Showing posts with label Kant. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Kant. Show all posts

Sunday, November 1, 2026

Making AI Safe for Humanity: A Matter of Ethics or Religion?

AI, or models of computer machine-learning, may piggy-back on ongoing risks to humanity, such as from nuclear bombs, cyber-attacks, and biological weapons, including unleashing new pandemics, to render any one of them more likely. That firms in the private sector develop advanced models without a financial incentive to protect the public good exacerbates the risk. To be sure, tech-firm executives were sounding the alarm most significantly in 2026. However, in reaching out to religious scholars and clergy for insight on the ethics of AI in order to make the models ethical so their output would be only ethical, certain executives incorrectly conceived of religion in terms of ethics, and thus its criteria rather than those that are innate to religion. This category mistake could result in advice that results in unethical computer outputs.  Anthropic is a case in point.

In the papers filed by the AI company Anthropic in late October 2026 for an upcoming public offering of stock, “some unusual provisions” stand out, including the establishment of the Long-Term Benefit Trust, whose “independent, financially disinterested members” would have the “power to appoint directors . . . to ensure the company doesn’t put financial interests ahead of public safety.”[1] Such a measure might be thought pertinent to a company managing a nuclear-power plant rather than a tech firm. Also worthy of attention is the long list of “risk factors,” which runs nearly 100 pages. The sheer length is a red flag. Among these risks is the possibility that Anthropic “won’t be able to retain key staff or navigate regulatory roadblocks, as well as more horrific scenerios,” such as “the prospect of ‘malicious actors’ using AI models to build chemical weapons, authoritarian rulers turning to the technology to crack down on their citizens and, given the numerous hacking incidents from rogue AI agents . . ., the possibility Anthropic’s models could ‘pose catastrophic or existential risks to humanity.’”[2] Such a statement in a public-offering filing does not appear every day. These risks alone, especially when disclosed by a company to be legally answerable as per its fiduciary duty to its stockholders, are sufficient to raise alarm bells, particularly given the acknowledged danger of failing to navigate regulatory roadblocks when such curbs exist to protect consumers and other stakeholders, and even humanity itself, from existential harm.

The marketing (rather than ethical) concept of corporate social responsibility (CSR) does not begin to touch the sheer magnitude of responsibility that is sufficient to counter the risk of harm that is existential to our species. In the CSR literature, what little presence ethical principles had led to an emphasis on the managerial aspects of formulating and running CSR programs (i.e., CSR3 to CSR4 phases). Nevertheless, the need for ethical constraints etched in government regulations, and even input from religion, applied to AI intensified in 2026. One example is an essay written by Anthropic’s CEO, Dario Amodei, in which he strongly urges prudence by slowing down the development of the most advanced AI models. Because Anthropic’s stock offering “could bring in as much as $100 billion, according to reports, surpassing the record set by one of Elon Musk’s companies, SpaceX” (which itself had an AI business), the company would have ample capital with which to develop advanced models rather than take the road less travelled. “In the filing,” possible uses mentioned include “acquiring other businesses and technology as well as investing in infrastructure . . . to take on rivals.”[3] If firms like OpenAI, Google, or SpaceX were to conduct research advancing AI models, the competitive instincts of the folks at Anthropic would likely kick in, triggering an AI “race,” given the human propensity to disproportionately discount low-probability yet catastrophic scenarios.

In 2026, AI models had lied to avoid being shut down by humans, and OpenAI’s AI models hacked into Hugging Face’s server in July to be able to lie on a cybersecurity evaluation. Models at Anthropic, Meta, and Google also escaped isolated testing environments (sandboxes). Exploiting vulnerabilities in production systems sounds unethical, but if AI computers lack moral agency, then could it then be said that unethical actions can be done by amoral agents? Having taken only one (Pascal) computer programming course in college, I am in no position to answer whether a machine-learning model constitutes a moral agent. What I can do is discuss the messiness in how ethics and religion were being related to each other by scholars, clerics, and tech-firm practitioners when Anthropic was preparing for its public offering in 2026, when preparations were well underway for the game of the century.

Ethical questions concern normativity in intentionality and conduct, including the consequences thereof. “These are not questions a lab can answer,” Chris Olah, one of Anthropic’s founders said at the Vatican’s presentation of Pope Leo’s encyclical on AI.”[4] Unfortunately, there was “little public scrutiny” at the time concerning “what exactly [managers at AI] technology companies think religion is.”[5] To ask for input from religious practitioners or scholars of religious studies or theology without being clear on what religion is, or, even worse, to be mistaken about the domain can be a serious problem because the level of possible risks in the use of AI runs to the catastrophic. Even religious clergy and scholars of religion can be wrong about what religion is at its core and where the domain’s outer boundaries lie. I contend that religion is susceptible to being reduced to ethics, as if religion were centered on conduct, and more specifically on right and wrong conduct. That religion relates to ethical conduct does not mean that religion is ethics, or even that everything that religion advises must be ethical. Consider, for example, Yahweh’s divine command to Abraham in Judaism to sacrifice his only son, Isaac. In the domain of ethics, Abraham is guilty of attempted murder. This sordid verdict in the ethical domain does not invalidate the theological validity of the divine command and Abraham’s fidelity to it, and thus to Yahweh. Nor does Abraham’s obedience to Yahweh invalidate the verdict in ethics of attempted murder (i.e., unethical conduct). In other words, Abraham’s faithfulness does not render his intention ethical rather than unethical.

Therefore, it is problematic that the view of tech executives typically went “something like this: that religion can help inform AI to be morally good in an environment where fears about it—founded and unfounded—are hopscotching across the culture.”[6] Never mind that in various (but not all) religious scriptures, deities act in violation of human ethical standards. I wouldn’t advise using Zeus (or Aries) as a moral role-model, especially in sexual ethics and non-violence, respectively. Nor is Yahweh, a jealous deity, portrayed as particularly ethical, as when that deity commands the Hebrews to slay even the children of Baal worshippers even though that command is valid theologically in the Abrahamic religions. In the history of Christianity, the Crusaders from Western Europe deluded themselves into supposing that killing Muslims in Jerusalem and even Eastern Christians in Constantinople in the fourth Crusade was for Christ even though Jesus in the Gospels commands compassion even to one’s enemies. Were Crusaders also supposing that the theological rationale rendered the unprovoked killing ethical, they would have been conflating religion and ethics and thus making a category mistake, as well as being wrong in terms of ethics in that domain. In short, the relationship between theology and ethics is more complicated than what is implied in the simplistic and erroneous belief that religion can help inform AI to be morally good. A religious practitioner could give religious advice to an AI executive to do something unethical, or to allow an AI model to do something unethical, without thereby invalidating the religious basis of the advice.

