Secularized Religion in Nazi Ideology

In 2025 at Harvard, Madeline Levy presented her dissertation in progress in a graduate-student research workshop, which I was privileged to attend in my capacity as a research scholar at Harvard. She was presenting how the Hitler Youth program in Nazi Germany appropriated from religion politically, thus in a secular context yet with the aura of a religious cult. Interestingly, most of the kids in the program had been in church groups. Almost two decades earlier, I had audited a course on Nazi Cinema at another university; the course was taught by an 81-year-old German man who had been forced into Hitler Youth. Unlike Stalin’s cinema, which was blatant Soviet propaganda, Nazi cinema was escapist (not counting the anti-Jew propaganda “documentaries”). In contrast, Hitler Youth was hardly escapist, as the program was steeped in Nazi ideology. Although that ideology was secular, casting even Catholic Europe as an enemy, Levy was making the case that religious paraphernalia was incorporated in the program nonetheless. She brought up the element on ontology, or being, which in turn led me to draw on philosophy to explain the kids as becoming moral agents in a Kantian sense. Although philosophy and theology are distinct, both can be applied to political theory in a historical context.

The full essay is at "Political Religion."

Acting Morally: Bhukti Yoga and Kant Beyond Duty

At Harvard’s Bhukti Yoga Conference in 2025, a Hindu religious artist whose Hindu name is Srimati Syamarani, spoke on the art of spiritual life. A person is like the hand of Krishna. The hand puts food in Krishna’s body, so the entire body is nourished. The hand serving the body is a duty. So too is following the type of bhukti that is following rules and regulations out of duty. At some point, it will no longer be felt as a duty. In Kantian terms, this means not acting ethically by being compelled by reason—the necessity of the moral law that reason presents to us; rather, going beyond moral duty is to approximate the holy will, but not because it is the nature of finite rational beings to be good; rather, it is out of love of the moral law, including its necessitating us to act ethically. In bhukti devotion, however, it is not love of the form of moral law (i.e., it being an imperative, or command, of reason) that obviates the sense of duty to serve Krishna and other people, as in being a hand of Krishna serves Krishna’s body; rather, it is love directed to Krishna (and ensuing compassion to people) that transcends ethical obligation per se. This is not to say that bhukti practice can go beyond feeling obligated due to a feeling, whereas it is by the use of reason that Kantian gets beyond duty, for it is the feeling of respect that empirically motivates a person to treat people as not only means to one’s own goals, but also as ends in themselves. As rational beings, we partake in reasoning, albeit in a finite way, and reason itself has absolute value because it is by reason that value is assigned to things. Even so, it cannot be said that a devotee of Krishna in Hinduism can go beyond acting out of duty due to an emotion (i.e.., love or compassion) whereas for Kant it is just by reasoning that a person can go beyond acting because one is duty-bound.

To Kant, acting out of a maxim, which is simply a reason for doing something, that includes a desire for an empirical object is lower than having as a reason, acting out of the moral law. Material principles presuppose an object of desire. Getting that object is a condition of having the subjective, material principle. Kant didn’t want a material maxim, such as the desire for one’s own happiness, not to mention wealth, to have anything to do with the moral law. A material maxim cannot furnish the content of a moral law. “All practical principles that presuppose an object (matter) of the faculty of desire as the determining ground of the will are, without exception, empirical and can furnish no practical laws.”[1] A moral law, which is practical in that it relates to actions rather than, say, metaphysics, cannot be oriented to getting something that is desired. Not even the desire to be happy can be admitted to a moral law. “All material practical principles as such are, without exception, of one and the same kind and come under the general principle of self-love or one’s own happiness.”[2] Even though self-love, unlike self-conceit, is constrained by moral law, self-love is sordid in that it can be the basis of a reason for doing something (i.e., a maxim) that is connected with a desire for something. Additionally, Kant maintains that “(t)he maxim of self-love (prudence) merely advises,” whereas “the law of morality commands. . . . there is a great difference between which we are advised to do and that to which we are obliged.”[3] In short, being motivated by self-love is not strong enough to get us to act morally. It is the form of a moral law, specifically as a command by reason, that turns out to be crucial in us, who have other inclinations, to be moral agents.  

