Showing posts with label idolatry. Show all posts
Showing posts with label idolatry. Show all posts

Saturday, February 15, 2020

The Basis of Christian Faith: Beyond Idolatry

I think perhaps the title of the film, Silence (2016) ought to have been “The last Priest” because the main character, Rodrigues, is the last remaining Roman Catholic priest in Japan. His inner struggle is the core of the narrative, and of the theological/ethical dilemma to be resolved. The movie is set in Japan in 1640-1641. A Buddhist inquisitor, Mokichi, is torturing and killing Christians, who must step on a stove carving of Jesus as proof of committing apostasy (i.e., renouncing their faith). Taking it as proof, Father Rodrigues torments over whether to apostasy in order to save the Japanese Christians whom Mokichi is having killed serially until the priest renounces his faith. I submit that the assumption of proof rests on dubious grounds, so Rodrigues is actually faced with a false dichotomy.

The full essay is at "Silence."


Monday, February 25, 2019

Self-Idolatry as the Root of Greed

The film L’Argent (1983) is about how far people will go to get money (l’argent en francais). One major problem with greed is that people who are enthralled by it will go to virtually any length to get money. Even a religion can unconsciously warped to separate greed from earning and having wealth. Historically, Christian thought on greed and wealth has shifted from anti- to pro-wealth. Whether enabled by their religion or not, greedy people will think nothing of other people being hurt in the process. Hence, greed can be reckoned as selfishness incarnate. To claim that money is God not only puts a lower good above a higher one, but also manifests self-idolatry.


The full essay is at "L'Argent."

Sunday, January 27, 2019

Is God the Invisible Hand?

A Baylor University survey on religion and economics in 2011 revealed something that may be distinctly American, culturally speaking. The results indicated that about “one in five Americans combine a view of God as actively engaged in daily workings of the world with an economic conservative view that opposes government regulation and [advocates] the free market as a matter of faith.”[1] Specifically, those Americans believed that the “invisible hand” of a competitive market is actually God at work. Put another way, the assumption is that the economy “works” because God wills it to by intervening directly in the market mechanism itself. Government regulation, in diverting economic supply and demand from “the invisible hand,” is thus sinful. Regulating the economy challenges God’s omnipotence (i.e., power) by interfering with God’s intervention in our daily lives via the operation of the market mechanism. 
A problem for Americans who view God as actively intervening in Creation in general and through the market mechanism in particular concerns a market equilibrium short of full employment wherein unemployed people, who would starve without government assistance, are abundant. Would an interventionist universal deity allow so much innocent suffering, particularly when Jesus is said to advocated caring for the poor? Or can we generalize to say that all of unemployed deserve to be without, and perhaps even to die? This seems particularly harsh, even regarding those workers who get fired for having an intractably bad attitude. Lest the “interventionist” Christians point to charity (derived from caritas, which is higher-oriented human love), why would God set the unemployed up to rely on non-profit institutions even though they cannot be relied on to feed and house people who need sustenance assistance on a daily basis.
A more fundamental problem facing the “divine interventionist” crowd concerns the troubling assumption that as finite beings we are able to have such specific knowledge of God's will as to be certain that the invisible hand is indeed that of God intervening in Creation on a daily basis. St. Denis of the sixth century would remind the "interventionists" that the divine is inherently beyond the limits of human cognition and perception. Even revelation, Augustine warned, must go through a dark window to reach us mere mortals. We cannot, therefore, have knowledge of the particularities of God's will. 
To suppose, for example, that a member of a church choir and bus driver suffered an accident days before a concert because a demon was going after the choir itself whereas God was necessarily behind the choir represents an impious presumption of human knowledge. Such a rationale strains even belief. For some reason, when the human brain enters a religious frame of mind, usual checks on inordinate reasoning/assumptions can go haywire without the mind detecting it. Assuming they cannot be wrong, interventionists may not realize the harm brought on the unemployed by efforts to block regulation that could reduce market volatility and even bring market-functioning closer to full employment. 
Moreover, the confluence of the “interventionist” theological belief and a political/economic ideology is a red flag that self-idolatry is in the mix, or perhaps even the determining force, because ideology is human, all too human. Activist religious groups such as Unitarian-Universalists, Congregationalists, and Quakers, for instance, are at risk for placing particular political, economic, or social ideologies at the forefront in distinctly religious terms. One Unitarian minister once told me that certain social structures are sacred. I replied that as such structures are human artifacts, the appellation of sacred effectively divinizes us, hence is self-idolatry. In other words, faith itself can come to be identified with a particular economic structure--one in which economic inequality does not exist, which may be utopian. The minister was not amused, and I'm sure he believed that he could not be wrong about his belief being salubrious in religious terms. The same can apply to political and economic conservatives who assume their opposition to government regulation has a divine foundation. Most (81%) political conservatives said in the survey that tone ultimate truth exists in the world. The question is perhaps whether they believe that they know that truth and furthermore cannot be wrong about it.
To be sure, one in five Americans surveyed in 2011 said they did not believe that God intervenes in their daily lives, and by implication, through economic markets. Rather than believing that God directs greed to good material ends through an “invisible hand,” the theologically “non-interventionist” Americans favor the human use of government to mitigate economic harm by reducing economic inequality. Such Americans who favor government intervention while not believing that God intervenes in human life tend to believe that there is no one ultimate truth. This may mean that such people are not as likely to assume that they know God's ways and furthermore that it is impossible to be wrong about such knowledge. Yet the non-interventionist view risks the assumption that since God doesn't intervene to help suffering people, why should I? Government regulation can serve as a substitute that lacks compassion and is thus less worthy in religious terms. Furthermore, non-interventionists may be vulnerable to placing their human ideology in the religious void created by the non-interventionist assumption. God doesn't get involved, so my ideology is highlighted even in religious terms because it can solve the problem. 
It is worth observing in closing that relying on government regulation itself, whether from interventionist or non-interventionist auspices, can be inadequate, especially in democracies in which the interests of the regulated prevail in the halls of government due to lobbying and campaign contributions. Especially without a truth-based religio-normative basis for regulation, greed may get the upper hand if religion itself is eliminated as possible a constraint. A normative bulwark based solely on even an ethical principle may not be strong enough to constrain the basic desire for more (i.e., greed). Of course, believing that God does not want markets to be regulated can also enable greed. That the Clinton Administration kept subprime-mortgage-based (risky) bonds from being regulated contributed greatly to the financial crisis of 2008. A religio-normative basis for a non-regulatory economy could thus really put a people at risk. 


