one essence, with
three supposits. A particular human is
assumed passively; that particular human nature is assumed passively such that
the particular human nature is related so to the Divine Word without losing its
distinctiveness from the divine word.
The co-relation is one of reason, since they have different ontological
statuses. Aristotle: knowing involves a
real relation that changes the thing that knows. It is a relation of reason. The relation in the nature assumed(to the
Divine Word) is real, whereas the relation of the Divine Word (to the
particular human nature) is reason.
Why: the relation to the Divine Word changes the human nature (but the
human nature, though divinized, is still distinct from the Divine
nature)--thus, it is a real relation.
But the thing assumed does not change the Divine Word, so this relation
is only of reason (can't be real). A
particular human nature shares the esse of the Divine Word. A particular substance nature is not its own
esse when it shares in the supposit of something else. The Divine Word uses all of creation as an
instrument, but that particular human nature that is assumed participates in
the Divine esse whereas the other particular human natures would not, but would
form their own supposits. Any particular
human nature could be assumed. That the
Divine Word assumes one changes that particular human nature in that its esse
no longer subsists in its own suppository, but in one of the supposits of the
Divine Word. The assumed human nature
therefore loses its own esse and takes on that of one of the Divine Word's
supposits. Because a universal and
particular need not be in a one-to-one relationship, a universal (the Divine
Word) can assume more than one particular human nature. Each human has their own particular human
nature, so there can be more than one incarnation. That this is possible and not actual is a
conservative position taken by Aquinas, based on his interpretation of
Scripture.
The
particular human nature assumed does not have an esse from its own supposit;
the others do. The particular human
nature assumed has a real relation to the Divine Word because that nature's
esse changes from itself to a supposit of the Divine Word, and thus really
changes. The Divine Word which assumes a
particular human nature has a relation of reason to that nature because the
esse of the Word does not change (so the relation is not real, otherwise the
esse of the Word would be altered by taking on the relation). The basic idea is that the esse of the Word
does not change whereas the esse of the nature changes.
12/11/95
Sacraments:
In
general, he does not see our bodies as imprisoning our souls. But, the body is for the benefit of the
soul. So, there is some hierarchy. Further, revelation and grace complement
rather than replace nature. So, it makes
sense that God would become incarnate in a human body and it makes sense that
God would work through materials of this world as signs of grace. Sacraments are not just signs, but are
instrumental causes, of grace in the soul.
The grace flows through the instrumental causes (sacraments). Something material can be part of an
instrumental cause of something immaterial.
God is the principal agent.
Root
of disagreements on the sacraments: different views of causality.
The
Eucharist:
The
Eucharist participates in the divine in a unique way among sacraments in that
the body and blood of Christ are really present. What is the meaning of 'really present'? Augustine: it is a symbolic spiritual
presence; the liturgy is a drama.
Nothing happens to the bread and wine; they are signs of a spiritual
presence. In the eighth century,
Radbertus claimed that the bread and wine change internally to become the body
and blood. A real change. Ratramnus: supported Augustine's stance. The debate tended to favour Radbertus'
stance. Later, Bergenger of Tours
claimed that it was a symbolic change on the grounds that otherwise the
accidents and substance would have to exist separately. Lanfranc insisted that accidents and
substance can exist separately. He won. But, other views outstanding:
Impanation: The Body of Christ assumes
the substance of the bread the way the Divine Word assumes the human nature of
Christ thus licensing mutual predications.
Incarnational view: both 'human' and divine natures, each retaining its
distinctiveness yet being unified. There is no internal change in the divine
Word; it is a relation of reason from the Word to the bread. Nothing is happening to the bread. So, nothing is said of the nature of the
bread. Aquinas: bread is a nonrational
nature, so it can't be assumed.
Transubstantiation: the accidents of
the bread are no longer accompanied by the substance of bread but accompanied
by the substance of the Body of Christ.
Unlike the annihilation view, the change acts on the whole substance of
the bread. Annihiation, one substance is taken away and another comes. 'How' is
not considered in that view. A problem
with the transubstantiation view: Aristotle: accidents must adhere in their
substance. So, a new metaphysic was
needed for this view.
Annihilation: The substance of the
bread is annihilated, but its accidents remain, when the Body of Christ comes
to be present. How one substance came to
replace the other is not considered.
Consubstantiation: The bread remains
and the Body of Christ comes to be present along with it.
Why
not allow all of these? The issue was
important then, and the Church wanted to have the best account. But, the
council of Lateran IV did not explicitly exclude any of these options. It is
not clear that transubstantiation was the chosen view.
What
is 'Body'? It is a substance that can
have its accidents or the accidents of something else. Very few folks believed that the accidents of
the body were present by extention (e.g. chemical change). This is not to say
that there are no accidents of the Body along with the accidents of the bread
present.
Aquinas: transubstantiation. He is trying to
give an explanation on the how of the change.
Being present by the power of the sacrament rather than by natural
comcomittance, does not involve extension (e.g. having it accidents of
extension there). So, the Body of Christ
can be on the table and yet in heaven ruling.
It's quantity (an accident) is not extended in place in the way that
other substance's quantities are(natural comcomitance). Further, the substance of the Body can be
present without its accidents.
Real
presence: it is a metaphysical change on the altar rather than just a symbol or
a spiritual experience of God. This
question was salient due to reverence to the elements in practice. That began in the eighth or ninth
century. It was quite different from the
early Church practice of communion or Augustine's view of the elements. The theologies of the real presence came out
of the practice whereby the elements themselves were revered or
worshipped. Aquinas wanted to say that
the substance of the bread wasn't there so that it would not be idolitry. Scotus: but one is still bowing down before
bread-accidents. Even so, Scotus did not
view it as idolitry because he believed that the Body was present.