Even enjoying doing your duty is a material practical principle because such a motive is empirical in nature, whereas being motivated to act because of the form of the moral law is not a material principle. The holy will of an infinite being can only be approximated by finite rational beings by trying to extirpate material desires (i.e., trying to rid oneself of all inclinations). But we can’t do that completely. Even so, we can be morally good agents because we can feel obligated to do something out of duty; we know we can be ethical because we are obligated. That is to say, we can be moved to do something just because it is our duty. Moral goodness is only possible for finite rational beings; if we were infinite, we wouldn’t be morally good—we would be good because that would be our nature. A fully rational agent would just do as a matter of its nature what it ought to do, so doing so would not even be thought of or felt as a duty. In bhukti, Krishna does not feel obliged to act ethically; rather, the deity does so out of compassion, which is the deity’s nature.

To Kant, Love and benevolence are a matter of duty to for finite beings such as us. In contrast, pathological love is from an inclination and thus cannot be a duty.  Practical love is the duty to make the following maxim: acting for others’ state rather than one’s own as a reason for doing something. Even though for Kant self-love is subject to the moral law (whereas self-conceit is not), it seems to me that the maxim of love and benevolence is difficult to reconcile with the idea that self-love is confined by the moral law. I think Kant’s desire to distinguish self-love from self-conceit is responsible for his over-estimation of self-love normatively (i.e., as a good thing).

Also, whereas love and benevolence are salient in bhukti devotion and the devotee’s interpersonal relations, for Kant, practical love can’t be the sole motive in acting on a moral duty because but there cannot be a duty to have a feeling. “If a rational being is to think of his maxims as practical universal laws, he can think of them only as principles that contain the determining ground of the will not by their matter but only by their form.”[4] The moral law has the form of an imperative by the nature of law itself, as necessitated by reason. Necessitation is the process by which a finite rational being brings oneself to do what one ought to do by what one takes as a command of reason to do. Necessitation is a psyche process in the phenomenal realm (i.e., of appearances) that is empirically motivated by means of the feeling of respect. But this is only empirically so; a priori (i.e., apart from experience), it is the duty itself that motivates us. Think of reason as commanding you. A person follows the command by being motivated by a feeling of respect for the moral law itself. It is precisely that feeling that can obviate the sense of duty itself; even though our nature, unlike Krishna’s or God’s, is not goodness itself (omnibenevolence), we can get beyond feeling obligated to act according to the duty required by reason and motivated by respect for other people as ends in themselves (because they too are rational beings). With sufficient respect for the form (i.e., imperative) of moral law itself, a person can act morally not out of a sense of duty.

In her talk, Srimati Syamarani spoke of following the rules and regulations first as her duty, but then out of love for Krishna. In contrast, Kant claims that love cannot be the sole motive for acting morally, whether out of duty or not. Respect for the imperative of reason itself in its capacity as a moral law-giver is very different than the love that a devotee directs to a deity, and yet these two ways can get finite moral agents acting morally and yet not out of a sense of duty.

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1. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., 5:36.
4. Ibid., 5:27.

On Embodied Souls in Business: Hinduism and Christianity

A man whose chosen Hindu name is Vridavanath spoke at Harvard’s Bhukti Yoga Conference in 2025 on the plight and ultimate aim of an embodied soul as described in the Bhagavad-Gita. A conditioned soul/self (atman) that has entered the material realm and is thus subject to karmic consequences can come back to the divine source of all: the One that is in all. As material, embodied beings while alive, that is, as both biological and spiritual, we are prone to getting locked into dualities of attachment and aversion, which in turn play right into suffering. We forget that we are wearing material masks, and that our real identity (atman) is greater than our material roles that we assume in our daily lives. Through our actions, we bind ourselves by the law of karma. Before being born into the material realm, a person’s unembodied soul (atman) knew Krishna, but as embodied, the soul/self relates to other corporeal bodies rather than to other people as spiritual beings and thus in compassion. Why does Brahman or Krishna—the respective impersonal or personal notions of Absolute Truth—create the world with separateness from the divine included?  Furthermore, how is a devotee of Krishna to navigate working in business, given the separateness woven into the very fabric of our daily existence as material and spiritual beings?

