Showing posts with label love. Show all posts
Showing posts with label love. Show all posts

Friday, December 26, 2025

The Scarlet and the Black

In the film, The Scarlet and the Black (1983), Gregory Peck and Christopher Plummer face off as Monsignor Hugh O’Flaherty and Col. Herbert Kapper at the end of the film when the Nazi head of police in Rome abruptly changes his tune in challenging the Catholic priest no longer by threats, but by appealing to the priest’s faith of humble compassion applied even to one’s enemies so O’Flaherty will extend mercy to Kapper’s wife and children, who would otherwise fall into the hands of the Allied troops advancing into Rome. Before that dialogue, O’Flaherty and Pope Pius XII subtly debate whether the pope had been right in compromising with Hitler in order to keep the Catholic Church intact in Nazi Germany. The film can thus be viewed in light of the potential of the medium of film to convey and even thrash out contending theological ideas.


The full essay is at "The Scarlet and the Black."

Thursday, December 25, 2025

Pope Leo’s First Christmas Message: On International Relations

That severe, systematic inflictions of suffering on whole peoples were going on in the world even on Christmas Day in 2025 did not require a papal announcement for people the world over to be informed of those atrocities. Russia’s military incursion in Ukraine and Israel’s genocide in Gaza had been going on with international impunity for years. The suffering in Yemen and Sudan was less well-known, but substantial nonetheless. Speaking out against the sordid state-aggressors on the first Christmas of his pontificate, the pope provided an alternative basis for international relations that is so antithetical to military invasion and genocide that the message could seem utopian and thus practically of no use whatsoever. Because “might makes right” had made such unimpeded “progress” even in becoming the default and status-quo, the principle of humble compassion to the humanity to one’s detractors and even outright enemies could seem like a fairy tale. 

Nevertheless, even though the principle was so utterly eclipsed in practice on the world’s stage at the time, a person can have faith that even enunciating the alternative has value. At the very least, making it explicit shows powerful people such as Russia’s Putin and Israel’s Netanyahu in an especially dark light. Ironically, were either of those men to come to terms with themselves and change their ways, the principle would call the rest of us to forgive them. Even absent such a change-of-heart, or a dawning of heart in those two men, the principle mandates that the rest of us respond in humane compassion even to those two men on an interpersonal level should either of them need help. Such is the depth of power of the principle that it can be reckoned as inculcating what can be called divine nature even if the principle is not anthropomorphized in human form; the principle has validity, and thus value, in itself. So even if it seems utterly unrealistic for it to become the default in international relations (and even interpersonal relations), there is value in the pope’s inclusion of the principle in his first Christmas message.

In his Christmas Day homily, Pope Leo “remembered the people of Gaza, ‘exposed for weeks to rain, wind and cold’ and the fragility of ‘defenseless populations, tried by so many wars,’ and of ‘young people forced to take up arms, who on the front lines feel the senselessness of what is asked of them, and the falsehoods that fill the pompous speeches of those who send them to their deaths.’”[1] The infliction of genocide, and even such suffering as to qualify as a holocaust, on a defenseless civilian population that had been subjugated for many decades, render Israel’s Netanyahu government and its supports equivalent to the Nazis in Europe almost a century earlier. The very language used by the pope, as in “the pompous speeches of those who send them to their deaths” could definitely be applied to Hitler and Netanyahu.

The sheer depravity of such powerful men who have allowed their respective hatreds to manifest in atrocities without any internal restraint is antipodal to a person who “would truly enter into the suffering of others and stand in solidarity with the weak and the oppressed.”[2] It is paradoxical that such outwardly powerful, militaristic government officials are actually so weak internally, whereas people who are willing to defer “before the humanity of others”—even and especially detractors and even enemies—may have no worldly force yet are very strong internally.[3] 

Therefore, it is of value for anyone, especially a pope with a microphone, to set the stubborn savagery of men like Putin and Netanyahu relative to a principle that, if internalized and acted on by enough people, would change the world even though the likelihood of such a drastic, fundamental change is only possible rather than probable. Being possible is itself astonishing, given the fixity of human nature. Worldwide, peoples and their respective government officials in 2023 failed to retain the lesson that had presumably been learned when the Nazi holocaust was exposed in 1945. Standing by rather than going in to rid Gaza of the Israelis and even Ukraine of the Russian army can be reckoned as instantiating the banality of evil, which is two degrees of separation from the principle of humble compassion for the humanity of others, especially one’s enemies. The world, and humanity itself—our species—can thus be condemned for standing by instead of stopping at least the holocaustic genocide that had been going on for years as of Christmas, 2025.



1. Silvia Stellacci and Colleen Barry, “Pope Leo XIV Urges the Faithful on Christmas to Shed Indifference in the Face of Suffering,” APnews.com, December 25, 2025.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.

Friday, December 19, 2025

The Apocalypse

In the film, The Apocalypse (2002), the Apostle John is a prisoner at an island-prison because he is a Christian. He is having visions of heaven in the last of days and Valerio, another prisoner is dutifully writing what John dictates so various church congregations can know of John’s revelations. He is esteemed so much by other Christians that he feels pressure to steer them to God’s truth. Too much esteem, I submit, is being directed to John, as he is, as he admits, only a human being, though he does get caught up in his own direct access to God, as in being able to know the will of God. This is a temptation for any religionist, especially religious leaders. Although subtly, the film conveys John’s over-reaches though without having another character explicitly refer to them as such.


The full essay is at "The Apocalypse."

Sunday, December 7, 2025

Hope Gap: A Critique of Institutional Religion

Organized or institutional religion as the Roman Catholic Church is in the background in the 2019 European film, Hope Gap. Even with such names as Grace and Angela, religious connotations are present. In fact, the film can be interpreted, at least in part, as a critique on religion in general and Catholicism in particular. The medium of film can indeed play a vital role in critiquing sacred cows from the vantagepoint of an oblique angle or a safe distance.


The full essay is at "Hope Gap."

Tuesday, October 28, 2025

The Crow

Considering the amount of screentime devoted to raw violence, it may come as a surprise that The Crow (1994) is actually about love. Not that the film is about an abusive romantic relationship, for the respect that is necessary for love is instantly expunged as soon as violence enters into the equation. The infliction of violence is a manifestation of self-love in the sordid sense of self-idolatry, rather than of love that is directed to other people. So, it may be difficult to fathom how violence can serve love, and even be a manifestation of love, as The Crow illustrates.


The full essay is at "The Crow."

Wednesday, August 27, 2025

Mary

The film, Mary (2024), is pregnant with intimations of the theological implications of her unborn and then newly born son, Jesus. That story is of course well-known grace á the Gospels, and the theology of agape love associated with that faith narrative is at least available through the writings of Paul and many later Christian theologians. What we know of Mary is much less, given that her role in the Gospels is not central even though the heavy title, Mother of God, has been applied to her without of course implying that she is the source of God. The film, like the magisterium of the Roman Catholic Church has done, endeavors to “evolve the myth” by adding to Mary’s story even though the additions are not meant to be taken as seriously as, for example, the Catholic doctrine that Mary is assumed bodily into heaven. The movie comes closest to the magisterium in suggesting that Mary’s birth is miraculous; the magisterium holds that Mary is born without sin, and that Jesus inherited this because of the Incarnation (i.e. God, rather than Joseph, impregnates Mary). Suffice it to say that the perception of myth as static is the exception rather than rule; it is natural for the human mind to work with myths such that they can evolve rather than take them as given in a final form or extent. This is not to say that we should focus on the faith narratives as if they were ends in themselves and thus unalterable; rather, as the film demonstrates, religious transcendence is of greater value.


The full essay is at "Mary."

Monday, July 7, 2025

Hypocrisy in Institutional Religion

Religion plays a prominent role in the film, Lykke-Per, or A Fortunate Man (2018). On the surface, Peter Sidenius, a young engineer, must navigate around an old, entrenched government bureaucrat to secure approval for his ambitious renewable-energy project. The two men clash, which reflects more general tension that exists everywhere between progressives and conservatives regarding economic, social, religious, and political change. Although pride may be the ruin of Peter and his project, the role played by religion is much greater than pride manifesting as arrogance, if indeed it is arrogant to stand up to abuse of power, whether by a government bureaucrat or one’s own father.


