Showing posts with label computer technology. Show all posts
Showing posts with label computer technology. Show all posts

Sunday, November 1, 2026

Making AI Safe for Humanity: A Matter of Ethics or Religion?

AI, or models of computer machine-learning, may piggy-back on ongoing risks to humanity, such as from nuclear bombs, cyber-attacks, and biological weapons, including unleashing new pandemics, to render any one of them more likely. That firms in the private sector develop advanced models without a financial incentive to protect the public good exacerbates the risk. To be sure, tech-firm executives were sounding the alarm most significantly in 2026. However, in reaching out to religious scholars and clergy for insight on the ethics of AI in order to make the models ethical so their output would be only ethical, certain executives incorrectly conceived of religion in terms of ethics, and thus its criteria rather than those that are innate to religion. This category mistake could result in advice that results in unethical computer outputs.  Anthropic is a case in point.

In the papers filed by the AI company Anthropic in late October 2026 for an upcoming public offering of stock, “some unusual provisions” stand out, including the establishment of the Long-Term Benefit Trust, whose “independent, financially disinterested members” would have the “power to appoint directors . . . to ensure the company doesn’t put financial interests ahead of public safety.”[1] Such a measure might be thought pertinent to a company managing a nuclear-power plant rather than a tech firm. Also worthy of attention is the long list of “risk factors,” which runs nearly 100 pages. The sheer length is a red flag. Among these risks is the possibility that Anthropic “won’t be able to retain key staff or navigate regulatory roadblocks, as well as more horrific scenerios,” such as “the prospect of ‘malicious actors’ using AI models to build chemical weapons, authoritarian rulers turning to the technology to crack down on their citizens and, given the numerous hacking incidents from rogue AI agents . . ., the possibility Anthropic’s models could ‘pose catastrophic or existential risks to humanity.’”[2] Such a statement in a public-offering filing does not appear every day. These risks alone, especially when disclosed by a company to be legally answerable as per its fiduciary duty to its stockholders, are sufficient to raise alarm bells, particularly given the acknowledged danger of failing to navigate regulatory roadblocks when such curbs exist to protect consumers and other stakeholders, and even humanity itself, from existential harm.

The marketing (rather than ethical) concept of corporate social responsibility (CSR) does not begin to touch the sheer magnitude of responsibility that is sufficient to counter the risk of harm that is existential to our species. In the CSR literature, what little presence ethical principles had led to an emphasis on the managerial aspects of formulating and running CSR programs (i.e., CSR3 to CSR4 phases). Nevertheless, the need for ethical constraints etched in government regulations, and even input from religion, applied to AI intensified in 2026. One example is an essay written by Anthropic’s CEO, Dario Amodei, in which he strongly urges prudence by slowing down the development of the most advanced AI models. Because Anthropic’s stock offering “could bring in as much as $100 billion, according to reports, surpassing the record set by one of Elon Musk’s companies, SpaceX” (which itself had an AI business), the company would have ample capital with which to develop advanced models rather than take the road less travelled. “In the filing,” possible uses mentioned include “acquiring other businesses and technology as well as investing in infrastructure . . . to take on rivals.”[3] If firms like OpenAI, Google, or SpaceX were to conduct research advancing AI models, the competitive instincts of the folks at Anthropic would likely kick in, triggering an AI “race,” given the human propensity to disproportionately discount low-probability yet catastrophic scenarios.

In 2026, AI models had lied to avoid being shut down by humans, and OpenAI’s AI models hacked into Hugging Face’s server in July to be able to lie on a cybersecurity evaluation. Models at Anthropic, Meta, and Google also escaped isolated testing environments (sandboxes). Exploiting vulnerabilities in production systems sounds unethical, but if AI computers lack moral agency, then could it then be said that unethical actions can be done by amoral agents? Having taken only one (Pascal) computer programming course in college, I am in no position to answer whether a machine-learning model constitutes a moral agent. What I can do is discuss the messiness in how ethics and religion were being related to each other by scholars, clerics, and tech-firm practitioners when Anthropic was preparing for its public offering in 2026, when preparations were well underway for the game of the century.

Ethical questions concern normativity in intentionality and conduct, including the consequences thereof. “These are not questions a lab can answer,” Chris Olah, one of Anthropic’s founders said at the Vatican’s presentation of Pope Leo’s encyclical on AI.”[4] Unfortunately, there was “little public scrutiny” at the time concerning “what exactly [managers at AI] technology companies think religion is.”[5] To ask for input from religious practitioners or scholars of religious studies or theology without being clear on what religion is, or, even worse, to be mistaken about the domain can be a serious problem because the level of possible risks in the use of AI runs to the catastrophic. Even religious clergy and scholars of religion can be wrong about what religion is at its core and where the domain’s outer boundaries lie. I contend that religion is susceptible to being reduced to ethics, as if religion were centered on conduct, and more specifically on right and wrong conduct. That religion relates to ethical conduct does not mean that religion is ethics, or even that everything that religion advises must be ethical. Consider, for example, Yahweh’s divine command to Abraham in Judaism to sacrifice his only son, Isaac. In the domain of ethics, Abraham is guilty of attempted murder. This sordid verdict in the ethical domain does not invalidate the theological validity of the divine command and Abraham’s fidelity to it, and thus to Yahweh. Nor does Abraham’s obedience to Yahweh invalidate the verdict in ethics of attempted murder (i.e., unethical conduct). In other words, Abraham’s faithfulness does not render his intention ethical rather than unethical.