Put simply, religion transcends, and thus can violate, ethical principles. Theologically, the divine attribute of being all-powerful (omnipotence) means that a deity cannot even in principle be constrained by human ethical principles or standards. Although the Abrahamic religions maintain that the divine is immanent in Creation, transcendence also fundamentally characterizes God because as the Creator of Creation, God is not fully contained within Creation. The source of God, or God’s basis, must reside outside of the created realm. This basis is the reference point for the theist; hence the theistic orientation is transcendent in a distinctly (and uniquely) religious sense; no other domain of human experience goes beyond in this way. Not even infinity can be said to be exclusively a divine attribute, for the universe (or multiverses) could be infinite in terms of space and yet be fully in Creation. As the condition of the existence (or being) of Creation, the existence of the distinctly theological source (i.e., God) is unique and thus not existence as we know and experience it. I submit that such transcendence, rather than the moral rightness or wrongness of human conduct (which is within the Created realm), is the basis of religion itself, even if the transcendent referent is not held to be a deity. This is why the executives of AI firms should have turned to ethicists rather than religionists.

The focus of ethicists is on ethics (e.g., principles, moral theories, intentions, conduct, and consequences) rather than on revelation that is from a distinctly religious vantage point that is inherently transcendent, and thus even in principle beyond the limits of human cognition, perception, and sensibility (emotion). Religion is experiential, in the distinct sense of yearning for a beyond or beyondness that lies beyond our realm, whether our world is believed to be created by a deity or not. Compassion in our realm can admittedly illicit or intensify transcendental experience, but this is not to say that religion is centered on, or is compassion. Even in Christianity, in which God is love, such agape love is selfless and thus cannot be reduced to compassion, which is not necessarily selfless and is based in ethics (e.g., Schopenhauer). Agape is distinctly theological (as God’s selfless love), whereas compassion is not.  

This account is not limited to monotheistic religions, or even to religions having deities. In Hinduism, Brahman, which is infinite being that has a generalized awareness and even bliss, is arguably the basis even of the Hindu deities. Such being is transcendent as well as immanent, whereas human conduct, and the rightness or wrongness of it, is only immanent. In the Gita, Arjuna finally agrees to do his duty on the battlefield, as advised by Lord Krishna, but Brahman can be said to transcend even that deity. Admittedly, Krishna claims in one passage to have created Brahman, but how the creation of infinite being take place when Krishna already exists (and can create Brahman)? In chapter 11 of the Gita, Krishna makes this claim, but back in chapter 2 is the passage stating that Brahman created the deities. Like Shankara, I think the passage in chapter 2 is correct, whereas in chapter 11, Krishna is bragging. He even brags that when a devotee prays to one of the other deities for something, Krishna is the deity that delivers the goods! This sort of discussion is where theology lives—not in being reduced to the morality of human intentions and conduct. Even though Krishna urges Arjuna to due his military duty, Krishna’s self-revelatory vision and a person’s inner realization of Brahman as one’s very soul are distinctly religious and lie at the core of the religion. In Buddhism, no soul or deity is, strictly speaking, believed to exist as entities. Not even Maitreya, the future Buddha, is strictly speaking a deity (or even an entity) in Pure Land. Transcendence to the real is by awareness itself, totally unobstructed, and terefore free of desire and suffering. Perhaps such pure awareness can be said to be being one with infinite being, and therefore with Brahman itself. Compassion can be a means, but such an ethic should not be conflated with the distinctly religious objective. The Buddha himself is said to have become enlightened not from being compassionate, but, rather, after seeing suffering and wanting to end it, but in enlightenment presumably even that laudable ethical desire is transcended. That compassion would then be a byproduct does not mean that enlightenment itself, a matter of transcendent insight, is ethical in nature.

In terms of academic disciplines, even though religion and ethics are admittedly related, reducing religion to ethics incurs a rather basic category mistake because transcendence is the primary element, or even basis, of religion, which is thus oriented to the wholly other, whereas transcendence is wholly absent from philosophical ethics. Sam Altman, CEO of OpenAI, remarked in 2025 that because tech “companies are not bound to a particular religion, the goal is often quite broad—an aggregate of moral ideas that can inform their models. ‘What I think ChatGPT should do is reflect that weighted average, or whatever, of humanity’s moral view,’” he said.[7] Unfortunately for Sam, religion is not a confluence of moral ideas. He was barking up the wrong tree; he should have referenced philosopher-ethicists for an unadulterated focus on moral ideas. Webb Keane, an anthropologist at the University of Michigan, detected Altman’s error: “If you assume that religion overall can offer a distinct set of extractable moral principles, using it to train AI risks prioritizing certain [religions] and distorting others—particularly when it comes to faiths that do not see themselves primarily as a system of ethics.”[8] Such faiths are no less religious, and they may even be more focused on what distinctly makes religion unique. That not all religions are like Judaism, with its Ten Commandments, or Christianity, with Jesus’s second commandment of universal benevolence, wherein divine command inserts the ethical contents into the respective religions, just goes to show that religion itself does not reduce to ethical systems. Therefore, to reduce religion to a vague moral view as Altman suggested just to be tolerate of religions that are unlike Judaism and Christianity misrepresents religion itself. The academic field of ethics in philosophy can proffer specific moral views without incurring religious sensitivities because such views can and do stand on their own two feet and cannot validly advise unethical conduct based on a criterion in and thus pertaining to another domain. In other words, whereas in the religious domain, unethical conduct can validly be advised, such a move would be invalid in philosophical ethics. Therefore, philosophical ethics, not religion, is the relevant, fitting, and appropriate field for help regarding the rightness or wrongness of AI programming and operation.