The full essay is at "A Fortunate Man."

Thursday, April 3, 2025

Acting Morally: Bhukti Yoga and Kant Beyond Duty

At Harvard’s Bhukti Yoga Conference in 2025, a Hindu religious artist whose Hindu name is Srimati Syamarani, spoke on the art of spiritual life. A person is like the hand of Krishna. The hand puts food in Krishna’s body, so the entire body is nourished. The hand serving the body is a duty. So too is following the type of bhukti that is following rules and regulations out of duty. At some point, it will no longer be felt as a duty. In Kantian terms, this means not acting ethically by being compelled by reason—the necessity of the moral law that reason presents to us; rather, going beyond moral duty is to approximate the holy will, but not because it is the nature of finite rational beings to be good; rather, it is out of love of the moral law, including its necessitating us to act ethically. In bhukti devotion, however, it is not love of the form of moral law (i.e., it being an imperative, or command, of reason) that obviates the sense of duty to serve Krishna and other people, as in being a hand of Krishna serves Krishna’s body; rather, it is love directed to Krishna (and ensuing compassion to people) that transcends ethical obligation per se. This is not to say that bhukti practice can go beyond feeling obligated due to a feeling, whereas it is by the use of reason that Kantian gets beyond duty, for it is the feeling of respect that empirically motivates a person to treat people as not only means to one’s own goals, but also as ends in themselves. As rational beings, we partake in reasoning, albeit in a finite way, and reason itself has absolute value because it is by reason that value is assigned to things. Even so, it cannot be said that a devotee of Krishna in Hinduism can go beyond acting out of duty due to an emotion (i.e.., love or compassion) whereas for Kant it is just by reasoning that a person can go beyond acting because one is duty-bound.

To Kant, acting out of a maxim, which is simply a reason for doing something, that includes a desire for an empirical object is lower than having as a reason, acting out of the moral law. Material principles presuppose an object of desire. Getting that object is a condition of having the subjective, material principle. Kant didn’t want a material maxim, such as the desire for one’s own happiness, not to mention wealth, to have anything to do with the moral law. A material maxim cannot furnish the content of a moral law. “All practical principles that presuppose an object (matter) of the faculty of desire as the determining ground of the will are, without exception, empirical and can furnish no practical laws.”[1] A moral law, which is practical in that it relates to actions rather than, say, metaphysics, cannot be oriented to getting something that is desired. Not even the desire to be happy can be admitted to a moral law. “All material practical principles as such are, without exception, of one and the same kind and come under the general principle of self-love or one’s own happiness.”[2] Even though self-love, unlike self-conceit, is constrained by moral law, self-love is sordid in that it can be the basis of a reason for doing something (i.e., a maxim) that is connected with a desire for something. Additionally, Kant maintains that “(t)he maxim of self-love (prudence) merely advises,” whereas “the law of morality commands. . . . there is a great difference between which we are advised to do and that to which we are obliged.”[3] In short, being motivated by self-love is not strong enough to get us to act morally. It is the form of a moral law, specifically as a command by reason, that turns out to be crucial in us, who have other inclinations, to be moral agents.  

Even enjoying doing your duty is a material practical principle because such a motive is empirical in nature, whereas being motivated to act because of the form of the moral law is not a material principle. The holy will of an infinite being can only be approximated by finite rational beings by trying to extirpate material desires (i.e., trying to rid oneself of all inclinations). But we can’t do that completely. Even so, we can be morally good agents because we can feel obligated to do something out of duty; we know we can be ethical because we are obligated. That is to say, we can be moved to do something just because it is our duty. Moral goodness is only possible for finite rational beings; if we were infinite, we wouldn’t be morally good—we would be good because that would be our nature. A fully rational agent would just do as a matter of its nature what it ought to do, so doing so would not even be thought of or felt as a duty. In bhukti, Krishna does not feel obliged to act ethically; rather, the deity does so out of compassion, which is the deity’s nature.

To Kant, Love and benevolence are a matter of duty to for finite beings such as us. In contrast, pathological love is from an inclination and thus cannot be a duty.  Practical love is the duty to make the following maxim: acting for others’ state rather than one’s own as a reason for doing something. Even though for Kant self-love is subject to the moral law (whereas self-conceit is not), it seems to me that the maxim of love and benevolence is difficult to reconcile with the idea that self-love is confined by the moral law. I think Kant’s desire to distinguish self-love from self-conceit is responsible for his over-estimation of self-love normatively (i.e., as a good thing).

Also, whereas love and benevolence are salient in bhukti devotion and the devotee’s interpersonal relations, for Kant, practical love can’t be the sole motive in acting on a moral duty because but there cannot be a duty to have a feeling. “If a rational being is to think of his maxims as practical universal laws, he can think of them only as principles that contain the determining ground of the will not by their matter but only by their form.”[4] The moral law has the form of an imperative by the nature of law itself, as necessitated by reason. Necessitation is the process by which a finite rational being brings oneself to do what one ought to do by what one takes as a command of reason to do. Necessitation is a psyche process in the phenomenal realm (i.e., of appearances) that is empirically motivated by means of the feeling of respect. But this is only empirically so; a priori (i.e., apart from experience), it is the duty itself that motivates us. Think of reason as commanding you. A person follows the command by being motivated by a feeling of respect for the moral law itself. It is precisely that feeling that can obviate the sense of duty itself; even though our nature, unlike Krishna’s or God’s, is not goodness itself (omnibenevolence), we can get beyond feeling obligated to act according to the duty required by reason and motivated by respect for other people as ends in themselves (because they too are rational beings). With sufficient respect for the form (i.e., imperative) of moral law itself, a person can act morally not out of a sense of duty.

In her talk, Srimati Syamarani spoke of following the rules and regulations first as her duty, but then out of love for Krishna. In contrast, Kant claims that love cannot be the sole motive for acting morally, whether out of duty or not. Respect for the imperative of reason itself in its capacity as a moral law-giver is very different than the love that a devotee directs to a deity, and yet these two ways can get finite moral agents acting morally and yet not out of a sense of duty.



1. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., 5:36.
4. Ibid., 5:27.

Tuesday, March 18, 2025

Transcendence in Hindu Bhakti

Edwin Byrant, a scholar of Hinduism who spoke at the Bhakti Yoga conference based at Harvard in March 2025, discussed the transcendence that is in bhukti devotion to a Hindu deity, such as Krishna. Such transcendence can end a person’s transactional approach in trying to please a deity in exchange from beneficial grace from the deity’s love. Both the steps and definitions of bhakti reveal the salience of transcendence in loving devotion to a deity.

The steps of Bhakti Yoga begin with a person recognizing one’s own suffering. We want to put an end to our own suffering. The first step is to recognize that there is a higher power: a power higher than oneself. There is order in the cosmos, so there must be a higher power that is ordering the universe. We are naturally self-centric, but we should be able to recognize that we are not the cause of the order of the universe. Therefore, the recognition of a higher power—an intelligence that is omnipotent—includes an acknowledgement that none of us is that higher power. The next stage is surrendering to it. Then, a person can look to the higher power manifesting in one’s life. Ultimately, love is the gift that comes from the outside. When it is given, then the transactional element is ended; the person forgets oneself in loving a deity. The focus is on trying to attract the deity’s grace. As such grace is transcendent, and thus beyond our power and knowledge, and thus our efforts to please, we can only attempt to attract a deity’s attention and get lost in the loving itself.

Transcendence can be gleamed too from definitions of Bhakti. The Sanskrit word, bhakti, is a verbal noun (i.e., something you do): an action that connects. In the Bhakti Sutras, several definitions are given. They boil down to seva, which loosely translates as service. It is to try to please. It is not selfish.  So, bhakti includes engaging in acts to please the other. To purify the selfishness and please the beloved. Minds can only manifest thoughts, and this is not sufficient to know how to please an entity that is transcendent. Part of surrendering is acknowledging our limitations.  So, we look to religious experts, such as gurus, and religious texts, such as the Puranas and the Bhagavad-Gita, on which a guru should be based, for even gurus are human, all too human.