1. Cathy Lynn Grossman, “Religion Colors Money Views,” USA Today, September 20, 2011. 

On Christian theological takes through the centuries on greed and wealth, see God's Gold at Amazon. 

Thursday, August 3, 2017

Has American Catholicism Become Unavoidably Republican?

Putting a religious faith through a particular political ideology can be regarded as artificial because the transcendent is not limited to the confines of particular ideologies. Were it otherwise, the transcendent would not go beyond the limits of human cognition, perception, and sensibility. Leaders of religious organizations should thus be particularly careful lest they inadvertently cut transcendence short. Practically speaking, that some members could feel marginalized or leave the organization altogether is a capricious cost that can be avoided. In other words, according to religious criteria, no reason would exist for such marginalization or departures. Unfortunately, religious leaders can easily dismiss this drawback out of a desire to channel the religious through their particular ideologies. I suppose this is a form of idolatry.
In the Roman Catholic Church, for instance, a liberal political ideology became associated with Cardinal Blasé Cupich of Chicago after the “started a program against gun violence and opposed Republican health care proposals on the ground that they would strip coverage for the weak and poor.”[1] Alternatively, the Cardinal could have preached against the violence that had plagued parts of the city and for helping the weak and poor. He could have gone to some of the problematic neighborhoods as well as to places where the poor received medical services—even bringing along other clergy to volunteer. Starting a program specifically oriented to guns, and voicing opposition to a political party’s proposal is to step out of the shoes of the fisherman and into the shoes of a legislator. Faithful Catholics in Chicago could legitimately have had a different stance on guns as well as on health policy at the federal level. The Cardinal’s political shoes could easily have made such Catholics uncomfortable going to church and even, particularly sadly, with their Catholic faith. A desire of a religious leader to advance particular political platforms becomes self-centered if it causes members of the religious organization to feel even just uncomfortable.
Visiting a large Catholic church in my hometown outside “Chicagoland” in northern Illinois in 2013, I was amazed at how blatantly Republican the members were; they made no effort to hide their political identification, and it didn’t hurt that the bishop at the time made no secret of his political conservatism. The parish was socially conservative on political issues “down the line.” Even members who were political moderates must have felt uncomfortable there. Indeed, the parish lost considerable members. To be sure, the pastor, who would go on to become bishop of North Dakota, was extremely conservative (and reportedly not very kind). Sadly, “belligerence can acquire a theological justification,” according to Antonio Spadaro and Marcelo Figueroa writing in La Civilta Cattolica.[2]
The authors look at American evangelical Christians and Roman Catholics as having been “brought together by the same desire for religious influence in the political sphere.”[3] Looked at in the other direction, the desire includes bringing the political sphere into church. The authors warn that the “religious element should never be confused with the political one. Confusing spiritual power with temporal power means subjecting one to the other.”[4] As people of religious faith are subjected to temporal, ideological constraints—even scripts—the faith is artificially circumscribed, as is the body of Christ gathered in fellowship. In fact, the fellowship itself becomes artificially delimited.
In short, the “article warns that conservative American Catholics have strayed dangerously into the deepening political polarization in the United States.”[5] Meanshile, American Unitarian Universalist societies have also contributed to the polarization by becoming virtual liberal camps geared to political activism. I could imagine Unitarian protesters facing off against pro-life Catholic protests with only a street between them as they shout at each other in the name of religion but actually in the sphere of politics—a domain that had become polarized societally by the time Donald Trump was elected U.S. President. The willowing down to ideology brings with it a perspectival narrowness in which even shouting under ostensibly religious auspices does not register as oxymoronic—not to mention as eviscerating any religiousity.  Clearly, it makes no difference whether the ideology is liberal or conservative; the effect is the same. I would even say a presumption to moral and political infallibility also comes with the partiality that is inherent in willowing truth down to a particular ideology. No self-corrective, let alone humbling, feedback loop can operate, so the partisans armed with what they presume is religious truth are unwittingly vulnerable to going too far without realizing it. Even Christian partisans could end up killing rather than loving their enemies without any recognition that they have violated Jesus’s commandment and teachings. That even something as obvious as this could easily be missed ought to be sufficient reason to ward off the temptation to get political and judge fellow religionists accordingly. Yet with an impaired self-corrective feedback loop, resisting the temptation “after the fact” may require nothing short of a miracle.

This book may be helpful for tips on how to sidestep the political: Spiritual Leadership in Business.  See also Christianized Ethical Leadership.





[1] Jason Horowitz, “A Vatican Shot Across the Bow for Hard-Line U.S. Catholics,” The New York Times, August 2, 2017.
[2] Antonio Spadaro and Marcelo Figueroa, “Evangelical Fundamentalism and Catholic Integralism: A Surprising Ecumenism,” La Civilta Cattolica.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Jason Horowitz, “A Vatican Shot Across the Bow for Hard-Line U.S. Catholics,” The New York Times, August 2, 2017.