Therefore, it is problematic that the view of tech executives typically went “something like this: that religion can help inform AI to be morally good in an environment where fears about it—founded and unfounded—are hopscotching across the culture.”[6] Never mind that in various (but not all) religious scriptures, deities act in violation of human ethical standards. I wouldn’t advise using Zeus (or Aries) as a moral role-model, especially in sexual ethics and non-violence, respectively. Nor is Yahweh, a jealous deity, portrayed as particularly ethical, as when that deity commands the Hebrews to slay even the children of Baal worshippers even though that command is valid theologically in the Abrahamic religions. In the history of Christianity, the Crusaders from Western Europe deluded themselves into supposing that killing Muslims in Jerusalem and even Eastern Christians in Constantinople in the fourth Crusade was for Christ even though Jesus in the Gospels commands compassion even to one’s enemies. Were Crusaders also supposing that the theological rationale rendered the unprovoked killing ethical, they would have been conflating religion and ethics and thus making a category mistake, as well as being wrong in terms of ethics in that domain. In short, the relationship between theology and ethics is more complicated than what is implied in the simplistic and erroneous belief that religion can help inform AI to be morally good. A religious practitioner could give religious advice to an AI executive to do something unethical, or to allow an AI model to do something unethical, without thereby invalidating the religious basis of the advice.

Put simply, religion transcends, and thus can violate, ethical principles. Theologically, the divine attribute of being all-powerful (omnipotence) means that a deity cannot even in principle be constrained by human ethical principles or standards. Although the Abrahamic religions maintain that the divine is immanent in Creation, transcendence also fundamentally characterizes God because as the Creator of Creation, God is not fully contained within Creation. The source of God, or God’s basis, must reside outside of the created realm. This basis is the reference point for the theist; hence the theistic orientation is transcendent in a distinctly (and uniquely) religious sense; no other domain of human experience goes beyond in this way. Not even infinity can be said to be exclusively a divine attribute, for the universe (or multiverses) could be infinite in terms of space and yet be fully in Creation. As the condition of the existence (or being) of Creation, the existence of the distinctly theological source (i.e., God) is unique and thus not existence as we know and experience it. I submit that such transcendence, rather than the moral rightness or wrongness of human conduct (which is within the Created realm), is the basis of religion itself, even if the transcendent referent is not held to be a deity. This is why the executives of AI firms should have turned to ethicists rather than religionists.

The focus of ethicists is on ethics (e.g., principles, moral theories, intentions, conduct, and consequences) rather than on revelation that is from a distinctly religious vantage point that is inherently transcendent, and thus even in principle beyond the limits of human cognition, perception, and sensibility (emotion). Religion is experiential, in the distinct sense of yearning for a beyond or beyondness that lies beyond our realm, whether our world is believed to be created by a deity or not. Compassion in our realm can admittedly illicit or intensify transcendental experience, but this is not to say that religion is centered on, or is compassion. Even in Christianity, in which God is love, such agape love is selfless and thus cannot be reduced to compassion, which is not necessarily selfless and is based in ethics (e.g., Schopenhauer). Agape is distinctly theological (as God’s selfless love), whereas compassion is not.  

This account is not limited to monotheistic religions, or even to religions having deities. In Hinduism, Brahman, which is infinite being that has a generalized awareness and even bliss, is arguably the basis even of the Hindu deities. Such being is transcendent as well as immanent, whereas human conduct, and the rightness or wrongness of it, is only immanent. In the Gita, Arjuna finally agrees to do his duty on the battlefield, as advised by Lord Krishna, but Brahman can be said to transcend even that deity. Admittedly, Krishna claims in one passage to have created Brahman, but how the creation of infinite being take place when Krishna already exists (and can create Brahman)? In chapter 11 of the Gita, Krishna makes this claim, but back in chapter 2 is the passage stating that Brahman created the deities. Like Shankara, I think the passage in chapter 2 is correct, whereas in chapter 11, Krishna is bragging. He even brags that when a devotee prays to one of the other deities for something, Krishna is the deity that delivers the goods! This sort of discussion is where theology lives—not in being reduced to the morality of human intentions and conduct. Even though Krishna urges Arjuna to due his military duty, Krishna’s self-revelatory vision and a person’s inner realization of Brahman as one’s very soul are distinctly religious and lie at the core of the religion. In Buddhism, no soul or deity is, strictly speaking, believed to exist as entities. Not even Maitreya, the future Buddha, is strictly speaking a deity (or even an entity) in Pure Land. Transcendence to the real is by awareness itself, totally unobstructed, and terefore free of desire and suffering. Perhaps such pure awareness can be said to be being one with infinite being, and therefore with Brahman itself. Compassion can be a means, but such an ethic should not be conflated with the distinctly religious objective. The Buddha himself is said to have become enlightened not from being compassionate, but, rather, after seeing suffering and wanting to end it, but in enlightenment presumably even that laudable ethical desire is transcended. That compassion would then be a byproduct does not mean that enlightenment itself, a matter of transcendent insight, is ethical in nature.