By its very nature, transcendence goes beyond the limits of human cognition and perception, so even a succinct, well-organized explanation or account of transcendence itself or that which is posited as transcendent should be recognized as limited. For example, it may not be clear how surrender to a higher power implies or even is compatible with devotional love, at least from the perspective of the world in which we live. Such utter dependence as a creature such as Man can recognize in one’s relation to the Creator, which is the basis even of existence itself, may involve or admit a distinctly theological love that is qualitatively different than interpersonal love, which is based in social psychology. This is not to claim that the former kind of love cannot relate to the latter—only that the former cannot be derived from the latter. We may be so used to projecting the love we feel in our own realm onto the love that a deity has and that we may direct to a deity that we could scarcely recognize or even conceptualize of distinctly theological love. It would follow that any definition of bhakti can only be provisional, and yet any given definition is improvable. Transcending transactionalism, for example, is just part of the process in coming to terms with what Hindu bhakti really is, as sui generis rather than projected devotional love.


Comparative Devotionalism: Hinduism and Christianity

I suspect that many people would feel very uncomfortable watching a religious person express devotional love to that person’s chosen deity in a very emotional and effusive manner. The sheer emotional intensity amid the dancing and chanting in a Hare Krishna temple can be daunting to a visitor. The phenomenon of what in Hinduism is called bhukti is hardly rare, and this begs the question of whether there is a human instinctual urge to feel and express even lifelong loving devotion to an entity that is not based in the created realm and thus cannot be realized and instantiated as another human being can be and is. Whether there is a phenomenon that is human, thus beyond the manifestations in various religions can go a long way in answering the question of whether an innate instinctual urge exists, even if it is more pressing in some people than in others. Some people, for instance, work their whole life in business, while other business practitioners reach a certain point in years when they “check out,” and head to a divinity school or seminary. Still other people assume religious vocations as young adults and spend the rest of their life ministering to people and officiating at religious rituals. Some people spend their entire life without feeling devotional love directed to a deity, while other people, such as the Hindu mystic, Ramakrishna, are utterly consumed by the inward fire of religious devotion. Was Ramakrishna’s devotion different in kind from a Christian’s intense love of Jesus, or is there what can be termed a human bhakti phenomenon, and if so, is it capable of breaking down religious barriers that can excite animosity and even hatred?

Jess Navarette, speaking at Harvard’s Bhakti Yoga conference in March, 2025, discussed comparative Bhakti by looking at Hindu and Christian parallels. Bhakti yoga is the practice of loving devotion. There is a coherent thread back to the Vedas, and devotion to Krishna is salient in several of the chapters of the Bhagavad-Gita. In chapter 7 alone, Krishna tells Arjuna, “Here (now), O son-of-Pritha, how, [with] the mind attached to Me, engaged in Yoga, [with] Me as refuge, you may know Me fully, without doubt.”[1] Taking refuge is other than epistemological (i.e., knowing), as dependence is involved. Furthermore, Krishna says that people who act meritoriously and for “whom evil has come to an end” are those who “worship” Krishna rather than the other deities.[2] Because the early-medieval Hindu theologian and philosopher Shankara claims that even in the Gita, achieving the realization that one’s self (atman) is identical to brahman, which is being itself and is conscious or aware, it is important to stress that Bhakti devotion to a deity involves more than just knowing the deity’s higher nature; loving devotion, such as is evinced in worshipping a deity, is the essence of bhakti.

Although it is problematic to apply the Hindu term bhakti to other religions, such as Christianity, just as applying the word “God” to brahman is also problematic, devotion to a deity is in other religions besides Hinduism, and by looking at the similarities, the phenomenon of religious devotion can be better understood because the artifacts of particular religions can be distinguished from the trans-religious phenomenon itself. This, by the way, is an excellent reason for studying comparative religion or theology, though such an orientation comes with the opportunity cost of the foregone benefits of specializing in one religion.

One such bhukti parallel pertains to Jesus washing the disciples’ feet[3] and Krishna washing Sudama’s feet.[4] Both Lord Jesus and Lord Krishna commend service by leading by example. Also, both highlight the closeness of God and the intimacy that is possible in loving devotion.  Finally, both passages imply the personal care and attention that the Son of God and Lord Krishna give to humans, who should thus be humble (and grateful) in return, for such care and attention is voluntary.

Another parallel of devotion to God pertains to Judaism and Christianity, and this similarity will lead us to back to making Hindu-Christian comparisons. Deuteronomy 6:5 says, “Love the Lord your God with all your heart, soul, and strength” and Matthew 22:37-40 says, “Love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your mind. This is the first and greatest commandment. And the second is like it: Love your neighbor as yourself.” Although the latter extends love to interpersonal relations, both passages are very direct in issuing the imperative that devotional love is to be directed to God. Of the thought of Gregory of Nyssa (4th century), Navarette wrote, “The perfection of human nature consists in being united with God by a kind of devotion which leads the soul to love Him above all things.”  Furthermore, Francis of Assisi’s prayer includes “to be loved as to love.”

It may that in the Hindu Gita, love itself is not so explicitly mentioned by Krishna, whereas taking refuge in and worshiping Krishna are more explicitly demanded, yet this does not mean that devotional love is not much desired by Krishna in the Gita as by the Christian God. Rather, it may be the case that Christianity builds on the passage in Deuteronomy to be known as the religion of love, hence both Paul and Augustine wrote that God is love. Devotion is to be directed to pure (agape) love itself. Is this the epitome of bhukti, or is the Hindu articulation really all that different from being devoted to love personified (or as an entity, rather than impersonal), especially considering the example of Ramakrishna in the nineteenth century?  After all, as a Hindu devotee of Kali the goddess of death, Ramakrishna was so authentically and lovingly devoted to her that a brahmin priest let Ramakrishna speak extemporaneously during a ritual. His devotion to Kali was certainly no less than that of Thérèse of Lisieux and that of Gertrud of Helfta to the Christian Lord Jesus. Both women were cloistered Christian nuns; at the very least they had few distractions, so they could devote themselves entirely to being devoted in love to Jesus.

Taking refuge in Krishna is not so far off, and, as stated above, it is more emotional than knowing Krishna’s higher nature epistemologically. It may be that the intimacy itself (e.g., high trust) that is inherent in taking refuge in a deity is none other than love, as in the old expression, where there’s smoke, there’s fire; or, taking refuge could be in terms of ontological dependence that is a micro reflection of the fact that creation is dependent on Krishna’s creative force. Perhaps in teasing out the relationship between love and radical dependence, taking refuge in Krishna can be compared with the bridal imagery that has been so often appropriated by Christian mystics—nuns being known as brides of Christ. Certainly historically, there has been much interpersonal and societally-structured dependence in the marriage relationship between a husband and a wife; presumably love has existed in at least some of those relationships in spite of the dependence of (especially pregnant) wives on their respective “bread winners.”

Origen of Alexandria (185-254 CE) wrote on the Song of Songs of the Old Testament, treating the religious poem as an allegory of the relationship between the soul and God. According to Navarette, for Origin “the bride symbolizes the soul, while the bridegroom represents Christ”, and the objective is to “cultivate an intimate relationship with the Divine.”  In his presentation, Navarette also cited Bernard of Clairvaux, who, in his book, On Loving God, advances the idea that, according to Navarette, “besides reverence, there is the intimacy such that a bride has with her bridegroom.”  For Bonaventure too, “to attain God includes the imagery of a bride and bridegroom.” Similarly, Ramakrishna thought of himself as married to Kali, and to be married to the goddess of death is no small commitment. Moreover, how could any loving devotion of a creature such as Man not involve radical dependence, for neither in Hinduism nor in Christianity does a divinity need to create a world out of some kind of lack in the divine itself.

Even though Christianity’s core is that God itself is (selfless) love, love devoted to Krishna is certainly salient in the devotionalism. Even so, devotional love being directed to love itself (agape) does seem to be a good candidate to be known as the epitome of bhakti. This is not to say that Christian devotionalism is superior to Hindu bhakti; rather, it is to raise the thought, what if Krishna’s higher nature were exclusively love itself? Would that change how devotion to Krishna is to be interpreted in the Gita and practiced by bhukti practitioners?