Body, soul, and matter are the three fundamental elements in the created realm. Fundamentally, we are free beings but we are subject to attachments in the created realm. Honoring the free will of the soul, Brahman or Krishna creates separateness in Creation; it is not that conscious being or the supreme deity wants us to be in a condition of separation from the divine. Rather, the embodied soul is guided in part out of its inclination to live separately from the divine, and Brahman or Krishna use creative energy to accommodate the inclination and thus human free-will. It follows that not only goodness, but also passion and ignorance are the fundamental elements of the soul’s material (embodied) existence in the material world.

As the Supreme Soul, according to Vridavanath, Krishna leads embodied souls to goodness even though Krishna (and Brahman) transcends goodness. Similarly, liberation (moksha) is achieved when there is no longer any residue from good and bad karma. In Fear and Trembling, Kierkegaard makes the same point: that the divine command that Abraham gets to sacrifice his son Isaac trumps the ethical verdict of murder (and even attempted murder, as Abraham is commanded by Yahweh to put down his knife at the last minute). From the standpoint of the (ethical) good, Abraham is guilty of attempted murder. Yet from a theological standpoint, the divine command is to sacrifice rather than murder Isaac. This can only be viewed as absurd to other characters in the story, for they do not have access to the divine command that is given exclusively to Abraham. The ultimate goal in a faith narrative is theological rather than ethical, for such a narrative lies squarely in the sui generis domain of religion, even if that of ethics is related.

In his talk, Vridavanath said that the ultimate goal of the embodied soul/self in the Bhagavad-Gita is to know Krishna, by using the faculty of buddhi, which is the enlightened use of the reasoning faculty of the mind to know the source of the created realm. However, does knowledge exhaust devotion? It seems that the former is better suited to Absolute Truth being impersonal than to it being assumed to be personal, as a Supreme Person. In the Gita, Krishna tells Arjuna, "Whatever you do, whatever you eat, whatever you sacrifice, whatever you give, whatever austerities-you-perform—do that . . . (as) an offering to Me. Thus you will be freed from the bonds of action (whose) fruits are auspicious (or) inauspicious. Released, (with) the self-yoked by the Yoga of renunciation, you will come to Me."[1] The goal thus surpasses good as well as bad karma, and thus ethics, as the world itself must be renounced in terms of being attached to it for a person to be liberated. This does not mean non-action, according to the Gita; rather, renunciation means non-attachment to consequences of actions. The embodied soul/self is to do one’s duty in actions without being concerned about the results. Krishna also advocates meditation, as well as bhakti-yoga, the path of offering love by infusing each activity with love of Krishna and all creatures.

The inclusion of "whatever you give" includes offering in devotion to Krishna the fruits of one's labor (i.e., monetary compensation) yet without being attached to the consequences of our actions, including whether there will be a monetary bonus. Rather than desiring wealth, being duty-bound to perform one’s job and giving of one’s compensation to charity in devotion to Krishna and compassion to other people is the way to avoid accumulating bad karma from being greedy and ultimately to return to Krishna, and thus be liberated from any future rebirth (samsara).

The approach corresponds to the Christian social-ethic paradigm whose dominance replaced that of the one wherein having wealth is tightly coupled to greed, regardless of how the wealth is used.[1] That other paradigm is epitomized by Jesus’s saying that a rich person getting into the kingdom of God is like a camel getting through the eye of a needle (I have trouble even putting a thread through a needle’s eye). 

In the Gita, a devotee of Krishna can and in fact should fight in battle, and by implication, be a highly paid CEO of a company, but without being attached to the resulting fame and wealth, respectively. As in the “pro-wealth” (i.e., uncoupled) paradigm of Christianity, a devotee of Krishna does not have to renounce accumulating wealth, as long as at least some of it is given away in charity, in order to avoid serving two masters—Krishna and mammon. That Christian paradigm is, however, less strict because the Jesus-devotee does not have to be detached from the consequences of one’s work, including the prospect of getting a bonus. 

I submit, therefore, that the Christian “pro-wealth” paradigm is more suspectable to the onslaught of greed. This may be why Jesus in the Gospels is firm in demanding that the rich man give away all of his wealth to follow Jesus. It can be concluded that the susceptibility to succumb to greed is treated as higher in the “pro-wealth” Christian paradigm that in the Bhagavad-Gita.

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1. Gita 9.27-28 in Georg and Brenda Feuerstein, The Bhagavad-Gita: A New Translation (Boston: Shambhala, 2011), p. 199.
2. Skip Worden, Godliness and Greed: Shifting Christian Thought on Profit and Wealth and God’s Gold: Beneath the Shifting Sands of Christian Thought on Profit-Seeking and Wealth.