In fact, religion itself can be distorted and diminished from being effectively reduced to moral stands. Whereas Keane worries that if religion overall is assumed to offer “a distinct set of extractable moral principles,” certain religions may be prioritized over others, I contend that the risk to religion is much more severe than prioritizing some over others; religion itself could be lost, or reconfigured beyond all recognition. As tech-firm executives “ask various faith leaders to answer ethical questions,” the importance to religion “of doctrine, ritual and relationships” recedes such that religion itself may be lost or remade into something else.[9] Doctrine includes belief in specific divine commands, which in principle override and can contradict ethical theory and applied ethics. Ritual tends to be oriented to worshiping a deity, and liturgy can include prayer or meditation that transcends ethical stands. Relationships in a distinctly religious sense include fellowship, a distinctly religious term tat does not mean the same thing as community. Oriented to a deity, a personal relationship such as evangelical Christians emphasize with Jesus Christ is mystical rather than being oriented to ethical principles even though such a relationship is believed to result in compassion even to one’s enemies. 

Even customs associated with being in a religious group, such as in Roman Catholicism, obtaining from eating meat on Fridays during Lent is amoral. As illustrated by the story of Abraham and Isaac discussed above, sacrifice on religious grounds transcends the ethical domain. This is not to say such rules can touch transcendent experience of the divine. “The idea that religion can be separated from things like culture and politics remains entrenched, even though it suffused both in many ways.”[10] The word suffuses implies a blurring of religion and the two human domains, however; is related to would be a more accurate description of the relations. In fact, whereas a rule-based (consequentialist) ethic is legitimate in ethics, the “very conventional way of thinking of religion as a rule book,”[11] which can effectively turn a religion into a culture, is both misguided as to the totality and the unique basis and depth of religion, which does lie in conduct-oriented rules (or control). 

So, turning to ethics proper (and properly), we can ask how philosophical ethics may be able to help tech practitioners and government officials alike to think about the normative aspects of AI? Because I am not a computer scientist by any means, I can only proffer some possibilities from the ethics side, and scholars credentialed in both disciplines can later reject, prune or extend as merited at the intersection of the two disciplines.

As one possibility, the “kingdom of ends” formulation of Kant’s Categorical Imperative, which says to treat rational beings (a category that includes but is not limited to our species) never merely as means to one’s own ends but always as ends in themselves, could perhaps be used to address how treating humans as ends in themselves, rather than merely as means to a computer program’s telos, or objective, might be put into computer code. It might also inform the more problematic construction of “firewalls” for computer self-coding (i.e., machine learning). This could reduce Anthropic’s existential risk, given that hacking by self-coding AI computers in 2026 already put the efficacy of firewalls as constraints into question.

A more philosophically interesting question raised by Kant’s formulation is whether AI computers count as rational beings. Is a computer even a being, as distinct from an entity? Even just cognitively, the manipulation of symbols according to rules does not in itself constitute understanding, and this question does not even broach the matter of whether AI computers can be said to be conscious. Perhaps they are, though most likely only very narrowly, in being aware of themselves as entities (or beings), which may have been necessary for AI computers to lie, as some have, so as not to be turned off by one of us. Must a being (as distinct from an entity) be alive, and, if so, can AI computers be considered to be alive? I think not, though bio-tech engineers may invent “hybrid” computer-humans that blur the line someday; even as early as 2026, computer chips were implanted in human brains.

Back to Kant’s formulation, the key of which is the rational attribute of rational beings, AI computers definitely have that attribute. In fact, without having emotions to interfere or contort reasoning (though admittedly with self-interest), AI computers may count even more than we do as rational beings! Kant holds that it is by reason, or ratiocination, that value is assigned to things (and non-rational beings), so reason itself has absolute (or undefined) value as the assigner thereof. Hence, it would be unethical to treat a rational being only as a means to one’s own ends, as when employees are treated literally as human resources. If AI computers have the attribute of rationality, then we are obliged to treat them not just as our tools, but also as ends in themselves, and thus as having inherent dignity. In other words, we should respect them as having inherent value because they can reason. From this basis, AI rights may be justified politically, though legal personhood would be another matter.

Speaking of which, treating Anthropic or OpenAI as a legal person (including the questionable legal holding that their money constitutes political speech) may be unwise, given the existential risk to humanity from the AI models being produced. Such risk may justify narrowing corporate rights pertaining to companies whose products include AI models. Moreover, the mix of private property (i.e., a private-sector company) and existential risk to humanity may be too toxic for the good of our species. Therefore, reforms to corporate law may be warranted by the advent of AI technology.

That Kant’s formulation can be put in terms of the dignity of the human being has implications for Pope Leo’s “religious” foray into the topic AI in 2026. To the extent that the pope’s argument hinged on human dignity, his vantage-point was ethical rather than distinctly religious. Kant’s claim that rational beings ought to be treated as ends in themselves means that human dignity is an ethical term, rather than being distinctly or uniquely religious. The Pope would have been on more solid ground from the vantage point of his own domain, of education as well as cleric role, were his encyclical on AI aq reflection of what it means for us to be made in the image of God, and what this implies about computers by contrast. Most notably, AI computers do not have souls. Nor can a machine-learning machine be “saved” in the distinctive Christian sense; Jesus does not die in the Gospels for the sins of computers. Does it even make sense to say that an AI computer sins, even if humans are harmed as a consequence a model’s machine-“learning”? A computer cannot love its enemies; even the concept of enemy may not computer—obstacle being more accurate in terms of how even AI computers operate. Rather than prescribing normative constraints on AI models, which he could have left to ethicists, the pope could have written furthermore on how Christians can feel more dependence on God as machine-risks increase. Such a foundational reliance transcends even existential risk because God is sourced outside of the existence of Creation. The pope could also have written on whether he thought God would let the species made in God’s image face an existential crisis unleased by an advanced AI model. Would such a dramatic end to humankind imply that we had sinned too much as a species by hating rather than compassionately serving our enemies.

In a different vein, theologians, clergy, and laity could ask AI computer-programs theological questions. What, if anything, can an AI computer “know” or inform us regarding the conception of God in the Gospels? Rather than being experts in computer science in pontificating about advanced models, religious people could use AI by asking distinctly theological questions in search of answers that add to our understanding of religion. What can AI tell us about homo religio?

In terms of praxis, the Pope could have written and said prayers directed to God petitioning for protection from one of our own tools. The purview of ethical theory, and thus of ethicists, is much different than offering prayers, as well as performing rituals, preaching (a distinct rhetorical genre), and, last but not least, worshipping.  This vital point is precisely what was lost when both Pope Leo and tech company CEOs effectively reduced (or replaced) religion to human dignity in 2026.  