In his presentation, Navarette discussed the work the scholar, Francis Clooney, who pioneered the field of comparative theology. Navarette cited Clooney’s contention that “even partial common ground can strengthen our own religious convictions.” Perhaps Krishna’s description of devotion to Him can be useful to a Christian who is trying to love Jesus better. Moreover, in Hindu God, Christian God, Clooney, according to Navarette, predicts that the “fixed boundaries separating religions become all the less plausible . . . because the theological insights arising in comparative study will push those boundaries.” For example, Clooney claims that a Christian could accept the virtues of Narayana, who is the protector of all who has supreme mercy.[5] Sounds a lot like Jesus, doesn’t it? Preaching God’s mercy instead of drumming divine wrath into everyone’s heads in the Gospel stories, Jesus can be seen as a reformer in Judaism. To be sure, unrepentant sinners, such as “Christian” clergy who rape children, deserve divine wrath, but this should not prevent other people from realizing that divine mercy opens up the possibility of love, which presumably includes that which a religious devotee directs to a deity. Given the ontological chasm between deities and the created realm, which includes us, mercy opening up a space for love can create the sort of intimacy that collapses distance, and this can apply not only vertically, but also as benevolentia universalis.



1. Gita 7.1 in Georg and Brenda Feuerstein, The Bhagavad-Gita: A New Translation (Boston: Shambhala, 2011), p. 171.
2. Gita 7.28 in Ibid., p. 177.
3. John 13:1-17 (in The New Testament).
4. Bhagavata Purana, tenth canto 80:20-26.
5. Vedanta Desika, Rahasya Traya Saram (14th century).

Monday, February 3, 2025

Witchcraft as a Religion

If ever there were a mistaken title for a movie, Bell, Book and Candle must rank in the upper tier, for the spells in the bewitching comedy hinge on a cat and a bowl rather than bell, book, and candle. Magic can be thought of as the making use of concrete objects, combined with words, to engage a supernatural sort of causation meant to manipulate sentient or insentient beings/objects for one’s own purposes.  The film, Bell, Book and Candle (1958), is not only a love story and a comedy, but also the presentation of a story-world in which witches and warlocks engage in contending spells for selfish reasons. That story-world in turn can be viewed as presenting a religion, which can be compared and contrasted with others. Most crucially as far as religion is concerned, the supernatural element that is observable in the story-world points to the existence of a realm that lies beyond the world of our daily lives and thus renders the film’s story-world different. Put another way, the unique type of causation, which appears only as coincidence to the characters who are not in on the existences of witches and warlocks in the story-world, transcends appearance because the “laws” of the causation operate hidden from view, as if in another realm. I contend that it is precisely such transcendence not only in terms of belief, but also praxis, that distinguishes the domain of religion as unique and thus distinct from other domains, including those of science (e.g., biology, astronomy), history, and even ethics.


The full essay is at "Bell, Book, and Candle." 

Wednesday, November 13, 2024

Transcending Seductive Masks of Eternity: Thérèse of Lisieux

Marie Martin (1873-1897), known to the world as the Carmelite nun, Thérèse of Lisieux as well as Thérèse of the Child Jesus and the Holy Face, was a mystic who centered her devotional love on Jesus. Pope Pius X called her “the greatest saint of modern times”[1] and Pope John Paul Il made her a doctor of the Roman Catholic Church. Nevertheless, it is worth investigating whether her devotional love sublimated (i.e., looking upward) with Jesus as the object of the love was in fact humble, and thus more like divine than human love. Although psychological analyses of Thérèse exist in the secondary literature on her, we can both acknowledge her psychological challenges and put psychological couch aside as it is exogenous to the domain of religion, which has its own criteria; I will focus on and critique from a religious standpoing the distinctly religious meaning that Thérèse continues to provide in the West during the twenty-first century even though the wider secular culture in the West saturates modernity under the supervision of the tall, steel, and bewindowed edifices to wealth and worldly power.

Although her mother’s death when Thérèse was four was deeply felt by the little girl, and she may have suffered from mental illness at least as a child, the religious meaning that can be grasped from her mystical devotion to Jesus is nonetheless valid in religious terms. This is not to say that the trauma of losing her mother did not leave an imprint on her religious faith. She wrote, for example, of a dream in which she sees the “glance and smile [which are] FILLED with LOVE” of Venerable Anne of Jesus, the Foundress of Carmel in France, whom Thérèse refers to as “Mother” both in the dream and in writing about it later.[2] Thérèse also refers to the Church as “my Mother.”[3] The other side of the mother-equation is of course the child. Writing to her Prioress at the convent, Thérèse states, “I am acting with you as a child because you do not act with me as a Prioress but a Mother.”[4] The instinctual need for a mother was doubtlessly very much in play. The mother-daughter leitmotif is also salient in the following: “You have told me, my dear Mother, of your desire that I . . . . I began this sweet song with your dear daughter, Agnes of Jesus, who was the mother entrusted by God with guiding me in the days of my childhood.”[5] Thérèse is not referring to her literal childhood, even though she entered the convent when she was a teenager; rather, she has sublimated from her unmet psychological need to describing and inhabiting a spiritual relation that is a microcosm of the relationship between a creature, such as Man, and the Creator, which is God. Thérèse refers to heaven in the dream being “peopled with souls who actually love me, who consider me their child.”[6] She obviously did not mean this in the sense of being a corporeal daughter. She also wrote, “O Blessed Inhabitants of heaven, I beg you to ADOPT ME AS YOUR CHILD.”[7] That she uses capital letters to highlight being adopted spiritually as a child in heaven leaves no doubt both as to the salience of the child motif in her mind, and of the distinctly spiritual meaning that she applied to the word.

Rather than psychoanalyze the young adult who lost her mother so early, I want to draw on her book to explore the unique connotations that the child motif has in Christianity, which is in opposition to the values in the  earthly city. “The heart of a child does not seek riches and glory (even the glory of heaven),” she wrote.[8] To be sure, her focus in applying the child motif was not on differentiating Augustine’s two cities. Rather, she was describing what a creature is like relative to God. Distinctively and valid religious meaning is possible even amid disturbing psychological issues; the former is not invalidated by the presence of the latter. “I am only a child, powerless and weak,” she wrote.[9] Elsewhere in her text, she highlights that she is a “poor little weak creature.”[10] This is of course relative to God. From creatures being little and weak, Christianity goes on to postulate certain qualities. On July 17, 1897, Thérèse wrote, “I feel that my mission is about to begin, my mission to make God loved as I love Him, to teach souls my little way.”[11] Of that way, she adds, “It is the way of spiritual childhood, the way of trust and absolute surrender.”[12] There is a certain innocence and willingness to trust in a childlike nature that is innately suited to entering the Kingdom of God. Writing of children whom she had known, Thérèse refers to “the souls of little children” as already having “the theological virtues” and being “innocent.”[13]

Speaking on Thérèse in 1921, Pope Benedict XV said, “In spiritual childhood is the secret of sanctity for all the faithful of the Catholic world” so as to “enter wholeheartedly into the Little Way which led Sister Thérèse to the summit of heroic virtue.”[14] The pope made reference to the Christian scriptures, such as in the Gospel of Matthew (18:3-4), where Jesus says, “Amen, I say to you, unless you be converted and become as little children, you shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven. Whoever, therefore, shall humble himself as this little child, will be greatest in the kingdom of heaven.” In the Gospel of Mark (10:14-5), Jesus says, “Allow the little ones to come to me and forbid them not, for such is the kingdom of heaven. Amen, I say to you, whoever shall not receive the kingdom of God as a little child shall never enter into it.”[15] In teaching her “little way,” however, Thérèse had drawn instead on text from the Old Testament, including, “Whoever is a little one, let him come to me” (Proverbs 9:4), “For to him that is little, mercy will be shown” (Wisdom 6:7), and “As one whom a mother caresses, so will I comfort you; you shall be carried at the breasts, and upon the knees they shall fondle you” (Isaiah 66:12-3).[16]

Thérèse did not mean childhood in the sense of being selfish and not assuming responsibility. It is in this sordid sense that Thérèse wrote, “It was December 25, 1886, that I received the grace of leaving my childhood, in a word, the grace of my complete conversion” because “Jesus desired to show me that I was to give up the defects of my childhood and so He withdrew my innocent pleasures.”[17] Referring to one such defect, she wrote, “My excuse is that I am a child, and children do not reflect on the meaning of their words.”[18] Paradoxically, Jesus made her as like a child in another way: “I felt charity enter into my soul, and the need to forget myself and to please others,” she later wrote.[19] Rather than selfish childishness, losing oneself in pleasing others—in Thérèse’s case, converting grave sinners—rendered her anew as a child of God. From selfishness to losing oneself is not, however, something I would associate with children. Moreover, although pleasing others is better than selfishness, the distinctly theological love (i.e., agape) that Jesus exemplifies (and ultimately is) can hardly be characterized as people-pleasing.