Transcendence in Action in the Bhagavad-gita

Chaitanya Charan spoke at Harvard’s Bhukti Yoga Conference in 2025 about action and transcendence in the Bhagavad-gita. Arjuna faces adversity even though he is a good. That life is suffering is a Noble Truth in Buddhism. Why noble? Even suffering can be ennobling. That life can be unfair is a given in the Gita. Getting less than we think we deserve can be from our bad karma in a previous life. So, we can’t really know what we actually deserve, so it is important to accept results. They aren’t in our control anyway, whereas our present karma is. So, the advice is to be committed to doing your best in acting, but with detachment on whatever results from the action. I contend that detachment from pride and especially arrogance goes automatically with the transcendence of detachment from not only the results of one’s actions, but also from the created realm itself, which by analogy looks smaller and smaller as the planet Earth does from a spacecraft on the way to the Moon.

Acceptance and commitment to acting lead to transcendence, spirituality goes from being an anchor to being an airplane. In terms of bhukti devotion, Krishna is the higher reality. As a person grows spiritually, the deity becomes more important and the world’s importance becomes less. Transcendence is a matter of being more oriented to “another reality” than to the world, and thus such a person might seem to be not fully “here” in conversations with other people. Differing somewhat from Charan’s interpretation of the Gita, I contend that the higher “reality” in the Gita can be understood to be a deity itself, as in bhukti devotionalism, or, as Shankara claims in his commentary on the Gita, reaching the higher reality can be thought of as an ongoing realization that a person can have that one’s self (atman) is really the very same as brahman, which is conscious, limitless, powerful, and blissful being. In bhukti (i.e., devotion to a deity), according to Charan, a deity as a higher reality that is to be the primary focus even while the person is committed to actions in the world.  Charan pointed out that bhukti devotion does not mean that a person should not be fixed on a goal, for a goal is held before acting whereas results are afterward.

In the Gita, according to Charan, Arjuna is initially perplexed. If he does not fight, disaster on the battlefield would be likely because the other side, which has unjustly cast out Arjuna and his brothers from a share in rulership, would win. If Arjuna does fight, he might kill his teachers and even one of his grandfathers. The Gita is essentially a call to action; the philosophical basis for acting is not the point in the Gita. Act, but with detachment from whatever results. Act with wisdom; act with a higher consciousness, which, means transcending attachment to things of the world to a higher realization.

Whether in being oriented to Charan’s bhukti higher reality personified as Krishna or Shankara’s impersonal brahman, that the process of transcending the world shifts a person’s orientation such that the world looks smaller and the higher reality looks larger is decisive in Charan’s view of spirituality gained from having studied and meditated on the Gita text. He did not mention, however, the compatible idea that a natural or automatic sense of humility is an important inherent byproduct of shifting (and then holding) one’s primary focus to a reference-point that is by definition, according to the Christian theologian, Pseudo-Dionysius, beyond the limits of human thoughts, perception, and emotions. Even in the realization that one’s atman is identical to brahman, a person’s ego cannot be front and center if the reference point (i.e., brahman) is not sourced in and thus limited to the world in which we live (i.e., the created realm, whether it is created by brahman or Krishna). Being limitless is a quality of brahman. 

Human beings are so steeped in pride (i.e., the presumptions of ego, as if deserving to be on stilts during a flood) that the byproduct of having a qualitatively unique kind of orientation (i.e., in terms of religious transcendence) is crucial not only to being able to be at peace, but also for interpersonal relations to be so as well. A focus on Jesus or the kingdom of God can serve the same purpose for a Christian even without taking into account the leitmotif of humility in the Gospels. In fact, that humility is a byproduct of maintaining a transcendental orientation even while performing actions in the world and relating to other people is especially valuable precisely because intending to be humble can be such a weak motive in human nature. I suppose that relying more on a natural byproduct of a distinct kind of orientation than on an intention to have the byproduct itself as a quality may be Taoist in nature. In other words, it may be more natural to human nature to assume an orientation to a transcendent referent point or entity than it is to try to be humble, given the gravitas of the human ego.  This is not to say that valuing humility highly as a virtue is not another means by which a person can be naturally humble.