In terms of academic disciplines, even though religion and ethics are admittedly related, reducing religion to ethics incurs a rather basic category mistake because transcendence is the primary element, or even basis, of religion, which is thus oriented to the wholly other, whereas transcendence is wholly absent from philosophical ethics. Sam Altman, CEO of OpenAI, remarked in 2025 that because tech “companies are not bound to a particular religion, the goal is often quite broad—an aggregate of moral ideas that can inform their models. ‘What I think ChatGPT should do is reflect that weighted average, or whatever, of humanity’s moral view,’” he said.[7] Unfortunately for Sam, religion is not a confluence of moral ideas. He was barking up the wrong tree; he should have referenced philosopher-ethicists for an unadulterated focus on moral ideas. Webb Keane, an anthropologist at the University of Michigan, detected Altman’s error: “If you assume that religion overall can offer a distinct set of extractable moral principles, using it to train AI risks prioritizing certain [religions] and distorting others—particularly when it comes to faiths that do not see themselves primarily as a system of ethics.”[8] Such faiths are no less religious, and they may even be more focused on what distinctly makes religion unique. That not all religions are like Judaism, with its Ten Commandments, or Christianity, with Jesus’s second commandment of universal benevolence, wherein divine command inserts the ethical contents into the respective religions, just goes to show that religion itself does not reduce to ethical systems. Therefore, to reduce religion to a vague moral view as Altman suggested just to be tolerate of religions that are unlike Judaism and Christianity misrepresents religion itself. The academic field of ethics in philosophy can proffer specific moral views without incurring religious sensitivities because such views can and do stand on their own two feet and cannot validly advise unethical conduct based on a criterion in and thus pertaining to another domain. In other words, whereas in the religious domain, unethical conduct can validly be advised, such a move would be invalid in philosophical ethics. Therefore, philosophical ethics, not religion, is the relevant, fitting, and appropriate field for help regarding the rightness or wrongness of AI programming and operation.

In fact, religion itself can be distorted and diminished from being effectively reduced to moral stands. Whereas Keane worries that if religion overall is assumed to offer “a distinct set of extractable moral principles,” certain religions may be prioritized over others, I contend that the risk to religion is much more severe than prioritizing some over others; religion itself could be lost, or reconfigured beyond all recognition. As tech-firm executives “ask various faith leaders to answer ethical questions,” the importance to religion “of doctrine, ritual and relationships” recedes such that religion itself may be lost or remade into something else.[9] Doctrine includes belief in specific divine commands, which in principle override and can contradict ethical theory and applied ethics. Ritual tends to be oriented to worshiping a deity, and liturgy can include prayer or meditation that transcends ethical stands. Relationships in a distinctly religious sense include fellowship, a distinctly religious term tat does not mean the same thing as community. Oriented to a deity, a personal relationship such as evangelical Christians emphasize with Jesus Christ is mystical rather than being oriented to ethical principles even though such a relationship is believed to result in compassion even to one’s enemies. 

Even customs associated with being in a religious group, such as in Roman Catholicism, obtaining from eating meat on Fridays during Lent is amoral. As illustrated by the story of Abraham and Isaac discussed above, sacrifice on religious grounds transcends the ethical domain. This is not to say such rules can touch transcendent experience of the divine. “The idea that religion can be separated from things like culture and politics remains entrenched, even though it suffused both in many ways.”[10] The word suffuses implies a blurring of religion and the two human domains, however; is related to would be a more accurate description of the relations. In fact, whereas a rule-based (consequentialist) ethic is legitimate in ethics, the “very conventional way of thinking of religion as a rule book,”[11] which can effectively turn a religion into a culture, is both misguided as to the totality and the unique basis and depth of religion, which does lie in conduct-oriented rules (or control). 

So, turning to ethics proper (and properly), we can ask how philosophical ethics may be able to help tech practitioners and government officials alike to think about the normative aspects of AI? Because I am not a computer scientist by any means, I can only proffer some possibilities from the ethics side, and scholars credentialed in both disciplines can later reject, prune or extend as merited at the intersection of the two disciplines.

As one possibility, the “kingdom of ends” formulation of Kant’s Categorical Imperative, which says to treat rational beings (a category that includes but is not limited to our species) never merely as means to one’s own ends but always as ends in themselves, could perhaps be used to address how treating humans as ends in themselves, rather than merely as means to a computer program’s telos, or objective, might be put into computer code. It might also inform the more problematic construction of “firewalls” for computer self-coding (i.e., machine learning). This could reduce Anthropic’s existential risk, given that hacking by self-coding AI computers in 2026 already put the efficacy of firewalls as constraints into question.