Thérèse applied the positive qualities of a child to denote her inferiority in her love-relation with Jesus, and more to the point, that she was a mere creature whereas he is God. It is in coming from a subordinate position that, when “Jesus saw that the time had come for me to be loved, He entered into a covenant with me and I became His own.”[20] She even draws in the mother motif: “To be Your Spouse, to be a Carmelite, and by my union with You to be the Mother of souls, should not this suffice me?”[21] She even brings in the child motif, for she also viewed herself as “the Child of the Church and the Church is a Queen since she is Your Spouse, O divine King of Kings.”[22] Rather than intimating incest, she was using possession to denote the extent of difference between a creature and its Creator. “O Jesus, Your little bird is happy to be weak and little,” she wrote.[23]

Thérèse is also implying that Jesus’ love is superior to her own even in her capacity as a devotee of Jesus rather than of wealth or earthly power. She broadly sketches the distinctive nature of Christian divine love in writing, “Because I was little and weak He lowered Himself to me, and He instructed me secretly in the things of His love.”[24] Him lowering, or humbling himself, rather than being all high and mighty to someone who is weaker, constitutes the things of his love, and thus can be construed, moreover, as the self-emptying, agape love that God evinces in the Incarnation—that is, in God lowering itself to become joined (but not mixed) with earthly flesh in the person of Jesus Christ. The nature of God, which is divine love, gets poured into a human vessel without mixing with it. The theme of God’s love as humble rather than self-exalting carries through to how it is revealed. In the Gospels, Jesus says, “I thank thee, Father, that thou hast hidden these things from the wise and the prudent and revealed them to babes.”[25] Thérèse saw herself as such a babe. But did she love as Jesus loves or as people typically love? Was she really a child spiritually?

I contend that her piety was belied to a considerable, but not complete, extent by the epistemological arrogance of a creature presuming to know God and see God as it really is. In this way, Thérèse did not evince the innocence of a spiritual child and did not love as Jesus loves, for spiritual arrogance and agape love are antipodal. I submit that a mystic’s devotional love (i.e, caritas) is susceptible to the sin of pride because of the infusion and thus inclusion of eros and the likeness of the beloved to our world even in anthropomorphic terms. Beloved masks of eternity can thus be the final obstacle to further transcendence. If enough people master this insight in thoughts and worship, humanity would see a leap in the development of humaniry with respect to religion in the world comparable to the leap from animal sacrifice to the realization that religion has an interior aspect that antiquates the prior belief that gods demand animal sacrifices as a means of atonement for the sins of humans.

It is a mistake to assume that having an interior spirituality renders the divine within our grasp as creatures. Thérèse made this mistake. She wrote, “As the Imitation says, God communicates Himself at times in the midst of great splendor or ‘gently veiled, under shadows and figures.’[26] It was in this way He deigned to manifest Himself to our souls, but how light and transparent the veil was that hid Jesus from our gaze!”[27] In describing a vision she had of Anne, the founder of the order, Thérèse wrote, “The Carmelite raised her veil or rather she raised it and covered me with it.”[28] I submit that Paul and Augustine had been more accurate and less presumptuous, given the inherent limitations of finite, mortal creatures as qualitatively distinct from their Creator, which is wholly other, in characterizing the veil as more like a window darked by smoke, such as we can imagine from incense and candles in a Church. “Doubt was impossible, faith and hope were unnecessary,” Thérèse continues, “and Love made us find on earth the One whom we were seeking.”[29] Although Paul had written that without love, faith is for naught, to relinquish faith and doubt regarding that of God is to make a category mistake regarding belief and knowledge in regard to that which goes beyond the limits of human reason, perspective, and emotions. In writing, “Yes, Jesus did all this for me,” Thérèse demonstrates epistemological (i.e., about knowledge, and the reaches thereof) arrogance.[30]

Hyperextended epistemological certainty of divine matters runs throughout Thérèse’s book. One instance is especially revealing. After her Christmas conversion, when she prayed for Pranzini, a prisoner on death’s row, she was certain that God would show her a sign of Pranzini’s last-minute piety, because she “was absolutely confident in the mercy of Jesus.[31] Reading of Pranzini kissing a crucifix while he was on the scaffold to be hanged, Thérèse was certain that Jesus had answered her prayer. David Hume would retort that Thérèse had actually committed the naturalistic fallacy, wherein an instance of positive correlation, such as two things occurring in a temporal relation, is erroneously assumed to involve causation (i.e., that one thing caused the other).

Another implication is in line with William James’ criticism of a thirteenth-century nun, Gertrud of Helfta. James wrote of that mystic’s view of God as being “full of partiality for his individual favorites,” including Gertrud.[32] Although I have argued that criticism is not applicable to Gertrud, it is ripe by the time we get to Thérèse. Writing both of when she walked down the stairs like a queen on Christmas, having just been transformed by Jesus from fear to joy, and later, when Jesus mystically made her his own: “Then I became beautiful in His eyes and He made me a mighty queen,” Thérèse depicts herself as among Jesus’s favorites.[33] Humility belied by religious superiority over other people is evident in her statement regarding what Jesus did for her: “Because I was little and weak He lowered Himself to me, and He instructed me secretly in the things of his love. Ah! had the learned who spent their life in study come to me, undoubtedly they would have been astonished to see a child of fourteen understand perfection’s secrets . . .”[34] To understand perfection esoterically can be likened to having the divine attribute of omniscience, or perfect knowledge. Even the learned would indeed come to such a person, though in the Gospels the learned Jews generally are averse to Jesus and his message.

Even though Thérèse admits that she was little and weak (and thus unworthy), the scent of arrogance wafts over her assumptions of being a queen and of superiority over older, learned Christians. She even extends the value (i.e., superiority) to include her “spiritual sister,” Céline, destined by Jesus “as the privileged one of His love!”[35] In writing to another nun, Thérèse observes, “How fortunate we are, dear sister, to understand the intimate secrets of our Spouse,” which is Jesus.[36] She makes the esoteric knowledge of the Gnostics look like front-page material of a well-circulated newspaper. Also, the exclusiveness of being married to Jesus is evident, as if that extent of union with the divine would not apply to anyone who loves distinctively in line with benevolentia universalis extended even and especially to one’s detractors and those who one regards as low, or outside. In the Gospel of Mark, the strangers catch on to Jesus’ message while his disciples don’t, and, moreover, Jesus says in Matthew (19:30; 20:16), Mark (10:31), and Luke (13:30) that the first are last and the last are first, and it is the meek whom Jesus says in his Sermon on the Mount will inherit the earth.[37]

Thérèse may have been in denial regarding the current undercutting her own intent to be humble. Rather than attribute this psychologically to the “nervous” illness that Thérèse had as a child or even the fact that her father referred to her as his “little Queen,”[38] it is more efficacious when in the domain of religion (rather than science) to focus on the distinctly religious meaning of divine, self-emptying love (agape) as it runs up against the sin of pride in a spiritual dynamic that does not reduce to psychology. Unlike all other domains, that of religion includes the belief and experiential yearning for a reference point that transcends the limits of human cognition, perception, and, yes Augustine, even emotion, as Pseudo-Dionysius argued in the sixth century. Similarly, Thérèse wrote, “I feel it is quite impossible for the human tongue to express things that the human heart can hardly understand.”[39]

Even though the religious meaning in Thérèse’s statement, “I wanted to love, to love Jesus with a passion, giving Him a thousand proofs of my love while it was possible,”[40] is laudatory, Jesus as Thérèse’s favorite mask of eternity may have paradoxically been the most intractable obstacle facing her to a more transcendent mystical experience of the divine as wholly other—as including mysterium. As David Hume claims in The Natural History of Religion, the human brain has difficulty holding onto divine simplicity, not to mention that which is utterly mysterious, for long without lapsing back to the familiarity of anthropomorphic masks. Her ultimate mask was Jesus, whose underlying paradigm is, “the heaven of our soul, made to His image, the living temple of the adorable Trinity!”[41] Rendering the divine in such familiar terms as a deity to whom a devotee can apply marital connotations to the relationship runs the risk of rendering the divine in human, all too human terms. Doing so unintentionally elevates the human being (and our realm) in religious terms, and thus may be partly why Thérèse unintentionally succumbed to spiritual arrogance.