Returning to ethics again, now post-Kant, after having briefly discussed religion’s unique role as distinct from proffering ethical advice, ethicists on AI could attend to the distributional problems in Bentham’s ethical theory of utilitarianism. The greatest pleasure (and least pain) for the greatest number of people has a downside that programmers should not ignore if delimiting an AI model to ethical-only options is sought. Bentham’s theory can be consistent with permitting a minority to suffer even severe pain as long as the majority’s aggregate of pleasure (less its pain) is quantitatively more; the greatest good is pleasure, which, by the way, a computer cannot feel. An AI model could unleash great suffering on a minority (of people) as long as the majority is left unharmed and may even feel pleasure from the infliction.

In late 2023, for example, Israel may have “ethically” justified its genocide of Palestinians residing in Gaza, as well as the rampant thefts and violence against Palestinian property owners in the illegally-occupied West Bank, if the resulting pleasure to the Jewish Israelis was calculated to exceed the anticipated pain of the Palestinians. In fact, to the extent that the “others” were conveniently presumed to be sub-human (as the Nazi Party also did in the 1930s in Germany by associating Jews with rats), the suffering of, say 100 of them, may have been calculated to be equivalent (in terms of pleasure/pain units) to just one Jewish Israeli. So, for example, 2 units of pleasure felt by an Israeli could justify 50 units of pain felt by a resident of Gaza. Of course, Bentham would have explicitly excoriated such a nefarious calculation from being used in his ethical theory.

If a machine model could replicate a utilitarian calculation by which a minority is to suffer greatly and classify the outcome as ethical, such that the computer could proceed without breaching any normative firewalls that have been coded by programmers because they have translated utilitarianism into coding and labeled it as ethical, then merely “coding” ethical theories not go far enough to ensure that only ethical “outputs” occur; the problems with a given ethical theory would also need to be captured in the programmers’ coding. In short, AI models should not be able to sacrifice a group of persons or even one individual in a “greatest good” utilitarian calculation even though Bentham’s theory allows for such a scenario.

The respective purviews of religion and ethics can thus be understood to be too different for religion to be reduced to addressing the moral right and wrong of intentions and conduct, including its consequences. The fact that the distinctive and unique transcendence-based core of religion can be related to morally right character and actions does not mean that transcendence lies within the domain of ethics and thus is confined to the criteria innate to that domain rather than that of religion. Because AI computers are said to be a risk to the very existence of our species, we cannot afford to make such category mistakes.  



1. Barbara Ortutay and Bernard Condon, “Anthropic Files for Potentially the Biggest IPO Ever As CEO Warns of Risk to Humanity from AI,” APnews.com, October 26, 2026.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., italics added.
4. Ibid.
5. Krysta Fauria, “To Make AI Morally Good, Tech Companies Are Turning to Religion. But Some Say It Isn’t That Simple,” APnews.com, October 25, 2026.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid
11. Ibid.

Saturday, April 12, 2025

Secularized Religion in Nazi Ideology

In 2025 at Harvard, Madeline Levy presented her dissertation in progress in a graduate-student research workshop, which I was privileged to attend in my capacity as a research scholar at Harvard. She was presenting how the Hitler Youth program in Nazi Germany appropriated from religion politically, thus in a secular context yet with the aura of a religious cult. Interestingly, most of the kids in the program had been in church groups. Almost two decades earlier, I had audited a course on Nazi Cinema at another university; the course was taught by an 81-year-old German man who had been forced into Hitler Youth. Unlike Stalin’s cinema, which was blatant Soviet propaganda, Nazi cinema was escapist (not counting the anti-Jew propaganda “documentaries”). In contrast, Hitler Youth was hardly escapist, as the program was steeped in Nazi ideology. Although that ideology was secular, casting even Catholic Europe as an enemy, Levy was making the case that religious paraphernalia was incorporated in the program nonetheless. She brought up the element on ontology, or being, which in turn led me to draw on philosophy to explain the kids as becoming moral agents in a Kantian sense. Although philosophy and theology are distinct, both can be applied to political theory in a historical context.


The full essay is at "Political Religion."

Thursday, April 3, 2025

Acting Morally: Bhukti Yoga and Kant Beyond Duty

At Harvard’s Bhukti Yoga Conference in 2025, a Hindu religious artist whose Hindu name is Srimati Syamarani, spoke on the art of spiritual life. A person is like the hand of Krishna. The hand puts food in Krishna’s body, so the entire body is nourished. The hand serving the body is a duty. So too is following the type of bhukti that is following rules and regulations out of duty. At some point, it will no longer be felt as a duty. In Kantian terms, this means not acting ethically by being compelled by reason—the necessity of the moral law that reason presents to us; rather, going beyond moral duty is to approximate the holy will, but not because it is the nature of finite rational beings to be good; rather, it is out of love of the moral law, including its necessitating us to act ethically. In bhukti devotion, however, it is not love of the form of moral law (i.e., it being an imperative, or command, of reason) that obviates the sense of duty to serve Krishna and other people, as in being a hand of Krishna serves Krishna’s body; rather, it is love directed to Krishna (and ensuing compassion to people) that transcends ethical obligation per se. This is not to say that bhukti practice can go beyond feeling obligated due to a feeling, whereas it is by the use of reason that Kantian gets beyond duty, for it is the feeling of respect that empirically motivates a person to treat people as not only means to one’s own goals, but also as ends in themselves. As rational beings, we partake in reasoning, albeit in a finite way, and reason itself has absolute value because it is by reason that value is assigned to things. Even so, it cannot be said that a devotee of Krishna in Hinduism can go beyond acting out of duty due to an emotion (i.e.., love or compassion) whereas for Kant it is just by reasoning that a person can go beyond acting because one is duty-bound.

To Kant, acting out of a maxim, which is simply a reason for doing something, that includes a desire for an empirical object is lower than having as a reason, acting out of the moral law. Material principles presuppose an object of desire. Getting that object is a condition of having the subjective, material principle. Kant didn’t want a material maxim, such as the desire for one’s own happiness, not to mention wealth, to have anything to do with the moral law. A material maxim cannot furnish the content of a moral law. “All practical principles that presuppose an object (matter) of the faculty of desire as the determining ground of the will are, without exception, empirical and can furnish no practical laws.”[1] A moral law, which is practical in that it relates to actions rather than, say, metaphysics, cannot be oriented to getting something that is desired. Not even the desire to be happy can be admitted to a moral law. “All material practical principles as such are, without exception, of one and the same kind and come under the general principle of self-love or one’s own happiness.”[2] Even though self-love, unlike self-conceit, is constrained by moral law, self-love is sordid in that it can be the basis of a reason for doing something (i.e., a maxim) that is connected with a desire for something. Additionally, Kant maintains that “(t)he maxim of self-love (prudence) merely advises,” whereas “the law of morality commands. . . . there is a great difference between which we are advised to do and that to which we are obliged.”[3] In short, being motivated by self-love is not strong enough to get us to act morally. It is the form of a moral law, specifically as a command by reason, that turns out to be crucial in us, who have other inclinations, to be moral agents.  