Tuesday, February 7, 2017

Being Partisan in the Pulpit: Going the Extra Mile

The Johnson Amendment, which became law in the U.S. in 1954 and was named for Lyndon Johnson, then a U.S. Senator, “is a provision in the tax code that prohibits tax-exempt organizations from openly supporting political candidates. In the words of the tax code, ‘all section 501(c)(3) organizations are absolutely prohibited from directly or indirectly participating in, or intervening in, any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for elective public office.”[1] I submit that it is in a cleric’s interest to expand this prohibition to include advocating for (or opposing) particular public policies. This general principle would of course be subject to exceptions in which a proposed or enacted policy is strongly anathema to the religious principles of the given religious organization or religion.

Generally speaking, it is in the medium- and long-term interest of both clerics and their religious organizations to resist the temptation to preach along partisan lines. That such preaching is a temptation should signal the presence of a bad odor, and yet it is almost always overlooked or dismissed out of hand. Besides turning off members who are good fits religiously speaking but do not agree with the particular political ideology being preached, the stain of partisan ideology can make the cleric seem self-obsessed. In other words, that such preachments are convenient to the speakers themselves can easily be translated into self-idolatry in religious terms.

One cleric, not of one of the Abrahamic religions, in my hometown once told me that according to his religion, certain social structures are sacred. In particular, only those sociological/economic/political systems that are egalitarian and thus just in this way can be sacred. The use of this overtly religious term takes human artifacts to have divine status. By implication, the social, economic, or political ideology in play is also divine. I submit that such a position counts as self-idolatry—the worship of the human as itself being sacred, or divine. Put another way, if the societal systems we design are sacred, then the makers themselves must also be sacred—essentially little gods admiring their handiwork. I submit that when the cleric preaches on socio-economic and political policies or systems thereof as sacred, he is engaging in self-idolatry. Religion for him has become too comfortable, too easy. Absent is the wholly other, or absolutely different, quality of the divine, which is transcendent as well as immanent. Declaring a human artifact to be sacred eclipses the transcendent.

Unfortunately, the temptation to make the preachment as fitting as possible to the preacher’s own ideology can easily exploit good exceptions, where the public policy is anathema to a major religious teaching. Roman Catholicism’s doctrine of humanae vitae (i.e., on the sanctity of human life) arguably justifies preaching in opposition to abortion and capital punishment. To be sure, the doctrine’s salience relative to the Incarnation and the Resurrection can be subject to critique, such that the political opposition may actually be ideological in nature. In other words, the doctrine of the sanctity of human life—which does not imply that human beings are sacred!—could be used as a subterfuge allowing for the true, subterranean motive: political influence in line with a particular moral/political ideology.

Even if the allowance of good exceptions has a tendency of being exploited, it is indeed possible that public policies run contrary to significant religious beliefs, and such opposition is legitimate in the pulpit.  The task for the conscientious cleric writing a sermon is to be on guard—like the disciples presumably on the night Jesus is handed over to the Roman guard—for the slithering motions of self-idolatry under the subterfuge of pious religion.





[1] Randall Balmer, “The Peril of Being Partisan at the Pulpit,” Stars and Stripes, February 7, 2017.

Sunday, July 12, 2015

Pope Francis on the World’s Economy Idolizing Profit: A Theological Self-Idolatry