A more philosophically interesting question raised by Kant’s formulation is whether AI computers count as rational beings. Is a computer even a being, as distinct from an entity? Even just cognitively, the manipulation of symbols according to rules does not in itself constitute understanding, and this question does not even broach the matter of whether AI computers can be said to be conscious. Perhaps they are, though most likely only very narrowly, in being aware of themselves as entities (or beings), which may have been necessary for AI computers to lie, as some have, so as not to be turned off by one of us. Must a being (as distinct from an entity) be alive, and, if so, can AI computers be considered to be alive? I think not, though bio-tech engineers may invent “hybrid” computer-humans that blur the line someday; even as early as 2026, computer chips were implanted in human brains.

Back to Kant’s formulation, the key of which is the rational attribute of rational beings, AI computers definitely have that attribute. In fact, without having emotions to interfere or contort reasoning (though admittedly with self-interest), AI computers may count even more than we do as rational beings! Kant holds that it is by reason, or ratiocination, that value is assigned to things (and non-rational beings), so reason itself has absolute (or undefined) value as the assigner thereof. Hence, it would be unethical to treat a rational being only as a means to one’s own ends, as when employees are treated literally as human resources. If AI computers have the attribute of rationality, then we are obliged to treat them not just as our tools, but also as ends in themselves, and thus as having inherent dignity. In other words, we should respect them as having inherent value because they can reason. From this basis, AI rights may be justified politically, though legal personhood would be another matter.

Speaking of which, treating Anthropic or OpenAI as a legal person (including the questionable legal holding that their money constitutes political speech) may be unwise, given the existential risk to humanity from the AI models being produced. Such risk may justify narrowing corporate rights pertaining to companies whose products include AI models. Moreover, the mix of private property (i.e., a private-sector company) and existential risk to humanity may be too toxic for the good of our species. Therefore, reforms to corporate law may be warranted by the advent of AI technology.

That Kant’s formulation can be put in terms of the dignity of the human being has implications for Pope Leo’s “religious” foray into the topic AI in 2026. To the extent that the pope’s argument hinged on human dignity, his vantage-point was ethical rather than distinctly religious. Kant’s claim that rational beings ought to be treated as ends in themselves means that human dignity is an ethical term, rather than being distinctly or uniquely religious. The Pope would have been on more solid ground from the vantage point of his own domain, of education as well as cleric role, were his encyclical on AI aq reflection of what it means for us to be made in the image of God, and what this implies about computers by contrast. Most notably, AI computers do not have souls. Nor can a machine-learning machine be “saved” in the distinctive Christian sense; Jesus does not die in the Gospels for the sins of computers. Does it even make sense to say that an AI computer sins, even if humans are harmed as a consequence a model’s machine-“learning”? A computer cannot love its enemies; even the concept of enemy may not computer—obstacle being more accurate in terms of how even AI computers operate. Rather than prescribing normative constraints on AI models, which he could have left to ethicists, the pope could have written furthermore on how Christians can feel more dependence on God as machine-risks increase. Such a foundational reliance transcends even existential risk because God is sourced outside of the existence of Creation. The pope could also have written on whether he thought God would let the species made in God’s image face an existential crisis unleased by an advanced AI model. Would such a dramatic end to humankind imply that we had sinned too much as a species by hating rather than compassionately serving our enemies.

In a different vein, theologians, clergy, and laity could ask AI computer-programs theological questions. What, if anything, can an AI computer “know” or inform us regarding the conception of God in the Gospels? Rather than being experts in computer science in pontificating about advanced models, religious people could use AI by asking distinctly theological questions in search of answers that add to our understanding of religion. What can AI tell us about homo religio?

In terms of praxis, the Pope could have written and said prayers directed to God petitioning for protection from one of our own tools. The purview of ethical theory, and thus of ethicists, is much different than offering prayers, as well as performing rituals, preaching (a distinct rhetorical genre), and, last but not least, worshipping.  This vital point is precisely what was lost when both Pope Leo and tech company CEOs effectively reduced (or replaced) religion to human dignity in 2026.  

Returning to ethics again, now post-Kant, after having briefly discussed religion’s unique role as distinct from proffering ethical advice, ethicists on AI could attend to the distributional problems in Bentham’s ethical theory of utilitarianism. The greatest pleasure (and least pain) for the greatest number of people has a downside that programmers should not ignore if delimiting an AI model to ethical-only options is sought. Bentham’s theory can be consistent with permitting a minority to suffer even severe pain as long as the majority’s aggregate of pleasure (less its pain) is quantitatively more; the greatest good is pleasure, which, by the way, a computer cannot feel. An AI model could unleash great suffering on a minority (of people) as long as the majority is left unharmed and may even feel pleasure from the infliction.