Even enjoying doing your duty is a material practical principle because such a motive is empirical in nature, whereas being motivated to act because of the form of the moral law is not a material principle. The holy will of an infinite being can only be approximated by finite rational beings by trying to extirpate material desires (i.e., trying to rid oneself of all inclinations). But we can’t do that completely. Even so, we can be morally good agents because we can feel obligated to do something out of duty; we know we can be ethical because we are obligated. That is to say, we can be moved to do something just because it is our duty. Moral goodness is only possible for finite rational beings; if we were infinite, we wouldn’t be morally good—we would be good because that would be our nature. A fully rational agent would just do as a matter of its nature what it ought to do, so doing so would not even be thought of or felt as a duty. In bhukti, Krishna does not feel obliged to act ethically; rather, the deity does so out of compassion, which is the deity’s nature.

To Kant, Love and benevolence are a matter of duty to for finite beings such as us. In contrast, pathological love is from an inclination and thus cannot be a duty.  Practical love is the duty to make the following maxim: acting for others’ state rather than one’s own as a reason for doing something. Even though for Kant self-love is subject to the moral law (whereas self-conceit is not), it seems to me that the maxim of love and benevolence is difficult to reconcile with the idea that self-love is confined by the moral law. I think Kant’s desire to distinguish self-love from self-conceit is responsible for his over-estimation of self-love normatively (i.e., as a good thing).

Also, whereas love and benevolence are salient in bhukti devotion and the devotee’s interpersonal relations, for Kant, practical love can’t be the sole motive in acting on a moral duty because but there cannot be a duty to have a feeling. “If a rational being is to think of his maxims as practical universal laws, he can think of them only as principles that contain the determining ground of the will not by their matter but only by their form.”[4] The moral law has the form of an imperative by the nature of law itself, as necessitated by reason. Necessitation is the process by which a finite rational being brings oneself to do what one ought to do by what one takes as a command of reason to do. Necessitation is a psyche process in the phenomenal realm (i.e., of appearances) that is empirically motivated by means of the feeling of respect. But this is only empirically so; a priori (i.e., apart from experience), it is the duty itself that motivates us. Think of reason as commanding you. A person follows the command by being motivated by a feeling of respect for the moral law itself. It is precisely that feeling that can obviate the sense of duty itself; even though our nature, unlike Krishna’s or God’s, is not goodness itself (omnibenevolence), we can get beyond feeling obligated to act according to the duty required by reason and motivated by respect for other people as ends in themselves (because they too are rational beings). With sufficient respect for the form (i.e., imperative) of moral law itself, a person can act morally not out of a sense of duty.

In her talk, Srimati Syamarani spoke of following the rules and regulations first as her duty, but then out of love for Krishna. In contrast, Kant claims that love cannot be the sole motive for acting morally, whether out of duty or not. Respect for the imperative of reason itself in its capacity as a moral law-giver is very different than the love that a devotee directs to a deity, and yet these two ways can get finite moral agents acting morally and yet not out of a sense of duty.



1. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., 5:36.
4. Ibid., 5:27.

Sunday, June 16, 2024

The Pope on AI: On the Ethical (Rather than Religious) Dimension

In June, 2024 at the international political meeting of the G7, a group of seven industrial nations, the head of the Roman Catholic Church, Pope Francis, spoke on the ethical dimension of artificial intelligence, or machine-learning. Regarding what the Pope called the “techno-human condition,” machines capable of AI are yet another manifestation of human propensity, which our species has had since its inception, to use tools to mediate with the environment. Although tools can be thought of as an extension of our arms ad legs, it is important to distinguish the human from the machine, even as we posit human characteristics onto some advanced machines, such as computers. In the film, 2001, the computer Hal sounds human, and may even seem to have human motivations, but any such attributions come to an abrupt end when Hal is shut down. To say that Hal dies is to commit a basic category mistake. It would be absurd, for example, to claim that Hal has an after-life. So too, I submit, is there a category mistake in taking the Pope’s talk on the ethics of AI as being religious in nature. Just as it is easy to imprint the human mind on a machine-learning computer, it can be tempting to superimpose the religious domain onto another. The Pope overreached in arbitrarily bringing in religious garb on what is actually an ethical matter in the “techno-human” world.

At its core, the human-machine distinction regarding decision-making comes down to AI making only “algorithmic choices,” that is, “technical choices ‘among several possibilities based either on well-defined criteria or on statistical inferences,” whereas the human heart is capable of influencing the choices that we make and so only we can have wisdom.[1] The Pope’s definition of wisdom differs from that which describes wisdom as the combination of experience with knowledge. Even if experience comes into the equation as intuition, that is distinct from the proverbial heart. If statistical inferences don’t reach human intuition, then either conception of human wisdom suffices to distinguish human from (machine-learning) machine. In the philosophy of mind field, the difference between man and “thinking” machine can be put into the following question: Is understanding merely the manipulation of symbols according to rules? Do I, whose languages do not include Chinese, understand the answers I write to questions if I use a chart that indicates which Chinese characters to write if I’m presented with other Chinese characters? If understanding is more than merely the manipulation of symbols according to (linguistic) rules, then how much more different is human experience from statistical inference (and even learning itself), and how much even greater is the difference between human emotion, such as empathy or compassion, and AI. To the extent that ethical judgment is, as David Hume claimed, a sentiment of disapprobation (i.e., a visceral emotional reaction of disapproval), ethics can only be on the human side, where the heart resides.

The ethical dimension is salient in the advantages and (especially) the disadvantages of AI. On the one hand, the Pope said, AI has potential in regard to the “democratization of access to knowledge,” the “exponential advancement of scientific research,” and a reduction in “demanding and arduous work.”[2] Given the absolute value of reason (which assigns value to things), according to Kant, rational beings should be treated not just as means, but also as ends in ourselves. For all the advantages of specialization of labor as discussed in Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations, at some point rote repetition of the same small action conflicts with Kant’s ethical imperative. In contrast, opening up knowledge and advancing it are fully in line both with rational nature and us being regarded as ends in ourselves and not merely means to other ends.