During his trip to South America in July 2015, Pope Francis appealed to world leaders to seek a new economic model to help the poor, and to shun policies that "sacrifice human lives on the altar of money and profit."[1] This line reminds me of the ancient Greco-Roman religious practice of sacrificing animals on altars just outside temples dedicated to particular deities. Doubtless no thought went into the animals’ suffering. In the Jewish Bible, God spares Isaac just before Abraham implements Yahweh’s command to sacrifice Isaac. Like the ancient Greeks and Romans, Abraham constructs an altar for the purpose. In Christianity, Jesus Christ is sacrificed on an altar, which typically doubles as a table given the institution of the Eucharist in the Last Supper. This sacrificed lamb personifies God as agape, or selfless divine love, which manifests as benevolentia universalis, or neighbor-love. Sacrificing the needs of others is antipodal to serving them; hence the Roman Catholic pope’s preachment. Missing, however, was the subtle bias within Christian theology ironically in favor of money. 
To be sure, the pope criticized "the idolatry of money and the dictatorship of an impersonal economy lacking a truly human purpose."[2] Idolatry is a strong word; it implies that something or someone in Creation is being worshipped—which is to say, being treated as if it were God. According to the second-century Platonic philosopher Plotinus, the nature of God lies beyond the limits of human perception and conception (even as God is immanent in Creation). Hence God is mysterium.[3] This transcendent essential quality of God is not in my view metaphysical, for otherwise theology would simply be philosophy and the sui generis (i.e., of its own genus, or type) “native ground” of religion would be as void as outer space (although even space presumably contains dark matter). At any rate, to treat anything or anyone on Earth as an idol is to overstate the object’s religious significance. Such an object need not be corporeal in nature; an idea or ideology, for instance, is not beyond the limits of human cognition.
In his The Natural History of Religion, David Hume takes an expanded view of historical religions and finds what he takes to be a natural tendency in the human mind to successively render that which is worshipped in more familiar (i.e., “earthly”) terms. Our brains have trouble holding on to a pure notion of divinity as simple and invisible, so we tend to cloth it with stuff from our world (i.e., not transcendent). By analogy, or Christmas trees become so littered with artifacts that we come to appreciate, even worship, them rather than upholding the tree as it would exist naked and natural. In other words, we fashion God increasingly in terms of our world—the world we know and experience—because it is so difficult for our minds to grasp eternity. The earthly garb can obviously be idolized, and from that it is a slippery slope to treating stuff like money as an idol.
In my view, a way out of the cycle of increasing idolatry is to shift the focus from the nature of the divine as an object to the nature of the sui generis religious experience. In other words, God as love—Augustine’s key phrase—can be taken to refer to the experience rather than to God as an object. Such loving would be transcendental rather than emotional (or eros) in nature. In his Confessions, Augustine’s love for God is sublimated lust—I pine for your scent—and is thus human, all too human.[4] Loving the transcendent is, I submit, a qualitatively different (i.e., unique) kind of love—a different kind of yearning. I further submit that such yearning naturally (i.e., automatically, without intention) renders a person more sensitive to others (i.e., compassionate), and thus more inclined to serve rather than exploit them. As Kant posits, it is ethical to treat other people as ends in themselves rather than only as means.[5]
Treated as an end in itself, economic gain functions like heroin or alcohol to an addict, who finds it easy to dismiss the needs of other people and violate their personal boundaries and even dignity. The addict treats other people as means, hence without having boundaries worthy of respect or even acknowledgement. The malignant narcissism is in Scott Peck’s view a defense mechanism that stems from an inner sense of void, or emptiness, at the person’s core. Like Aquinas and Leibniz, Peck takes the lack of being as evil—God being perfect being. Hence we are worthy of compassion, including benevolentia universalis, because we have some being. Sadly, some people feel they have none deep inside. I submit that such people are particularly inclined to treat money as an idol.
In my view, the idolatry of money reduces to idolatry of self, or self-idolatry because economic gain is none other than the person gaining, or expanding his or her reach and thus being. That is, increasing wealth is a sort of expansiveness of the self and its power. The malignant narcissism wants everything for itself—everything under its control. To treat an object within the sphere of our experience as a religious idol is convenient from this standpoint, as such an object can be controlled.
In God’s Gold, I argue that Christian thought on how greed is related to wealth (money) shifted through the centuries from the dominance of anti-wealth stances to that of the pro-wealth stances. In this shift, the sin of greed became decoupled from profit-seeking and wealth, so the latter two could be deemed even salubrious (i.e., without the taint of greed and in fact good!). I suggest that this shift completed in the Renaissance, and that the major Reformers failed to hold back the momentum of the pro-wealth theological attitude (and values). To explain all this, I posit a theological bias, which is rooted in self-idolatry, subtly fueled the shift “from within” the religion. After all, both Luther and Calvin lived in the same commercialized Europe of the sixteenth century.
Therefore, whereas the pope was pointing to profits as the idol, I contend that the idol behind the idol is self-idolatry. He would doubtless agree. However, he would not likely see a bias toward it nestled in Christian theology itself. In other words, the pope may unwittingly have been facing a headwind from both the pro-wealth stance being dominant in Christianity at the time and the underlying theological bias in favor of the corporeal, or earthly, of which wealth is a species.
Turning now to a solution to the culture of greed and the related idolatry of money, the pope was cognizant of his limitations. In place of unbridled capitalism, he called for a new economic system that puts wealth in service to humanity rather than vice versa. “Human beings and nature must not be at the service of money.”[6] “Let us say no to an economy of exclusion and inequality, where money rules, rather than service. That economy kills. That economy excludes. That economy destroys Mother Earth.”[7] Faced with this daunting problem, the pope was realistic concerning himself and his Church. “Don’t expect a recipe from this pope. Neither the pope nor the church [has] a monopoly on the interpretation of social reality or the proposal of solution to contemporary issues. I dare say no recipe exists.”[8] That is to say, humanity had become so inured to serving as the instruments of profits that scarcely any ideas existed at the time to turn the arrow around.
The reference to social reality is interesting, for the Catholic Church historically had hardly been silent in furnishing one. For instance, people were to view themselves as the center of the universe—the Earth lying at the center. Furthermore, slave-owners could cite Paul’s dictum that slaves should obey their masters. The more a religious functionary focuses on social reality, the less he or she is oriented to the transcendental experience—and thus the less he or she is naturally apt to be compassionate. Abstractly speaking, reality is metaphysical rather than religious, and the social dimension of human experience is hardly transcendent, even if regular transcendental experience, or yearning, naturally stimulates compassion as a by-product.
Regarding the reference to Mother Earth, the pope meant that humanity had no idea as to a global system compatible with solving the climate-change problem. So used are we to the international geo-political system of sovereign nation-states that even the design of a global governance infrastructure capable of enforcing reductions in CO2 emissions eludes our intellectual grasp—to say nothing of how such a system could be implemented.
In short, the pope was calling for a new world order welling up from those people whom Jesus had paid particular attention to—the poor. In the contemporary context, the people to whom the pope was addressing were much broader than the poor; he was addressing the 99 percent and asking us why we passively stand by as an evil system built around the idolatry of money, and ultimately of self, spreads around the world, taking from us the very air that we breathe. Besides people coming up with ideas and becoming politically active, Christian leaders and laity alike could take a look at how Christian theology subtly enables the idolatry of greed manifesting in money or wealth as an end in itself that encompasses not only Creation, but lends transcendent purpose as well.

caritas naturalis seu benevolentia universalis


[1] Philip Pullella and Daniela Desantis, “Pope Francis Condemns Corruption and ‘Unbridled Capitalism,’ in South America,” Reuters, July 12, 2015.
[2] Ibid.
[3] See Rudolf Otto’s book, Idea of the Holy.
[4] Augustine draws on Plato’s Symposium wherein sublimated lust is directed to love of the eternal moral verities. Augustine replaces them with God. I am suggesting that such love, or caritas, is too much of our world and experience to serve us in a transcendent capacity. Calvin is similarly critical of caritas.
[5] This version of Kant’s categorical imperative is known as the kingdom of ends. It is typically likened to the Golden Rule. See Kant’s Practical Critique of Reason.
[6] Jim Yardley and William Neuman, “In Bolivia, Pope Apologizes for Church’s ‘Grave Sins’,” The New York Times, July 10, 2015.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Ibid.