This is not to say that no viable role exists in a person’s religiosity for divine form or religious ideas about God; much comfort can be had in devotion to a deity that has an easily-relatable form similar to those that inhabit our daily lives. Feeling love and directing the feeling to a personified ideal, as if to a tableau writ large, not only counts as extant love, but also puts the focus on the love itself, whether directly in being conscious of loving or indirectly in focusing on Jesus as essentially love. Ideally, however, the focus could be on theological love itself, unembodied and thus without distractions that are too familiar to be resisted by the mind.

My claim is that reality, and especially the source of reality, transcends even such masks of eternity because those masks compromise on the divine’s wholly other quality, which is to say that God, in not being bound by Creation, is qualitatively different, even in how being an "entity" applies. In short, devotional love is itself laudable, even though it is not the limit of religious experience. The mystic who stops at one’s favorite mask under the illusion that it is solid rather than a semi-permeable membrane can be seen as stopping needlessly short in yearning for the divine, which in Christianity is agape love itself. That is the ultimate value, and the real presence felt internally and yet still sought after in Christianity. Perhaps—just maybe—Thérèse unconsciously sensed on some level that even devotionally loving Jesus can be surpassed in spiritual terms: “Ah! Jesus, pardon me if I am unreasonable in wishing to express my desires and longings which reach even unto infinity,” she wrote.[42] Longing is a good word for yearning, and applied infinitely, the yearning for must itself be beyond the limits of human cognition, perception, and emotion. Interestingly, Thérèse wrote of her “measureless desires” (for God) in conjunction with raising the question of whether there is “PURE LOVE in my heart?”[43] Such love can be construed as self-emptying, wholly other divine agape rather than eros-related, anthropomorphic caritas love.

The instinctual-urge of the human brain to construe things in familiar terms, such as a deity being embodied in a familiar form, must contend with the distinctly spiritual instinct of the brain to transcend even its own limits in experiencing yearning for a distinctly religious object that is immanent yet transcendent and thus wholly other. The strength of the latter instinct doubtlessly varies, perhaps in part genetically. Even in those people in whom the gene is salient, it tends to be undercut by the former instinct of the brain to hang anthropomorphic ornaments on the tree of divine simplicity. Thérèse can be interpreted as illustrating that this undercurrent can be strong even under a strong riptide of water on the surface pulling her off-shore into the beyond. She is galvanized by her urge to love her Spouse, and yet her yearning is infinite and thus can go beyond even the face of God to its very nature, which, unlike the content of a mystical vision, is without limit. The questions I would ask Thérèse are: What of God lies beyond the contents of your visions and dreams and thus is not captured in them? How is theological love distinct from the various ways in which humans love?  For she asks, “How can I realize the desires of my poor little soul?”[44] She then unwittingly answers her own question. “To satisfy me I need all.” On the one hand, this sounds utterly human, all too human; on the other hand, it could intimate the urge in yearning as that of transcending ad infinitum, and thus beyond the alluring, familiar masks of eternity that may say more about us than God. Thérèse wanted a vicarious mother because her actual mother died of breast cancer so early. Deeper still, in spite of having a loving father, she desperately wanted to be loved, and Jesus fit that bill.

In approaching God with erotic-sourced love, or caritas, as Augustine did (drawing on the sublimated eros in Plato’s Symposium) and nuns such as Gertrud of Helfta and Thérèse of Lisieux also did as mystical devotees of Jesus, the distinctive, qualitatively different sort of love that is theological in type may go unrecognized. Like a garden’s native fauna long hidden by the overgrowth of exogenous weeds from other gardens, the distinctly theological love can easily be overlooked ironically in the garden of religion. Even devout mystics could stand to do some weeding.

To be sure, Thérèse was definitely onto something transcending her devotion to Jesus in understanding “that LOVE COMPRISED ALL VOCATIONS, THAT LOVE WAS EVERYTHING, THAT IT EMBRACED ALL TIMES AND PLACES. . . . IN A WORD, THAT IT WAS ETERNAL!”[45] Quoting from “Words of Our Lord to St. Margaret Mary,” which is in the book, Little Breviary of the Sacred Heart, Thérèse agreed that the “science of love,” which is in the book of life, is the key thing.[46] In so writing, she was going beyond, or, put in more distinctly religious terms, transcending her favorite mask to focus on the theological ether behind the mask that gives it its form and goes beyond even doing that. The mix of contending instincts, informed by her own psychological history without being reducible to that domain, is clear in what she wrote next: “Then, in the excess of my delirious joy, I cried out: O Jesus, my Love . . . MY VOCATION IS LOVE! Yes, I have found my place in the Church and it is You, O my God . . . ; in the heart of the Church, my Mother, I shall be Love.”[47] In this statement, she reverts back to her devotional love (i.e., caritas) directed to Jesus—a love that is somehow related to her emotional need for a vicarious mother—then she makes the move again transcending all that in yearning to be love itself (i.e., agape).

To be full, the distinctly theological sort of love in Christianity must, Thérèse wrote, “lower Itself, and that It lower Itself to nothingness and transform this nothingness into fire.”[48] Whereas devotional love is informed (or fueled) by garden-variety eros even when such love is sublimated in being directed toward a high object, according to Plato and Augustine, distinctly theological love whose source is the divine is directed to the powerless, weak, and imperfect creatures via universal benevolence. It is not clear to me that loving Jesus ever more intensely while in a convent satisfies this kind of love, for Jesus is not powerless, weak, or imperfect, and, as a god-man and God’s eternal Logos, Jesus is not a mere creature, even though, as a mask of eternity, Jesus has been interpreted by David Hume (albeit quietly, through analyzing Mary) as well as by Jews and Muslims as the epitome of anthropomorphized divinity.



1. Pierre Descouvemont, Therese and Lisieux (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdman’s Publishing, 1996).
2. Thérèse de Lisieux, Story of a Soul: The Autobiography of Saint Thérèse of Lisieux, Third edition, trans. John Clarke (Washington, D.C.: ICS Publications, 1996), p. 191.
3. Ibid., p. 197.
4. Ibid., p. 206.
5. Ibid., p. 205, italics added.
6. Ibid., p. 191.
7. Ibid., p. 196.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid., p. 195.
10. Ibid., p. 198.
11. John Clarke, “Introduction to the First Edition,” in Thérèse de Lisieux, Story of a Soul: The Autobiography of Saint Thérèse of Lisieux, Third edition, trans. John Clarke (Washington, D.C.: ICS Publications, 1996), p. xi.
12. Ibid., p. xii.
13. Thérèse de Lisieux, Story of a Soul, pp. 112-13.
14. John Clarke, “Introduction to the First Edition,”, p. xii.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Thérèse de Lisieux, Story of a Soul, p. 98.
18. Ibid., p. 196.
19. Ibid., p. 99.
20. Ibid., p. 101.
21. Ibid., p. 192.
22. Ibid., p. 196.
23. Ibid., p. 199.
24. Ibid., p. 105.
25. Matthew 11:25, quoted in Thérèse de Lisieux, Story of a Soul, p. 105.
26. The Imitation of Christ, III, 43:4.
27. Thérèse de Lisieux, Story of a Soul, p. 104.
28. Ibid., p. 190.
29. Ibid., p. 104.
30. Ibid., p. 102.
31. Ibid., p. 100.
32. William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1902), p. 262.
33. Thérèse de Lisieux, Story of a Soul, p. 102.
34. Ibid., p. 105.
35. Ibid., p. 107.
36. Ibid., p. 189.
37. Matthew 5:5.
38. Thérèse de Lisieux, Story of a Soul, p. 107.
39. Ibid., p. 187.
40. Ibid., p. 102.
41. Ibid., p. 104.
42. Ibid., p. 192, italics added.
43. Ibid., p. 197.
44. Ibid., p. 192.
45. Ibid., p. 194. The ALL-CAPS is in the original.
46. Ibid., p. 187.
47. Ibid., p. 194.
48. Ibid., p. 195. Elsewhere (p. 199), Thérèse refers to “the Eternal Fire of the Blessed Trinity,” which she then associates with “the Inaccessible Light.” So it can be concluded that it is in the nature of divine (agape) love ultimately to bring nothingness, or perhaps only apparent nothingness as it is in darkness and thus cannot be seen, into the light. To raise (or literally enlighten) the meek and the pure of heart, while humbling the proud; to bring in the outcasted to be placed even closer than self-declared inner circles; and to show compassion even (and especially) for one’s detractors and enemies when they need or could use some help: these are ways of operationalizing divine love by humans. Without this, faith is for naught, according to Paul.