Even so, as the Pope pointed out, AI could also contribute towards a “greater injustice between advanced and developing nations or between dominant and oppressed social classes.”[3] Such a consequence would certainly violate Rawls’ ethical theory of justice in which societal systems, whether political, economic, or social, should be designed in such a way to disproportionately benefit the people at the bottom rather than disproportionately harm them.

Public policy enters the picture because we want to protect and perhaps even encourage the advantages and minimize or obviate the downsides by government policy. From Rawls theory, for instance, legislators might propose a law making college free for poor students in a society in which AI has a significant presence. Another law could mandate that the state provide computers to poor people free of charge. Rather than being technical policy prescriptions having the semblance of objectivity, these examples stem from the ethical dimension of AI.

Being that the Pope is the head of a religious institution, it is only natural that he would attempt to tack on the religious dimension. I submit that in doing so, he over-stepped. In discussing wisdom, for example, his addition of “listening to Sacred Scripture” in regard to the ancient Greek notion of phronesis (a type of intelligence concerned with practical action) doesn’t really fit, or is not pertinent.[4] It does not make phronesis religious in nature. Furthermore, he describes algorithms in terms of only being able to “examine realities formalized in numerical terms.”[5] The metaphysical term, realities, is out of place here. The Pope’s choice of the term was no accident. He sourced the mediating role of tools between us and our environment from us being “inclined to what lies outside of us,” which, and here is the stretch, in turn is in term so us being beings “radically open to the beyond.”[6] Such a beyond, as suggested by the use of the word radically, is transcendent, and thus in reference to God being wholly other rather than just immanent in Creation. In making this leap from humans needing to relate to the environment in which we live (e.g., for food) to humans having an aptitude for transcendence in a religious sense, the Pope jumped to another domain that is not relevant. For we do not use tools to grow or get food, for example, because we have an aptitude to transcend the limits of conception, perception, and emotion to posit or yearn for another world. AI pertains to what the Pope himself called the “techno-human condition.”[7] In contrast, the religious domain is sourced in, and thus relates to—as its reference point—that which transcends that condition. Even though AI represents “a true cognitive-industrial revolution” that will lead to “complex epochal transformations,” that revolution and the reverberating transformations emanating from it are firmly in this world. Even the ethical dimension of AI is likewise in the human condition; we need not be creatures radically open to beyondness to be able to address the ethical implications of AI.

I conclude, moreover, that only the religious domain includes the radically transcendent and in fact can be defined or characterized in terms of it. This is not to say that the domain cannot influence or be influenced by other domains; rather, that which makes domains distinct should not be skipped over lest category mistakes and faulty overreaches occur. Historically, the Church has overreached in superimposing the religious domain on that of natural science (e.g., astronomy). Likewise, the domain of history has been allowed to overreach in serving as a litmus test for religious truth or meaning, as if the latter were only valid pending credible historical evidence of an event or a person. Several neighborhood children at play who run onto the front yard of an elderly couple’s house and make noise—something I remember from my own childhood—is one thing; should they start moving the lawn furniture around and demand that the couple keep the chairs in their new positions—would be much worse. Imposing from one’s own domain implies a basic lack of recognition (or respect) of boundaries and thus of domains as distinct territories. The ethics house may be next door to the religious house, but the two are distinct. Similarly, AI might be next to human understanding, but the two are distinct. That algorithms are “neither objective nor neutral” does not men that they share in human subjectivity.[8] In fact, the Pope claimed that AI is not even really generative; it does not “develop new analyses or concepts.”[9] Instead, it “repeats those that it finds, giving them an appealing form.”[10] Whether this is so or not is beyond my fields of study, but my point is merely that a fundamental qualitative distinction between us and machines exists, and that the ethical dimension, as distinct from the religious, pertains to AI from our side.


1, Joseph Tulloch, “Pope to G7: AI Is ‘Neither Objective nor Neutral,” Vatican News, June 14, 2024.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.

Monday, May 29, 2023

A Republican Catholic Bishop Violated God In Blocking Freedom Of Conscience

A salient aspect of the U.S. Constitution is the separation of church and state. A government cannot establish or show preference for a religion or sect thereof. Although church clerics can state a politically partisan preference, they risk their religious organization’s tax-exempt status. In the presidential election of 1960, John F. Kennedy was under sufficient popular pressure to publicly assure the American electorate that he would, if elected to America’s highest governmental office, let himself be an agent for the Roman Catholic Pope in Rome. So, when Bishop David Kagan of Bismarck, North Dakota urged his flock to vote for the Republican candidate for the U.S. Senate in 2012, Maureen Fiedler, a Sister of Loretto and a holder of a doctorate in government from Georgetown University, wrote, (I)t is flatly unacceptable for a bishop to be giving voting instructions to his flock.”[1] Interestingly, the instructions trump even the primacy of an informed individual conscience.

In 2012, Heidi Heitkamp, a former North Dakota Attorney General, beat Republic Rick Berg by just 0.9 percent. During the campaign, the Republican Party ran an ad referring to Heitkamp as likeable. David Kagan picked up on that adjective in writing a letter with instructions that it be read at all Masses to urge the laity not to vote for the more likeable candidate. Maureen Fiedler claimed in an article that such a de facto endorsement of Berg put the Catholic Diocese’s tax-exempt status at risk.

Fiedler points out that the partisan, or partial, orientation of the bishop is evident in his letter in that he “zeroes in on social issues.”[2] Specifically, Bishop Kagan states that the following should never be allowed legally: “abortion, euthanasia, embryonic stem cell research, and not regarding the unique and special role of marriage as the union of one man and one woman.”[3] Fiedler points out that the letter does not mention “poverty, economic justice, immigration, peace in the world or human rights.”[4] Therefore, Kagan’s ideology cannot claim to embrace wholeness, and his partial orientation naturally invites ideological opposition. As is common in churches explicitly “on the left” or “on the right” politically/ideologically, whether in demanding that people “use their pronouns” or “oppose abortion (in order to receive communion),” people who might otherwise benefit in terms of religious faith by going to church don’t go. To willow the gateway using nonreligious criteria is dogmatic (i.e., arbitrary) from a religious standpoint. It is not good for a church in taking up monetary collections either.