Thursday, January 15, 2015

Religion and Violence: On the Power of Self-Idolatry

Religion and power make awkward bed-fellows. Speaking in January 2015 on religious fundamentalism, Pope Francis suggested that violence belies claims of religious validity. That is to say, actions speak louder than words, and harming other people effectively renders a person’s claims of religious motivation null and void. Unfortunately, the typical assumption that people have that they cannot be wrong when it comes to their own religious beliefs also operates when political ideology is the actual motivation. Such pride, which I suspect is rooted in self-idolatry, stands as a wall preventing such remarks from influencing potential culprits.
In his annual speech to diplomats accredited with the Holy See, the pope remarked that religious fundamentalism, “even before it eliminates human beings by perpetrating horrendous killings, eliminates God himself, turning him into a mere ideological pretext.”[1] Leaving aside the necessary question of just what is fundamentalism and whether violence is a necessary part of it, a byproduct, or unrelated, the notion of God as a “mere ideological pretext” is intriguing. The concept “God” doubtlessly contains what Wittgenstein refers to as family resemblances rather than a definitive idea. What you mean by the word probably is not exactly what I mean by it. Yet we bandy the term about as if we are in fact referring to the same object, whose nature we would agree on. Our assumption of agreement is rarely made explicit and called into question, yet I submit we regularly assume an extent of agreement that overstates any actual convergence. Adding “ideological pretext” to the word’s functions and the presumed inter-subjective agreement is likely even further from what we normally suppose.
In short, what someone means by “God” may differ considerably from what someone else means by the term. In assuming agreement as to the nature of the referent, we miss the possibility that someone’s concept may be so different that it supports the use of violence. We might not see it coming.
Of course, once the violence has occurred, observers can reason backward to conclude that what the culprit means by “God” is very different. Accordingly, the pope spoke on the importance of visible indications. “This is an important sign that sincere faith in God makes one open to others, generates dialogue and works for the good, whereas violence is always the product of a falsification of religion . . . whose only goal is power over others.”[2] Religion is falsified into an ideological pretext, with power over others being the means by which to realize a vision in line with a certain concept of “God,” which in turn is rooted in self-idolatry—the culprit’s virtual worship of himself.
Religion as subterfuge has not only been evinced by rogue elements. Historically, the establishment has partaken, giving the phenomenon the veneer of legitimacy. Four popes, for instance, promised salvation to Roman Catholics willing to join the Crusades. Under Pope Francis’s reckoning, the violence committed against the Muslims in Jerusalem and the eastern Christians in Constantinople points to a falsification of religion rather uncomfortably near the pope. That this obvious implication was missing from the pope’s remarks may point to the wall of “religious” self-protection wherein a religionist presumes that he or she cannot be wrong regarding the veracity and validity of his or her own religious beliefs and assumptions. This assumption can open the door to unchecked lapses close to home, even as lapses elsewhere are obvious.
Religion itself may provoke or trigger a basic sort of cognitive lapse that involves assumptions that are premised on a god-concept that has been infected by self-idolatry. In other words, religious fundamentalism may not be the whole story. The ability of the human mind to self-regulate itself as concern religious matters may be faulty, such that we observe people who consider themselves to be religionists committing acts of violence.


[1] Liam Moloney, “Pope Links Fundamentalism to Atrocities,” The Wall Street Journal, January 13, 2015.
[2] Ibid.

Sunday, June 22, 2014

A Ukrainian Priest’s Divisive Politics: At What Religious Cost?

In Lviv, Ukraine, Rev. Addriy, a priest of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church rather than the Ukrainian affiliate of the Russian Orthodox Church, said after a Mass in June 2014 that the European Union is an “empire of evil” defying the Word of God and spreading sins including homosexuality and pedophilia. The priest went on to characterize the Ukrainians who toppled President Viktor Yanukovych as “Godless deviants” and “fools . . . in the pay of hostile foreign powers.”[1] Being in the western part of the state, the eastern-looking priest was not exactly “preaching to the choir”—meaning he must have known that his message would not be well-received by his congregation. This disjunction illustrates a distinctly religious problem that can arise when clerics fly too far afield from the religious domain onto those of politics, economics, or even social problems.

The problem is multi-level. On the surface, attention to non-religious matters carries with it the opportunity cost of foregone attention to religion. To be sure, the priest spoke outside of Mass, and thus he did not detract from it directly. However, at a deeper level, he did diminish the religious value of his Masses. His own diminished stature or credibility in the political matter at hand put his religious role at risk as well.

Anger at an opposing political view inexorably puts distance in a religious relationship. The latter is not limited to new-found suspicion regarding sermons or homilies. The transcendent religious experience—communion with God in Christian terms—involves shifting attention from the external environment (i.e., what is going on around you) to an “inward” orientation to a reference point that inherently transcends the limits of cognition and perception. Feeling “safe” enough to risk shifting attention off what is going on in the worship context (e.g., the church) is essential to being wholly invested in the experience itself of yearning for that which is yearned for beyond the particular mask of eternity. Feeling that the person in the room who is in charge is in any sense a threat, or even just disliking him or her, thus detracts from the religious experience, and thus from the religion itself as an instrument thereof.

So, beyond the point that political ideology is of another domain than religion, the over-reaching can inadvertently sabotage or at least diminish the intensity of the religious experience possible in a given worship context. In other words, a dedicated context, sui generis to religious experience, is compromised as soon as stuff from other domains is brought in. The inherent sensitivity of religious experience, owing both to the intimacy in yearning for “the wholly other” that lies inherently beyond our reach and the giving up of attention to one’s immediate surroundings (i.e., what is going on in the church), is violated by the breaking in of stuff from our realm (e.g., politics, and even church business!).

In the case of Roman Catholicism, for example, the “presence” of the sacrificed or consecrated Christ in the Tabernacle on the altar sets a sanctuary apart as sacred space from the rest of the world. Whether or not such a presence is actually in the bread in the enclosure is not the point; rather, that Catholics treat the sanctuary as perpetually dedicated to religious activity facilitates their entering into religious experience as in communing with God after ingesting Christ in the Eucharist. A priest or lectern making announcements from the weekly bulletin, for example, as the congregants are intensely focused in transcendent yearning disturbs the sensitivity of the experience itself.