Saturday, November 9, 2024

Relating the Christian Logos, Incarnation, and Kingdom of God

Among the classic biblically-based films out of Hollywood, and the first to show Jesus’ face, The Greatest Story Ever Told (1965) is a highly idealized rather than realistic depiction of the Gospel story. Only when Jesus is on the cross does emotion show on Jesus’ visage; even the horrendous suffering from the torture leading up to the crucifixion is not shown. The Christology is thus idealized, with Jesus’ divine nature impacting his human nature even though the two natures are theologically distinct. Because the film was the first to show Jesus’ face, it could be that depicting Jesus’ human nature in its fullness, absent sin of course, would be too much for a film made before the social upheaval that began in 1968 in the West to depict. The main drawback in depicting Jesus in such highly idealized terms is that it may be difficult for Christians to relate to Jesus in emulating him by carrying their own proverbial crosses in this fallen world. The main upside of the almost Gnostic idealization is that the theological point that the Incarnation is of the divine Logos, which in turn is the aspect of God that created the world, is highlighted. Reflecting David Hume’s concern, I submit that transcending (rather than denying) the anthropomorphic “God made flesh” to embrace God as Logos—God’s word that creates—more fully captures the insight of Pseudo-Dionysius, a sixth-century theologian, that God goes beyond the limits of human cognition, perception, and emotions. 


The full essay is at "The Greatest Story Ever Told."

Monday, June 17, 2024

Christianity and Hinduism: On Manifestations of Divinity

Hinduism is a polytheist religion whereas Christianity is monotheist. Many gods versus one seems like a clear distinction, and I submit that it basically holds. Yet nuances exist that make the distinction murky both in Hinduism and Christianity. The key to clearing up the ambiguity lies in deciding whether being a manifestation of something else is enough to count as existing as an entity. In simpler terms, is a manifestation real, or is it merely an appearance?

The foremost Hindu philosopher thus far is without doubt Shankara, who lived during the eighth century, C.E. in southern India and whose school, Advaita Vedanta, is essentially non-dualism—monism being the competing school of thought.  Shankara held that the deities in the Hindu pantheon are manifestations of brahman, which can be thought of as the substratum that pervades the universe. Only brahman really exists. The essence, content or substance of the individual soul, or atman, is brahman. To be a manifestation is to exist in the realm of appearance, rather than being something (i.e., an entity) that is real (or in the domain of the real). Shankara’s metaphysical framework also includes the realm of illusion, and it is important to keep in mind that the deities, such as Vishnu, Shiva, Krishna, and Ram, are not illusionary. Rather, they are manifestations of something that is real, namely brahman.

One of my professors, Keith Yandel, argued that Hinduism is thus monotheistic because its deities do not exist as entities, but are merely manifestations of one thing (brahman). But brahman is not a deity, but can be thought of as ether that is everywhere.  This cannot be said to be monotheism, even though brahman is one rather than being composed of distinct entities. Yandel’s basis was in Western philosophy and Christianity, and I believe he interpreted Hinduism through those prisms to expand the domain of monotheism in religion.

The problem is that the word “manifestation” is also in Christian theology in reference to the divine—in particular, to the Trinity, which is composed of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Although the Latin word personae used to denote these three “persons” of the Trinity strongly implies that they exist metaphysically as entities, unlike Shankara’s Hindu deities, the corresponding word used in Eastern (Orthodox) Christianity translates as “manifestation.” That puts us in the soup. For if the three manifestations of the divine in the Trinity do not absolve Christianity of being monotheist, then neither do the Hindu deities as manifestations keep Hinduism from counting as monotheist.

Ironically, praying to Jesus, if He is taken to be a distinct entity that really exists as such metaphysically, corresponds to the dualist camp in Hinduism, which holds that the deities, such as Vishnu and Shiva as well as their respective successive incarnations, are metaphysically real as entities. In short, if Jesus really exists as a distinct deity even though it is of the same substance as the Father and the Helper, and the latter two are real entities too, then from the standpoint of Hindu theological philosophy, Christianity is not monotheistic. But Christianity descends from Judaism, whose basic plank is that God is one. Preliminarily, it seems like Orthodox theology has a better understanding of the nature of the Trinity than does Roman Christianity and its descendants (i.e., Protestantism). To be a monotheist, it would seem that a Christian oriented to Jesus Christ would pray to a manifestation of the divine rather than to a particular deity. Jesus appears to be a deity, and thus an entity, yet in terms of metaphysical reality is an appearance of something that really exists: God. But then Hinduism would also be monotheistic because its deities are manifestations too.

Even if Western Christians come to think that they are praying to a specific manifestation of God (i.e., Jesus), such an understanding of the Trinity would imply that Hinduism is monotheist. Furthermore, to claim that Jesus is divine seems, at least to my Western mind, to mean that the Son of God is itself an entity that is real (i.e., exists as an entity, rather than as a manifestation of something even though that something is of the same substance). This way of understanding Jesus is consistent with dualism in Hinduism, in which its deities are real entities and so Hinduism is polytheist.  But then wouldn’t Christianity be as well? Must Jesus be a manifestation of the divine for Christianity to be monotheist? But then does it even make sense to pray to a manifestation that is in the realm of appearance rather than the real? Is there any way to finally square this circle?

If divine reality goes (or is sourced) beyond the limits of human conception, perception, and emotion as Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite suggested in the late 5th or early 6th century, C.E., then all we have access to is manifestation (and illusion). Faith is oriented beyond this, hence to what only can be belief that Jesus exists as a real entity, but the content of this belief can only be a manifestation to us. But then why can’t Shakara’s Hinduism be monotheist? Furthermore, if revelation holds that the persons of the Trinity exist metaphysically as entities even within the limits of our cognitive reach, then how can we stop the inference from the Hindu school of dualism that Christianity is actually polytheist—assuming that the Father and the Son really exist as distinct entities even though they are consubstantial (i.e., of the same substance). Put another way, can divine manifestation be applied in one religion with it being monotheist and yet be applied in another religion that is polytheist, or are both Christianity and Hinduism monotheist faiths? Can Christianity be thought of as being monotheist with three distinct really-existing entities of the Trinity while Hindu dualism is needed to keep Hinduism polytheist?

To say that the whole thing is a mystery is true, but this is also a cop-out (i.e., a way to side-step or escape the problem without solving it). In Hinduism, Krishna is associated with love, and in Christianity, Jesus is too. Can we say that a Hindu prays to the Lord Krishna while a Christian prays to the Lord Jesus? This makes both religions seem polytheist. But Augustine and Paul both wrote that God is love, and it can be said that Jesus is a particular manifestation of love both personified (manifesting as such, rather than really existing as an entity) and preached in the Gospels. But then would not Lord Krishna as such make Hinduism monotheist?

The solution might lie in distinguishing Christian theological love (i.e., God is love) from Hindu brahman (i.e., the ether that pervades existence). Christian agape (i.e., self-emptying, or selfless) love may manifest metaphysically as the Trinity in a way that maintains oneness to a degree that Krishna as a manifestation of brahman does not. The key may lie in the distinction between theological love and metaphysical ether. If so, do we even know how theological love is distinct from the varieties we encounter and experience in our world? Can we say that brahman as ether counts as divinity as distinct from metaphysical substance, or else how it is that manifestations that are divine (i.e., deities as appearances) can be of something that is not itself divine in its very nature? Lord Jesus and Lord Krishna may be pointing to two very different things, the difference of which affecting what it means to manifest something.