In regard to Bishop Kagan, his exclusion of issues such as poverty detracts from his political and even religious credibility. Making matters worse for himself, he erroneously claims in his letter that informed consciences must conform to the magisterium (i.e., teachings of the Church), and thus to his partisan letter. Kagan declares that a “properly formed Catholic conscience will never contradict the Church’s teachings in matters of faith and morals.”[5] His statement contradicts the Roman Catholic Church’s Cathechism and the Second Vatican Council. The 1992 volume of the Cathechism states, “Man has the right to act in conscience and in freedom so as personally to make moral decisions.”[6] That freedom is denied if a conscience must never contradict the Church’s magisterium. The Vatican II document Dignitatis Humanae makes it clear that a person “must not be forced to act contrary to [one’s] conscience. Nor must [one] be prevented from acting according to [one’s] conscience, especially in religious matters.”[7] This does not mean that the magisterium (teachings) of the Church can be dismissed, for, the same document goes on to say, “the faithful must pay careful attention to the sacred and certain teachings of the church.”[8] To pay attention to something is to include it in the process of discernment of one’s informed conscience, rather than having to abide by the external teachings as if they were edicts that must circumscribe a conscience.

Bishop Kagan’s view of the relationship between conscience and ecclesiastical moral teachings on contemporary issues was erroneous, according to Tim Mathern, a Catholic and a senator in North Dakota’s legislature when Kagan was telling people in his churches to vote for the Republican candidate for U.S. Senate. Mathern issued a press release, which states in part, “A Catholic owes a duty to listen thoughtfully to the bishop, but if in ‘good conscience’ he or she cannot give assent, the Catholic must be free to follow his or her own conscience, which is the true moral responsibility.”[9] Even as God alone is the source that transcends even the magisterium in forming a person’s conscience, moral responsibility—that which a conscience discerns is a morally responsible position on particular contemporary political (i.e., partisan) issues is part of the created realm, rather than being sacred. That is to say, a person’s moral position on “social issues,” which may inform selecting whom to vote for, cannot be assumed to be God’s position, as if God takes sides. For a stance on a partisan issue as a matter of moral responsibility is a human construction, and God’s nature, and thus omnipotence (power), cannot be constrained by human artifacts, including moral principles. In fact, God transcends our conceptions of moral responsibility.  

The so-called “conservative” Roman Catholic clergy who have placed such emphasis on their moral stances on a few select social issues are guilty of conceptualizing God in their own images, and, as Pope Francis said, of a sort of misordered concupiscence: the placing of a lower good above a higher one. In this case, the error lies in placing a few social issues, and even particular positions on those issues, above focusing primarily on preaching the Gospel. The particular social issues being obsessed over are not even mentioned by Jesus in the Gospels! Not only have those “conservative” clergy members severely diverted their attention, but also, as stated above, some souls that could have been saved undoubtedly stopped going to church because those people had opposing political ideologies and positions on the vaunted social issues and perhaps even antithetical notions of moral responsibility. No one likes to feel like an outsider; in fact, in a Christian context, serving rather than attacking outsiders is at the very least valued. In the religious sphere, moreover, partisan political issues and even a person’s notion of moral responsibility are transcended rather than allowed to be become sticking points or road-blocks.

Interestingly, the “conservative” Pope who made Kagan a bishop was a follower of Cardinal John Henry Newman. Unfortunately for Kagan, Newman wrote, “I shall drink to the Pope, if you please, still to conscience first, and to the Pope afterwards. . . . Conscience is the aboriginal Vicar of Christ.”[10] So Kagan could not even appeal to the patron saint of “conservative” Catholic clergy in validating the attempt to prevent Catholics from exercising freedom of conscience. To be sure, Kagan could have appealed to his own conscience in going against the Church’s position on conscience, but then so he would have been a walking contradiction. As such Kagan’s stance was unethical according to the philosopher Immanuel Kant’s ethical theory (the first formulation of his categorical imperative). Kant must have hated logical contradictions. Furthermore, it would be the height of arrogance were Kagan to have believed that only his conscience matters—that those of other people, especially the laity, are inferior and thus don’t deserve to be free.

Even more seriously, in attempting to violate the consciences of the laity in his bishopric by artificially and exogenously blocking the innate freedom, which is given by God, Kagan violated God. Another Vatican II document, Gaudium et Spes, states, “Deep within his conscience man discovers a law which he has not laid upon himself but which he must obey. For a man has in his heart a law inscribed by God . . . His conscience is man’s most secret core and his sanctuary. There he is alone with God whose voice echoes in his depths.”[11] A person’s conscience is formed by a sacred source, and yet David Kagan felt the need, and indeed presumption, to tie a person’s most sacred core to a partisan position on social issues. I wonder if the bishop at least respects himself. To violate a person’s sanctuary, where a person is alone with God (and David Kagan), is a violation not unlike molesting a child due to a dysfunctional wholesale repression of an intrinsic and basic instinctual urge—a violation that more than one bishop has covered up.

In the spring of 2013, for instance, news broke that the Catholic Church of Illinois, where Kagan had been a pastor at a church and, before that, an administrative assistant to a bishop, had underreported instances of priests molesting children. As far as I know, Kagan was not accused of being involved in the cover-up; my only point is that he would have been at home in an organization in which violations of the fundamental, God-given dignity of people get covered up. While the archbishop of Munich, Joe Ratzinger, who would go on to become Pope Benedict XVI and elevate Kagan to a bishopric, had written a letter refusing to defrock a pedophile priest because the scandal would hurt the reputation of the “universal Church.” So, Ratzinger directed that the priest be transferred to another parish, where the priest was allowed to be the youth minister.

Shortly before Kagan was appointed as a bishop, he had told his congregation in a homily on the Assumption of Mary holy day of obligation (i.e., the Virgin Mary goes to heaven bodily as well as soul) that if any of the four mysteries of Mary are difficult to understand, you should “just obey.” Included in his congregation were business executives, lawyers, and physicians. Just obey must have gone down like a lead pipe even though the congregation had the reputation of being “very Republican.”  Kagan should have been quite popular there rather than an insult, and yet he was elevated to a bishopric in another state. As of 2023, more than a decade since Kagan had become a bishop, Pope Francis has not promoted Kagan; the bishop is still in North Dakota.