Interestingly, the “pure” or rarified sensitivity that is in religious experience intentionally devoid of stimuli that can dilute the sensitivity itself can carry over onto ensuing experience back in a person’s daily world of quotidian stimuli. That is the religious experience is in one sense a “sharpener” of a person’s sensitivity, which on return to the world can “carry over.” Although the heightened sensitivity to the ordinary doubtlessly fades as a person’s ordinary sensitivity level kicks back in amid its customary context, regular “religious exercise” may give its more finely-tuned sensitivity greater staying power, such that the “sensitivity weight-lifting” sessions may eventually not be necessary for this purpose.

Applied interpersonally in a person’s daily life, the greater, “microscopic” sensitivity gained through religious experience is commonly known as compassion. In fact, this byproduct is typically misclassified as religious rather than ethical in nature, and this error in turn can invite or provide an opening for interlarding content from the world such as social issues (e.g. abortion, poverty, social justice) into the worship context. In the case of Unitarian Universalism, especially when its humanist movement reached its zenith in the 1970s in the United States, social structures based on the ideology of egalitarianism are regarded as sacred. Such self-ideology as sacred can be interpreted in religious terms as a manifestation of self-idolatry, which snuffs out or blocks outright transcendent spiritual or religious experience.

Therefore, sensitivity not only pertains to transcendent religious experience devoid of interfering external stimuli, but is a byproduct known as compassion that is of value in the world. Though not religious itself, the ethical principle of what Adam Smith calls “fellow-feeling” in his Theory of Moral Sentiments can itself thwart the sort of invective inflicted by the Ukrainian priest on his disheartened flock. “Do not cause your brother to stumble,” Paul advises in one of his letters to a congregation just a few decades after his Lord’s crucifixion.  If a cleric is not sufficiently careful in this regard, we can assume that he or she has little regard for the value of others’ religious experience, and even such experience itself, relative to more “worldly” agendas.

It is ironic, to say the least, to find religious functionaries and even institutions oblivious to what is conducive to a religious experience that is transcendent in nature. Both in being of value in itself and for one of its byproducts, intense dedicated yearning for that which inherently lies beyond the limits of human perception and cognition may actually receive scant attention in most religious services. Even where the rites are conducive to such experience, clerics may tend to treat the ritual as an end in itself rather than as preparatory. In how many Masses, for example, is the experience of communing with God after the Eucharistic ritual treated as the high point, or core, of the Mass? 

In this photo, furnished by the U.S. Defense Department, a bishop consecrates the bread into the body of Christ. Is this moment of the sacrifice of Christ in the Mass its high point even if so in terms of the Eucharistic rite? Behind the priest is the tabernacle, in which previously consecrated pieces are stored. They make the room into "sacred space" continuously rather than merely during a Mass. 

Instead, the priest-centric consecration of the bread and wine is said to by the pinnacle, and the Mass itself is typically quickly ended as soon as the priest finishes washing the dishes. Unlike any experience oriented to the external stimuli of a priest holding up the consecrated species, which admittedly can be quite meaningful to a Catholic, the communing experience following the ritual transcends even the worshipper’s immediate environment and thus is more conducive to isolating the eternal (by transcending the external) and then sensing that of the eternal back in the person’s daily life, including in other people. This sensitivity is more finely tuned to them, and thus to the subtle indications of their suffering; and I suppose the experience of yearning transfers over in a way in the motivation to relieve the suffering. However, the heightened sensitivity itself may also furnish the motivation. 

In terms of liturgy generally, religious ritual can be thought of as preparation, rather than as the whole of a religious service—distinctly religious experience being the immediate objective; as the referent is both by definition and experientially inherently “beyond,” the intensity can be put on the yearning itself, especially if the religionist is willing in true humility to transcend even the given mask of eternity to the raw numinous experience itself. Put another way, the yearning itself, or communing, can extend beyond the human reception of divine revelation into our familiar categories of thoughts and images. To the detriment of such "pure" religious experience wherein the immanence of transcendence demands a heightened sensitivity, the divisive Ukrainian priest had other treasures in mind, and therein in all probability his heart and god could also be found.




[1] Andrew Higgins, “Ukrainian Church Faces Obscure Pro-Russia Revolt in its Own Ranks,” The New York Times, June 21, 2014.

Saturday, June 14, 2014

The Eucharist as Transcendent Experience

Taking a swipe at a core tenet of Catholicism, Bill Keller of the New York Times writes, “Every faith has its baggage, and every faith holds beliefs that will seem bizarre to outsiders. I grew up believing that a priest could turn a bread wafer into the actual flesh of Christ.” I contend that the editor’s characterization of consecration represents a misunderstanding of the Eucharist. Such misunderstandings have been worse; in the early years of the Church, some pagans were under the impression that the Christians were meeting on Sundays to eat babies. Indeed, phrases such as “eat my body” may in fact be inherently prone to being misunderstood.

Generally speaking, religion may have a tendency to flirt with the literal, or empirical, even at the expense of that which is distinctly religious in nature. Hence Keller’s point that every institutional religion has baggage may be correct even if his interpretation of the Eucharist is erroneous. It should be of no surprise that religion is hardly immune to the vaunted pretentions of the human mind even to that which is beyond the limits of its cognition and perception. Under the circumstances, we would be well-advised to be relatively circumspect in how firmly we impose our religious beliefs as if they were established knowledge.

Regarding the Eucharist, Keller’s use of “actual flesh” is misleading, for both actual and flesh point to an empirical basis or connotation. When we moderns typically say actual, we mean that something actually exists, which is to say that it is the case empirically in the world in which we live (i.e., based in the human domain). Keller’s use of flesh confirms his usage of actual, for flesh is indeed found descriptively in the world, as in, The wolf ate the lamb’s flesh. In German, the word for meat is Fleisch. To be blunt, a priest does not turn a wafer into meat. I’m not sure whether changing something from one food group to another would constitute a miracle anyway. This allusion to food groups is apt, for my approach stresses the utility of delimiting categories. I assume that the various realms, such empirical, metaphysical, and theological, are qualitatively different and distinct.