Saturday, November 25, 2023

The Exorcist Extrapolated: Ministering to the Devil as "Love Thy Enemies."

One of the most iconic films of the horror-film genre, The Exorcist (1973) focuses on the duality of good and evil that the film’s director, William Friedkin, maintained is in a constant struggle in all of us. The dialogue between the two priests performing the exorcism on the one side and the Devil possessing Regan on the other not only reveal the duality, but also the essence of evil itself. Once this essence is grasped, interesting questions can be asked that are distinctly theological, as distinct from modernity’s trope of evil portrayed in terms of, and even reduced to, supernatural movements of physical objects. The decadent materialist version of the theological domain stems from modernity’s bias in favor of materialism and empiricism. In other words, highlighting supernatural physics as being foremost in representing the religious realm is how secularity sidelines religion, rather than how religion itself is. The bias of modern society is very clear in the film as the “professionals” go through alternative explanations first from the field of medicine, privileging the somatic (physical) and then the psychological domains of medicine. In other words, the narrative establishes (or reflects) a hierarchy of three qualitatively different levels of descending validity: the somatic is primary, and only then the psychological, and, if the first two do not furnish an explanation, then, and only then, are we to turn to the theological as metaphysically (i.e., supernaturally) real primarily shown by physical objects defying the laws of physics. Science, rather than religion, is thus still in the driver’s seat. The bias in favor of materialism is in the assumption that only after feasible hypotheses from modern medicine are nullified can theological explanations be considered (as credible). In this way, the film reflects the hegemony of materialism that has taken hold since the Enlightenment, and the relegation of the theological as “magical” supernaturalism, as in a bed levitating of objects flying around Regan’s bedroom. The essence of evil is instead interior. If religion is a matter of the heart, then how could evil be otherwise?


The full essay is at "The Exorcist."

Thursday, February 6, 2020

Politics and Religion: President Trump at a National Prayer Breakfast

Politics and religion intermeshed can be a nasty business. Franklin Graham, son of Billy Graham, witnessed every venue of his planned tour in Europe cancel because Franklin had “called Islam ‘evil,’ attacked laws increasing rights for transgender people, and told his followers that the legalization of same-sex marriage was orchestrated by Satan.”[1] Although criticizing another religion is religious in nature, turning to laws renders the attack political too. Although Franklin Graham may have assumed that many of his co-religionists would agree with him both in religious and political terms, wading into controversial political matters risks alienating people who are or would otherwise be religious followers. Even the willingness to traverse into the political realm may not be liked by some religionists, whether followers or not, especially if the incursion is into a controversy. Some co-religionists may agree with the distinctly religious belief, yet hold dissimilar political views. Such distance created between religionists can weaken a religious leader’s credibility and even following in the religious domain. Politicians dragging their respective religious faiths into the political domain can also be problematic, though authentic applications can pay off even if there is a cost politically. The incursion of Christianity at the end of U.S. President Trump’s trial in the Senate and as he took a victory lap can demonstrate the complexities of religion distended into another domain. A politician may invoke his or her religious beliefs to justify a political position, as Sen. Mitt Romney did before he voted to convict U.S. President Donald Trump on the abuse-of-power impeachment article. In his speech justifying his vote on the senate floor, an emotional Romney said, “My faith is at the heart of who I am. I take an oath before God as enormously consequential.”[2] Obviously, his vote itself had the immediate effect of isolating him in Trump’s GOP. Even so, incorporating his religious faith in the senate chamber could have cost Romney more politically to the extent that other Republicans did not agree with his political beliefs. Some Democrats (e.g., secular or of other faiths) may otherwise have thought more of the senator in spite of his vote. Also, his denomination of Christianity, the Church of Latter Day Saints (i.e., the Mormon church) may have taken a hit in religious circles. In other words, a religionist who explicitly brings his or her faith across the border to play a role in the political domain may pay a price back on the religious turf.

Even religion itself can suffer from a politician bringing it into the political domain, especially if he or she contradicts his or her religion in political action. At a prayer breakfast on the day after the senate trial on President Donald Trump ended with an acquittal, he said he did not believe in loving enemies in spite of the fact that the teaching even though Jesus includes in his Sermon on the Mount in the Gospels. The president immediately matched his statement, “Arthur, I don’t know if I agree with you,” with attacks on his political opponents, calling them “dishonest and corrupt people” who “badly hurt our nation.”[3] Then he went after Senator Romney, saying “I don’t like people who use their faith as justification for doing what they know is wrong.”[4] The charge of religion used wrongly is a good example of how extending the religious domain into the realm of politics can have political costs, as well as costs to the particular religion.

Even though Speaker (of the House of Representatives) Nancy Pelosi was prominently placed at the breakfast and had said that she prays for the president daily, Trump said, “nor do I like people who say, ‘I pray for you,’ when they know that’s not so.”[5] If Pelosi had lied about the praying, then her invocation of her faith meant that she was misusing her religion in the political domain. If she really had been praying in private, then the president misused his religion in going after her personally.

Instead of the New Testament preachment to love thy enemies, Trump had said that he preferred taking an eye for an eye, a teaching in the Old Testament that Jesus rejects in the New Testament. “It’s striking,” one journalist wrote after the prayer breakfast, “to hear Trump, who is a Presbyterian, so directly reject one of Christianity’s core teachings.”[6] In implying that he can be a Presbyterian and not believe in one of Jesus’ core teachings, both the president and his denomination look bad. That is, that the president cited his religious denomination and faith for political purposes hurt both him and his Church, for duplicity or hypocrisy is not generally looked on favorably.

As if to justify opposing Jesus’ dictum to love thy enemies, the president said at the breakfast, “So many people have been hurt and we can’t let that go on.”[7] He chaffed at having to like his enemies. I contend that loving one’s enemies is not the same thing as liking them. A mother may love her son but not like him, so like is not necessarily implied in love. Coming to an enemy’s aid when help could help the person—and valuing doing so—rather than attacking especially when the enemy is down—is the epitome of Jesus’ notion of loving one’s enemies. This goes beyond merely turning the other cheek when attacked. In fact, assent to valuing voluntarily helping people who have insulted, injured, or even physically attacked you can be viewed as the litmus test of whether a person is really a Christian. Even better is having helped a detractor, especially if he or she really needs help.  Resentment and retribution have no place.

In spite of loving your enemies being viewed as a strength rather than weakness by Christians, religion itself may be weak relative to political force once in the political domain. Pelosi may have been praying for the president, but this didn’t stop the president from going after her (and literally waving a newspaper whose headline was “President Acquitted” in the air) at the National Prayer Breakfast, which was “typically a nonpartisan event that organizers say is meant to provide a spiritual refuge from political warfare.”[8] Not even at such an event could religion have the upper hand; the president could disgorge Jesus’s famous dictum and attack his enemies even in victory. To be sure, that the president could be both a Presbyterian and an eye-for-an-eye guy points to a weakness within institutional Christianity. Even so, extending religion beyond its own domain into another may not be a good idea. However, if Sen. Romney bucked his own political party, which was controlled by the president, on the basis of his faith, then religion starts to look very good indeed in the political realm. Religion can be a strength even beyond its own domain, yet only if religion itself does not expand into something other than religious and, even worse, bring the other back into the religious realm as religious.

Religion must be authentic rather than employed as a political tool to have strength in the political realm. Yet even as authentic, a religious element can be vulnerable and even make the politician politically weaker. Sen. Romney and National Prayer Breakfast itself were vulnerable. The ways of the world are not those of the Kingdom of God that Jesus preached.

[1] Rob Picheta, “Evangelist Preacher Franklin Graham Planned a Seven-City UK Tour. All Seven Venues Have Dropped Him,” CNN.com, February 6, 2020(accessed same day).
[2] Michael Warren, “Guilty Vote Against Trump Casts Romney in a New Role: GOP Maverick,” CNN.com, February 6, 2020 (accessed same day).
[3] Daniel Burke, “Love Your Enemies? Nah, Says Trump,” CNN.com, February 6, 2020 (accessed same day).
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Ibid.