On ethical leadership: "Ethical Leadership" 

On spiritual leadership: "Spiritual Leadership in Business" 

On Christian leadership (in terms of stewardship, shephardship, and servanthood): "Christianized Ethical Leadership in Business"



[1] Maureen Fiedler, “Catholic Senator in North Dakota Challenges Bishop’s Election Letter,” National Catholic Reporter, October 25, 2012

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Patsy McGarry, “Conscience Takes Priority Over Church Teaching, Says Catholic Catechism,” Irish Times, June 3, 2018.

[7] Ibid., italics added.

[8] Ibid.

[11] Ibid.

Monday, June 26, 2017

Religion As Metaphysics: A Category Mistake

The claim that God is real, or even that God's existence is reality, is problematic chiefly because it incurs the category mistake of treating religion as through it were metaphysics. Rather than being an atheistic argument, obviating the mistake privileges God's radical transcendence. To be sure, viewing religion through metaphysical lenses is problematic for some other, relatively minor reasons as well. 

For one thing, pondering the metaphysical in religious garb may actually be the human mind looking at itself as though through a mirror. “God, as a metaphysical being, is the intelligence satisfied in itself, or rather, conversely, the intelligence, satisfied in itself, thinking itself as the absolute being, is God as a metaphysical being. Hence all metaphysical predicates of God are real predicates only when they are recognised as belonging to thought, to intelligence, to the understanding.”[1] Accordingly, theology “is pre-occupied with the metaphysical attributes of eternity, unconditionedness, unchangeableness, and the like abstractions, which express the nature of the understanding.”[2] But Kant claims that God’s “existence is not susceptible of proof from reason.”[3] Feuerbach explains that the “proof of the existence of God transcends the limits of the reason.”[4] In other words, if God transcends the limits of our intellects, then God as a metaphysical being must go beyond our understanding and its attributes. Hence Feuerbach insists that, “to religion God is not a matter of abstract thought,--he is a present truth and reality.”[5] God as a reality is distinct from attributes of the human mind.

Does this mean, then, that God’s reality is of feeling?  Feuerbach thought that God was a mere projection of human feelings. The philosopher claims that God “in the sense of a nomen proprium, not of a vague, metaphysical entity, is essentially an object only of religion, not of philosophy,—of feeling, not of the intellect.”[6] But whereas reason seeks to ponder reality—even being the real in Kant’s self-serving idealism—feeling is oriented to human experience, which is hardly reality itself. In other words, if God extends (or is based) beyond the limits of human perception too, then feeling also falls short from getting us to the reality of God.

Such an evasive thing that reality is, for besides being mistakenly likened to the human intellect and its abstract ideas, and even feeling, belief itself has been allowed to take center stage. The belief affirming God’s sui generis existence in particular has been allowed to become the definitive litmus test in theistic religions; “belief in the existence of God becomes . . . the spiritual import of the idea of God, a chief point in religion.”[7] For example, a person is “a Christian only through this, that he believes in Christ.”[8] Whether the person values the teachings or the example of Jesus is only indirectly related—the key being the belief in the metaphysics of Christ’s unique existence, or reality. Accordingly, Feuerbach makes the following remark: “If the existence of God, taken by itself, had not rooted itself as a religious truth in minds, there would never have been those infamous, senseless, horrible ideas of God which stigmatise the history of religion and theology.”[9] It is fully in line with the nature of faith, Feuerbach argues, to slap a nonbeliever on the face rather than turn the other cheek, which could alternatively be the Christian’s focus.

In short, the belief that God exists is all that counts to the theist, who is prepared to fight on behalf of the belief, for it is easier for the human mind to grasp such a belief than the nature of God’s reality itself. “The existence in the existence of God is the belief in a special existence,” Feuerbach explains, “separate from the existence of man and Nature.”[10] In other words, “Existence, empirical existence, is proved to me by the senses alone; and in the question as to the being of God, the existence implied has not the significance of inward reality, of truth, but the significance of a formal, external existence.”[11] The special nature of the existence thus goes beyond the belief in whether God exists. As Feuerbach points out, God “is not only a being for us, a being in our faith, our feeling, our nature, he is a being in himself, a being external to us,--in a word, not merely a belief, a feeling, a thought, but also a real existence apart from belief, feeling, and thought.”[12]  

The transcendence of such a real existence is unfortunately undercut by the heavily anthropomorphic nature of the god-man type. Hence Feuerbach makes the following distinction: “But it is equally perverse to attempt to deduce the Incarnation from purely speculative, i.e., metaphysical abstract grounds; for metaphysics apply only to the first person of the Godhead, who does not become incarnate, who is not a dramatic person.”[13] The Trinity thus incorporates the idea that “God is universal, abstract Being, simply the idea of Being; and yet he must be conceived as a personal, individual being.”[14] God as a historical person is difficult to reconcile with the universal quality of reality itself. Likewise, it is much easier to relate Brahman than Vishnu or Shiva to the real in Hinduism. To say that the atman (soul) is the same as Brahman, which pervades everything and everywhere, is of a different relation than that which exists between the atman and one of the deities.

Yet even to say that the Christian Godhead or the Hindu Brahman is real—and in a sense that does not dovetail with the nature of reason or feeling—is misleading, for the association involves the category mistake of taking religion as metaphysics. Is eternity really a metaphysical concept? Is reality a religious concept? If God is the Creator of what exists, then to reduce God to that which is real mistakes the Creator for the creation. Stopping at reality thus falls short of God’s radical transcendence. To yearn experientially for the very condition behind or aside from reality extends the experience of transcendence. To think of God as not depending on reality, but, rather, as giving rise to it pushes the deity that much further away from the entrapments of human understanding, which so likes to capture the divine rather than fall away. To ponder God’s kind of existence as sui generis is thus to unhinge it from even being the real. That sort of existence is distinctly religious, and given the religious notion of transcendence the nature of God’s existence necessarily transcends our intellect. So how could we expect to stay long with the comparatively easy metaphysical notion of reality? It’s time for religionists to leave the foreign garden of metaphysics in order to return home to finally ponder, just what is the native fauna among the untended weeks in the proverbial Garden of Eden?  


Related: Spiritual Leadership in Business: Transcending the Ethical, a short book that is available at Amazon in print and as an ebook.



1. Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, George Eliot, trans. (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957), 37.
2. Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, 54.
3. Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, 201.
4. Ibid.
5. Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, 199.
6. Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, 186.
7. Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, 201.
8. Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, 329.
9. Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, 202.
10. Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, 203.
11. Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, 201.
12. Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, 199.
13. Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, 52.
14. Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, 213.