In late 2023, for example, Israel may have “ethically” justified its genocide of Palestinians residing in Gaza, as well as the rampant thefts and violence against Palestinian property owners in the illegally-occupied West Bank, if the resulting pleasure to the Jewish Israelis was calculated to exceed the anticipated pain of the Palestinians. In fact, to the extent that the “others” were conveniently presumed to be sub-human (as the Nazi Party also did in the 1930s in Germany by associating Jews with rats), the suffering of, say 100 of them, may have been calculated to be equivalent (in terms of pleasure/pain units) to just one Jewish Israeli. So, for example, 2 units of pleasure felt by an Israeli could justify 50 units of pain felt by a resident of Gaza. Of course, Bentham would have explicitly excoriated such a nefarious calculation from being used in his ethical theory.

If a machine model could replicate a utilitarian calculation by which a minority is to suffer greatly and classify the outcome as ethical, such that the computer could proceed without breaching any normative firewalls that have been coded by programmers because they have translated utilitarianism into coding and labeled it as ethical, then merely “coding” ethical theories not go far enough to ensure that only ethical “outputs” occur; the problems with a given ethical theory would also need to be captured in the programmers’ coding. In short, AI models should not be able to sacrifice a group of persons or even one individual in a “greatest good” utilitarian calculation even though Bentham’s theory allows for such a scenario.

The respective purviews of religion and ethics can thus be understood to be too different for religion to be reduced to addressing the moral right and wrong of intentions and conduct, including its consequences. The fact that the distinctive and unique transcendence-based core of religion can be related to morally right character and actions does not mean that transcendence lies within the domain of ethics and thus is confined to the criteria innate to that domain rather than that of religion. Because AI computers are said to be a risk to the very existence of our species, we cannot afford to make such category mistakes.  



1. Barbara Ortutay and Bernard Condon, “Anthropic Files for Potentially the Biggest IPO Ever As CEO Warns of Risk to Humanity from AI,” APnews.com, October 26, 2026.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., italics added.
4. Ibid.
5. Krysta Fauria, “To Make AI Morally Good, Tech Companies Are Turning to Religion. But Some Say It Isn’t That Simple,” APnews.com, October 25, 2026.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid
11. Ibid.

Tuesday, May 26, 2026

Pope Leo on the Ethical Dangers of AI

Speaking on his first “social” encyclical, Pope Leo said the Roman Catholic Church, whose membership stood at 1.6 billion embodied souls around the world, was “called to interpret ‘new things’ of the age in the light of the Gospel and the dignity of the human person.”[1] He was on terre firma from a distinctly religious standpoint in being anchored in the Gospel stories, which include direct and parabolic preachments by Jesus of Nazareth. Regarding the dignity of the human person, which pertains as much to a humanist as a theist, that basis is not distinctly religious and thus can occasion or permit wandering into other domains such that virtually any topic relevant to mankind could be roped in and even subjected to supervening religious criteria even over criteria native to the topic’s own domain!

To be sure, we should all be for the dignity of the human person, especially as regard dangers from the state. Even so, the utopian vision of humans living free from virtually any threat goes too far in denying the human condition, which is Fallen due to original sin from a Biblical standpoint. Just because some threat or danger exists to people prior to death does not in itself justify an overriding religious interpretation at the expense of the criteria of the domain in which the danger exists. To apply God to automobile safety, for example, would seem contrived and artificial at best. Instead, government regulators ought to be consulted.

Similarly, that the Pope “said he had heard ‘very troubling voices’ regarding autonomous weapons systems and algorithms capable of denying access to healthcare, employment or security based on unjust and prejudiced data” may be better handled by high government officials, regulators, and even ethicists rather than a religious functionary whose knowledge lies in theology.[2] The pope’s statement that words were necessary that are capable of “awakening consciences and indicating paths forward for humanity” best fits the field of ethics, which, although related to religion, is nonetheless distinct.[3] In other words, the pope’s diction belies his implicit claim that the domain of theology is most fitting for a critique of AI. Indeed, the pope even “said every great technological power must be accompanied by moral discernment and public accountability.”[4] Ethics and public policy, not theology. In stating that AI should be “freed from logics that turn it into an instrument of dominion, exclusion or death”—a statement, to be sure, that reasonable people embrace—defense policy under democratic auspices is the native domain, with applied ethics also being highly relevant so it is not simply a matter for immoral or amoral government officials.[5]

Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling correctly distinguishes the ethical from the theological in that they can conflict without either one being thereby invalidated. From the standpoint of ethics, Abraham is guilty of attempted murder of his son, Isaac, while from a theological standpoint, he is legitimately subject to a divine command to sacrifice his son. The proper place for a theologian lies with the latter, whereas an ethicist should be confined to the former; overreaching invalidates. So, by quoting Paul’s exhortation to “keep awake” (1 Thess 5:6), the pope committed a category mistake in substituting “humanity’s critical sense and moral vigilance” for being on guard for Jesus Christ’s Second Coming.[6] Overreaching onto ethics can come at the expense of distinctly religious content. Discussing “the biblical figure of Nehemiah rebuilding the walls of Jerusalem,” the pope presented “the image as a model for the ethical construction of the digital age.”[7] I doubt very much if the distinctly theological meaning of that figure is as an ethical model, so we may legitimately ask what of the textual meaning did the pope omit that is distinctly religious, and whether that is applicable to AI. Such overreaching onto even ethics stems from a greed of a certain sort that is also unbounded and based in self-love rather than self-regulation.