I contend that the Eucharist involves the application of a theological concept through social contract as pertaining to an empirical object. This is not to say that the empirical realm is that of theology.  Van Rad makes this point in his text, History of Israel. A faith narrative, such as the covenantal relationship between Jehovah and the Hebrews is not comprised of bare historical facts, even if Biblical allusions to history are used for theological purposes and given a theological meaning. The meaning gleaned from the faith narrative does not establish or confirm historical facts. Nor are theological meanings scientific concepts; the two domains are distinct, and thus have their own respective criteria. Whereas history and science are confined within the empirical domain, which is in principle within the limits of human cognition and perception, theological meaning is transcendent in nature, meaning that our ideas and sensual impressions fail inherently to go the distance with respect to religion.

Neither is theology essentially metaphysics, for otherwise, religion would be none other than philosophy. Put another way, meaning is not reality itself. People who characterize the Trinity as real are making a metaphysical rather than a religious claim. The latter has to do with the unfathomable mystery behind the notion of a triune god, rather than any metaphysical claim that the three persons exist in reality itself. Put another way, if God is the condition or source of existence, then God cannot be existence itself—much less some empirical object existing. Neither does God as conceived theologically reduce to Kant’s “things in themselves.” God is not “the Real.” Yet neither is the transcendent limited to Kant’s phenomenal realm of appearances. Religious meaning is of its own, distinct, realm—yet how elusive it must truly be, for all the rush to cover it over with leaves from other fields. If I am indeed on to something here, we would hardly recognize the distinctly religious terrain for all we have interlarded on top of it. Put another way, our theological gardens tend to end up looking a lot like ourselves.

In terms of the Eucharist, Catholics maintain that the body and blood of Christ are really present theologically under the empirical “species” of bread and wine. In Catholicism, the real presence is a theological concept called transubstantiation. That it is applied to empirical objects—bread and wine—does not mean that the religious meaning is empirical in nature. The religious term refers to another theological concept—that of resurrected body—rather than to the empirical concept of “actual flesh.”

In a nutshell, Bill Keller has Jesus’ earthly body rather than his resurrected body in mind. To think of a resurrected body on the basis of a physical body is to reduce theology to physiology or biology. The resurrected Jesus walking through a door and asking for something to eat anticipates the tendency to liken what we don’t understand to things that are familiar. Theological meaning is distinct, rather than reducing to any of the empirical sciences, yet for centuries Christians insisted on being buried so their physical bones would be available to be resurrected.

Augustine writes that the relation between the Father and the Son should not be thought of in terms of the relationship between dads and sons. By implication, the Son as a theological concept is qualitatively different—meaning not just in degree—from what we know of what it means to be a son from our observations of sons in our midst. Christians forget Jesus’s reminder, “no one knows the Son except the Father” (Mt 11:27). It is all too natural to reduce begotten to made by clothing the transcendent in familiar clothes.

Resurrected body does not apply empirically; rather, it is a theological meaning that is situated in a faith narrative rather than a historical account. This is the point that Keller so vitally misses in his essay. The real presence of Christ in the Eucharist is not actual flesh. Nor is the real presence metaphysical in nature. The empirical species of bread and wine as like posts around which the Catholic believer can swing around, as it were, in the transition from the empirical realm of the everyday to a distinctly transcendental experience that transcends even the posts themselves. A major pitfall to watch out for is slighting the experience in favor of holding onto the posts. There is even a risk that some of the unsatisfied religious meaning gets transferred onto the empirical signs themselves, thus making them into idols without realizing it. The mistaken assumption is then that a sustained, intense focus on the empirical objects enhances rather than takes away from religious experience. In actuality, the religious domain, which is inherently transcendental, has been confiscated with more familiar experience within the limits of human cognition and perception. All the while, the Kingdom of God is within, as though smiling at these artificial edifices we create to edify and bemuse ourselves.

I contend that the bottom line on the real presence is the theologically-felt experience of transformation or sanctification that can be induced by applying the theological concept to the bread and wine via ritual. The religious experience is not exhausted by the symbols on the surface; religionists merely use them, and the associated ritual, as prep. Crassly put, they put people in the mood. Sustained, concentrated transcending as an experience that is really present (though not reality!) does not just happen after a person steps into a church from a busy day, hence the rites and posts to follow along the way. The point is the experience, felt as really present (and thus eternal rather than of time and space)—the artifices along the way are just so, rather than religious objects to be held as though they were ends in themselves, which is to say, idols.

Source:

Bill Keller, “Asking Candidates Tougher Questions About Faith,” New York Times, August 25, 2011.


Pope Francis on Youth Unemployment, War, and the Idolatry of Money

It is not often that the global economy’s military-industrial complex is tied to youth unemployment and, moreover, to the idolatry of money. Yet this is precisely the thread woven by the spiritual leader of the Roman Catholic Church. While the pope’s comments risk a certain overreach from the theological to the terrain of international political economy, which proffers its own body of knowledge, it can also be said that having a transcendent referent as one’s focus enables a person to make subtle taken-for-granted assumptions in our economic, social, and political systems transparent. In articulating an economic (and related political) center and giving it a distinctly theological interpretation stemming from the Biblical passage, “For where your treasure is, there your heart will be also,”[1] the Roman pope provides the world with a way to do political economy from a distinctly religious vantage-point.