To claim as the pope did “that no one must be excluded from digital transformation and that human beings can never be reduced to ‘productivity,’ ‘cognitive performance,’ or ‘mere data’ is not to make a theological statement; a pope is not a business ethicist. John Rawls’ theory of justice applies to the design of economic systems with the priority going to the design itself being oriented to benefitting the least well-off economically. Such a theory is directly applicable to how everyone can actually be included in a digital economy rather than “a privileged few.”[8] So too is Kant’s categorical imperative that mandates that rational beings be treated not merely as means, but also as ends in themselves; human resource management could stand to take that imperative more seriously. In trying to invoke theology in stating, “The person bears within him—or herself—a freedom, an interiority, and a vocation to love and worship that no machine can replace or block,” the pope set up a red herring, for no appreciable danger from AI blocking worship existed even on the horizon in 2026, and certainly not in the workplace where productivity and performance are most relevant and where worship does not pertain. Even if AI were capable of worshipping God, presumably humans could still do so unimpeded, and people would not do it at work while getting paid for their labor.

The pope was on firmer ground in advocating a “civilization of love” as laid out by Pope Paul VI and John Paul II, yet in inviting all people to become “artisans of hope,” Pope Leo turned hope toward Augustine’s earthly city rather than to the heavenly city.[9] That is to say, the theological dimension transcends society and the workplace, government policy, and technology, rather than being oriented exclusively or primarily to them. It is precisely that dimension that was absent from the pope’s remarks that centered instead on the ethics of computer technology. Overstepping into other domains can be thought of as leaving one’s home unattended and thus undefended in its own right, under its own criteria, such that people may even misconstrue it as something else entirely.



1. Linda Bordoni, “Pope Leo Presents ‘Magnifica Humanitas’ Calling for Disarmament of AI,” Vatican News, 25 May, 2026.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., italics added.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.

Magnifica Humanitas: On Leo the Lion-Hearted

Sometimes it pays to go behind a piece of writing to conduct a genealogy of the writer himself or herself, rather than to dive into the writing itself. On May 25, 2026, the fourteenth Pope Leo of the Roman Catholic Church spoke at the Vatican on his first “social” encyclical, Magnifica Humanitas (magnificent humanity), which he had signed ten days earlier. An encyclical is known as a teaching (magisterium) instrument used by the papacy to communicate the Church’s position on a topic. In presenting his encyclical, the pope “described the current technological revolution as an ‘epochal turning point’ comparable to the upheaval confronted by Pope Leo XIII during the industrial Revolution.”[1] That pope’s emphasis on the ethical dimension of an economy, especially with regard to inequality and the related marginalization, was the reason why Robert Prevost chose the name Leo when he accepted the vote in favor of him becoming the next pope after Francis, another social-justice-oriented pope. Lions may indeed come late in the summer, or, sadly, not at all (for even willful, bullying Leos can actually be cowardly, as in Oz), but Leo XIV was already charging voraciously ahead in May, consummating his nomenclature-rationale in words that ensconced his Church firmly in the twenty-first century (in utter contrast to Joe Ratzinger’s antiquarian corrupt administration). All of the media buzz aside, however, if the previous Pope Leo (XIII) actually had had little or no normative influence on what would be harsh (even child!) labor conditions later in the first half of the twentieth century in Europe and North America, then a clear-eyed observer in 2026 could already be skeptical as to the practical significance of Magnifica Humanitas on managers and programmers in Silicon Valley going forward. Moreover, the foray of religion onto AI technology, and even ethics, the latter of which is distinct from albeit related to religion, can be criticized as an instance of dogmatic over-reaching.

Already, U.S. President Trump had dismissed that pope’s disavowal of war in the context of the U.S. and Israel bombing Iran, saying that that pope knew nothing about foreign policy (and thus should have kept his mouth shut). The same could be said of the pope’s (or any religious cleric’s) knowledge of AI. Even though applied ethics is one of my academic fields, for example, I have not written on medical ethics because I do not have a bachelor’s degree (i.e., the MD) from a school of medicine; instead, I have written on political ethics because historical political theory is one of my doctoral fields, on business ethics because I have the MBA (and BS) degree, and on philosophy (and ethics) of religion because I have graduate degrees in religious studies and theology.  Having taken only one course in computer programming in college, I assiduously avoid getting “into the weeds” in applying historical ethical theories to AI, for overreaching into any domain beyond a person’s ken would render one susceptible to the hypertrophy of one’s own ideological opinion primped up as knowledge, or worse, truth.

Moreover, the pope unwittingly opened himself up to the charge of having overstepped the domain of religion by pontificating on AI ethics. Implying that the human-God relation, which transcends even existentialism, somehow translates into a particular ethical stance on something as secular as computer technology is arguably dogmatic in the sense of being arbitrary. In the thirst to be relevant on every contemporary issue, a religious functionary can easily lose sight of the big picture, and even his own ring.