“At the center of all economic systems must be man, man and woman,” the pope asserts; “everything else must be in service to this man.[2] In itself, this claim is not religious in nature. Rather, the tone is philosophical, reminiscent perhaps of Kant’s “kingdom of ends” in which morality means respecting rational beings as objective ends in themselves, rather than only using them as means. For Kant, a lack of goodwill, due to pathology, lies behind the lack of adequate respect that would otherwise put people first—hence the need for public legal justice. This is not to say that Kant secularizes the matter completely; any rational creature is an end in itself “by virtue of the autonomy of his freedom he is the subject of the moral law, which is holy.”[3]  Using reason, the rational being is an assigner of value; such a being thus has absolute value (hence deserving to be treated as an end in itself, rather than merely a means to someone else’s agenda). Now a rational being is uniquely free to subject himself to his own law, which, given the necessity that lies in reason itself, binds him.  “The moral law is holy (inviolable),” Kant writes; “the humanity in his person must be holy to him.”[4] For Kant, the humanity is the rational nature, which makes the moral law sacred because reason cannot be bent out of sheer caprice. Put another way, rational beings have absolute value in that we use reason to hold ourselves as if by necessity (though freely) to that which we assign value to.

Pope Francis can be read as substituting love for reason—that men and women are made out of love, and thus inherently to be loved rather than used as mere means. Here we can discern glimpses of Leibniz’s claim that human beings are due love as a matter of justice as per the extent of being or existence that we have, and Augustine’s emphasis on caritas, or human love that can be sublimated to love of God.

Whereas Kant points to pathological self-love as thwarting the respect due beings of love, Pope Francis argues in terms similar to Aquina’s misordered concupiscence—placing a lower good above a higher one. “(W)e have put money at the center, the god of money,” the pope claims. “We have fallen into a sin of idolatry, the idolatry of money.”[5] Where your treasure is, there may be found your heart. In this case, money, which Aristotle calls barren metal, has come to be loved rather than other people, not to mention God, which as Augustine stresses, is love itself. The basic problem, in other words, is warped priorities.

Not surprisingly, greed is not far away, lying behind money as a god at the center of all. “The economy is moved by the ambition of having more.”[6] That ambition is an end in itself, so no amount of money is ever enough. Interestingly, we can distinguish ever-lasting here from the eternal; whereas love cuts through time in having value, greed is of infinite, or unlimited, desire. Value that cuts through time, such as holds with love, gets expunged by the all-consuming god of money. Put in Kantian terms, people are treated as mere means rather than also as ends in themselves.

It is no wonder that the young and old are tossed to the wayside because of their relatively low utility. Regarding youth unemployment, the pope had this to say. “(W)e are discarding an entire generation to maintain an economic system that can’t hold up anymore, a system that to survive must make war, as the great empires have always done.”[7] The system, being designed to funnel money, must be protected, and it is no accident that the people-as-means, or human resources, attribute so easily translates into an economy of war. Rather than being at the center, the human being is reduced to collateral damage, or targeted outright.

Because “a Third World War can’t be done, they make [regional] wars,” the pope explains.[8] This involves the production and sale of weapons, which sorts out “the balance sheets of the idolatrous economies, the great world economies that sacrifice man at the feet of the idol of money.”[9] Here the pope explicitly relates making money an idol of inviolable worth and sacrificing people as if they are worthless. Barren metal, in other words, is put over beings capable of holding themselves to a moral law and of loving themselves and others—even those who would sacrifice them on an altar of gold. Not unexpectedly, an international political economy oriented to sustaining an arms trade divides economies—even sorting them reductively along the lines of weapons production and consumption. The United States is a “superpower,” whereas Africa has value only in as much as it has the wherewithal to purchase weapons and sustain its intestine squabbles.

Once held up as a coming cacophony of diversity “like a polyhedron, all united but each preserving its particularity, its wealth, its identity,” globalization has become impoverished, “a sphere in which all points are equidistant from the center” whose sheer gravity “takes away the wealth of diversity of thought and therefore the wealth of a dialogue between peoples.”[10] That is to say, the reductionistic, weapons-oriented organizing principle of the global military-industrial complex saps globalization of its many differences, essentially nullifying this sort of wealth in favor of a more banal form in which the dark hole of a bank vault functions as a god with a suffocating embrace.

Beware the military industrial complex. U.S. President Eisenhower delivered this starkly public warning as he embraced some free speech in his farewell address in 1960. It is dangerous to have so much financial and related political interest lined up on the side of war. This is hardly unknown, yet we tolerate it because the interests of capital have beguiled us into supposing that they have labor’s back. In other words, we have been made to fear the onslaught of mass unemployment that would ensue from a structural realignment off the weapons trade. 

In his interview in 2014, Pope Francis takes a more subtler look at what is really at stake. Whereas historically religion and then morality operated as viable constraints on the profit motive, the god of money seems to have a relatively free hand as of the early twenty-first century at least; correspondingly, people are secondary, and thus expendable, in the system designed and inhabited by the same. Money has come to be regarded as an absolute, with the worth of persons being defined exclusively according to its measure. Put another way, the unit of measurement has become an end in itself—inviolable, and thus an idol—while the measurers—the assigners of value—have come to accept their place as mere means, or human resources. 

Living in the “system”— an artifice entirely changeable even in its basic contours—many people just assume that the constantly-felt subterranean, subtly existential instability or uncertainty is a necessary part of life. Life means being expendable. Life means that money rules. From a transcendental referent point, a spiritual person can see the world differently—atypically—and thus make transparent our systems’ basic premises. Once recognized, they can be changed; the changers can take back their innate power to set the priorities for the systems, whether they are social, economic, or political in nature, and to see to it that the designs are in sync with those priorities. Where our treasures are, there too are our gods.




[1] Luke 12:34; Matthew 6:21. Not being in Mark, the source is likely the book of Q (which stands for Quelle, or “source” in German), a book of Jesus sayings hypothesized to have been a source used by the writers of Luke and Matthew.
[3] Kant, Critique of Practical Reason (1788)
[4] Ibid.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Ibid.