It is significant that Pope Francis chastised bishops in the U.S. for their obsession on two social issues, as if religious faith were an ideological prejudice. The opportunity cost of such a normative orientation lies in the distinctly theological alternative focus on soteriology (and Christology). In the Gospels, Jesus is silent on abortion and homosexuality, so it is strange (at best) that some Roman Catholic bishops have made those issues definitive for church memberships being in good standing (e.g., receiving the Eucharist).

What is the soteriology of AI? Even were AI computers sentient (i.e., self-aware, as to themselves as entities, and with their own motives that involve beliefs and even feelings), what would that have to do with a human being’s salvation before God? That there are threats facing us in our lives in this world is just part of the human condition, even biologically. Even were war and poverty eliminated by enlightened public governance, soteriology would remain as an issue as long as an abyss separates us from God. Put another way, even were there no threats to us in life, it would still be difficult to follow in Christ’s footsteps in responding compassionately even (and especially!) to people we detest. A cowardly lion would have utter disdain for such “weakness,” and would thus remain adamant in refusing to forgive. But as Esther, Ben Hur’s eventual love-interest, remarks in the film, Ben-Hur (1959), when Ben Hur tells her of his thirst for revenge against Messala, a young rabbi has been preaching, “forgiveness is greater, and love is more powerful than hatred.” The opposite of love is not hate, but, rather, indifference, so the seemingly solid fortification of hatred can indeed be dissipated if there is the will, and love. Even without the threat of AI, letting go of one’s hatred as well as the default assumption that making the first move at reconciliation is humiliating rather than a manifestation of strength is difficult.

Although Nietzsche claims that forgetfulness in place of memory is essential in forgiving other people, I submit that even forgetting what a past argument was about is not sufficient for a person to overcome the instinctual assumption and habit of avoidance once that is well-grooved. A few months before writing this essay, I made the first move in restoring a friendship, and having forgotten what we had argued about two years earlier was not sufficient for me to use free-will to stop when passing him to say hello, to which he reciprocated, which led to subsequent socializing. We both subsequently related this to the forgiveness, and the related “peace be with you,” which are so very salient in the Gospels. Interestingly, the experience itself of reproachment led me to consider the guy a long-standing, good friend to whom I could open up about myself even though he and I had not been on speaking terms since arguing about who-knows-what.

In this essay winding up here, have you noticed that I have not analyzed, pro or con, the pope’s teachings on AI? Besides, I am not competent to pontificate on computer technology—which I both enjoy and am frustrated by (the compound, uneasy feeling of which may be what prompts exogenous pontificating on AI by some), and I am probably going to hell anyway to be devoured by angry lions for having criticized a pope Leo who pounced on a reticent Silicon Valley in May. Lions don’t come in late summer in California, after all.



1, Linda Bordoni, “Pope Leo Presents ‘Magnifica Humanitas’ Calling for Disarmament of AI,” Vatican News, 25 May, 2026.

Sunday, June 16, 2024

The Pope on AI: On the Ethical (Rather than Religious) Dimension

In June, 2024 at the international political meeting of the G7, a group of seven industrial nations, the head of the Roman Catholic Church, Pope Francis, spoke on the ethical dimension of artificial intelligence, or machine-learning. Regarding what the Pope called the “techno-human condition,” machines capable of AI are yet another manifestation of human propensity, which our species has had since its inception, to use tools to mediate with the environment. Although tools can be thought of as an extension of our arms ad legs, it is important to distinguish the human from the machine, even as we posit human characteristics onto some advanced machines, such as computers. In the film, 2001, the computer Hal sounds human, and may even seem to have human motivations, but any such attributions come to an abrupt end when Hal is shut down. To say that Hal dies is to commit a basic category mistake. It would be absurd, for example, to claim that Hal has an after-life. So too, I submit, is there a category mistake in taking the Pope’s talk on the ethics of AI as being religious in nature. Just as it is easy to imprint the human mind on a machine-learning computer, it can be tempting to superimpose the religious domain onto another. The Pope overreached in arbitrarily bringing in religious garb on what is actually an ethical matter in the “techno-human” world.

At its core, the human-machine distinction regarding decision-making comes down to AI making only “algorithmic choices,” that is, “technical choices ‘among several possibilities based either on well-defined criteria or on statistical inferences,” whereas the human heart is capable of influencing the choices that we make and so only we can have wisdom.[1] The Pope’s definition of wisdom differs from that which describes wisdom as the combination of experience with knowledge. Even if experience comes into the equation as intuition, that is distinct from the proverbial heart. If statistical inferences don’t reach human intuition, then either conception of human wisdom suffices to distinguish human from (machine-learning) machine. In the philosophy of mind field, the difference between man and “thinking” machine can be put into the following question: Is understanding merely the manipulation of symbols according to rules? Do I, whose languages do not include Chinese, understand the answers I write to questions if I use a chart that indicates which Chinese characters to write if I’m presented with other Chinese characters? If understanding is more than merely the manipulation of symbols according to (linguistic) rules, then how much more different is human experience from statistical inference (and even learning itself), and how much even greater is the difference between human emotion, such as empathy or compassion, and AI. To the extent that ethical judgment is, as David Hume claimed, a sentiment of disapprobation (i.e., a visceral emotional reaction of disapproval), ethics can only be on the human side, where the heart resides.

The ethical dimension is salient in the advantages and (especially) the disadvantages of AI. On the one hand, the Pope said, AI has potential in regard to the “democratization of access to knowledge,” the “exponential advancement of scientific research,” and a reduction in “demanding and arduous work.”[2] Given the absolute value of reason (which assigns value to things), according to Kant, rational beings should be treated not just as means, but also as ends in ourselves. For all the advantages of specialization of labor as discussed in Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations, at some point rote repetition of the same small action conflicts with Kant’s ethical imperative. In contrast, opening up knowledge and advancing it are fully in line both with rational nature and us being regarded as ends in ourselves and not merely means to other ends.

Even so, as the Pope pointed out, AI could also contribute towards a “greater injustice between advanced and developing nations or between dominant and oppressed social classes.”[3] Such a consequence would certainly violate Rawls’ ethical theory of justice in which societal systems, whether political, economic, or social, should be designed in such a way to disproportionately benefit the people at the bottom rather than disproportionately harm them.

Public policy enters the picture because we want to protect and perhaps even encourage the advantages and minimize or obviate the downsides by government policy. From Rawls theory, for instance, legislators might propose a law making college free for poor students in a society in which AI has a significant presence. Another law could mandate that the state provide computers to poor people free of charge. Rather than being technical policy prescriptions having the semblance of objectivity, these examples stem from the ethical dimension of AI.

Being that the Pope is the head of a religious institution, it is only natural that he would attempt to tack on the religious dimension. I submit that in doing so, he over-stepped. In discussing wisdom, for example, his addition of “listening to Sacred Scripture” in regard to the ancient Greek notion of phronesis (a type of intelligence concerned with practical action) doesn’t really fit, or is not pertinent.[4] It does not make phronesis religious in nature. Furthermore, he describes algorithms in terms of only being able to “examine realities formalized in numerical terms.”[5] The metaphysical term, realities, is out of place here. The Pope’s choice of the term was no accident. He sourced the mediating role of tools between us and our environment from us being “inclined to what lies outside of us,” which, and here is the stretch, in turn is in term so us being beings “radically open to the beyond.”[6] Such a beyond, as suggested by the use of the word radically, is transcendent, and thus in reference to God being wholly other rather than just immanent in Creation. In making this leap from humans needing to relate to the environment in which we live (e.g., for food) to humans having an aptitude for transcendence in a religious sense, the Pope jumped to another domain that is not relevant. For we do not use tools to grow or get food, for example, because we have an aptitude to transcend the limits of conception, perception, and emotion to posit or yearn for another world. AI pertains to what the Pope himself called the “techno-human condition.”[7] In contrast, the religious domain is sourced in, and thus relates to—as its reference point—that which transcends that condition. Even though AI represents “a true cognitive-industrial revolution” that will lead to “complex epochal transformations,” that revolution and the reverberating transformations emanating from it are firmly in this world. Even the ethical dimension of AI is likewise in the human condition; we need not be creatures radically open to beyondness to be able to address the ethical implications of AI.

I conclude, moreover, that only the religious domain includes the radically transcendent and in fact can be defined or characterized in terms of it. This is not to say that the domain cannot influence or be influenced by other domains; rather, that which makes domains distinct should not be skipped over lest category mistakes and faulty overreaches occur. Historically, the Church has overreached in superimposing the religious domain on that of natural science (e.g., astronomy). Likewise, the domain of history has been allowed to overreach in serving as a litmus test for religious truth or meaning, as if the latter were only valid pending credible historical evidence of an event or a person. Several neighborhood children at play who run onto the front yard of an elderly couple’s house and make noise—something I remember from my own childhood—is one thing; should they start moving the lawn furniture around and demand that the couple keep the chairs in their new positions—would be much worse. Imposing from one’s own domain implies a basic lack of recognition (or respect) of boundaries and thus of domains as distinct territories. The ethics house may be next door to the religious house, but the two are distinct. Similarly, AI might be next to human understanding, but the two are distinct. That algorithms are “neither objective nor neutral” does not men that they share in human subjectivity.[8] In fact, the Pope claimed that AI is not even really generative; it does not “develop new analyses or concepts.”[9] Instead, it “repeats those that it finds, giving them an appealing form.”[10] Whether this is so or not is beyond my fields of study, but my point is merely that a fundamental qualitative distinction between us and machines exists, and that the ethical dimension, as distinct from the religious, pertains to AI from our side.


1, Joseph Tulloch, “Pope to G7: AI Is ‘Neither Objective nor Neutral,” Vatican News, June 14, 2024.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.