Shankara: Knowers-of-the-Self Should Not Fight

I contend that Shankara imparts too much of his Advaita Vedanta Hindu philosophy’s penchant for renunciation in interpreting the momentous chapter two of the Bhagavadgita. I know in having translated a text that it is all too tempting to “embellish” a text by re-phrasing beyond what is necessary for clarity. Sometimes, in reading another translation of a text that I am translating, I am astounded to find even entire subordinate clauses that do not correspond to the original text in its language. I believe Shankara does something similar in both his emphasis on the self (atman) as non-agent and his disavowal of action in favor of renunciation. Krishna’s advice to Arjuna is not to renounce fighting in the war, which even Shankara describes as righteous even though it is for earthly power. To fight dispassionately is obviously not the same as not fighting (i.e., not acting). Krishna is not in favor of Arjuna’s refusal to fight, whether Arjuna has knowledge of the Samkhya (i.e., discrimination of metaphysical reality: that eternal, immutable atman is Brahman).

Interpreting the Gita, Shankara acknowledges that “knowledge of Samkhya . . . has been imparted to” Arjuna by Krishna.”[1] In spite of the fact that knowers of Samkhya are to practice renunciation in line with the knowledge that an individual atman (self) is immutable and thus cannot act, Krishna tells Arjuna, “stand up, determined to fight.”[2] Take care, though, for being determined can be taken wrongly as wanting to fight; for in the next line, Krishna says, “Looking with an equal eye on pleasure and pain, gain and loss, victory and defeat, strive to fight; thus will you incur no sin.”[3] Krishna is preaching indifference in dispassionate fighting, rather than acquiescing to Arjuna’s desire not to fight. That desire, like all desire, occasions karma (i.e., the residue from righteous as well as unrighteous action) and thus keeps the self (atman) from losing itself even as an entity in Brahman.[4]

To Shankara, it is only as a non-knower of the nature and essence of one’s self (atman) that a person is excused for acting—for such a person doesn’t know any better. Only a person knows that one’s self cannot possibly act (because the atman has no parts and thus is not subject to change) that one should practice renunciation. Whereas the non-knower’s righteous actions can result in heaven, the knower’s renunciation (and thus lack of karma) can result in liberation (moksa).[5]

I’m not convinced that Shankara realizes the contradiction in admitting that Arjuna is now a knower even as Krishna rejects Arjuna’s decision of renunciation from fighting and even urges him to fight. To be sure, Shankara could reasonably retort that in acting dispassionately on the battlefield, Arjuna is honoring the fact that his atman cannot act and is perhaps not even acting. Shakara could charitably be interpreted as referring to a person’s atman in stating “that it is impossible for the Self-Knower to act, whatever actions have been enjoined by the Sastras have reference only to the non-knower.”[6] That is, the “Self-Knower” here being referred to could be an individual’s immutable atman, which does not act even as a person is performing duties by acting. The “immutability of the Self” negates “all actions on its part; such immutability is the “specific reason for ruling out all activities.”[7] It is a person’s atman that cannot act, so presumably this is so even when a person is acting, and so Krishna could be interpreted as telling Arjuna: act, for you have a duty to engage in righteous battle, but know that your inner self is not that which is acting. But Shankara makes it clear that just acting is not proper for a knower-of-Self, which Shankara acknowledges Arjuna to be once Krishna has imparted Knowledge of the Self.

Therefore, it is difficult to reconcile the narrower reading that atman, as immutable, cannot act with Shankara’s claim that “the science of the Gita [is that] the Self-Knower is obliged to renounce and not to perform works of all kinds.”[8] Shankara even refers to this as a doctrine! It is the performance itself, whether done dispassionately or with a desire to conquer or for wealth, that is forbidden for a Ksatriya who knows one’s own self (atman).[9] Again, Shankara states that “both the Self-knower perceiving the immutability of the Self, and the seeker after liberation, are called upon exclusively to renounce all Veda-enjoined works,” which, according to Shankara, include even the duty of a warrior to participate in righteous battle (even for earthly power) even though such participation can get a person to heaven.[10]

That a non-knower has a duty to act is not relevant here because Krishna imparts knowledge of the Self to Arjuna and tells him that, even with such knowledge, he should still fight. I must admit to being perplexed: Was Shankara so oriented to presenting his own philosophy of the Self (Advaita Vedanta) that he overlooked this vital point, or am I missing something?  Because disinterested yogic action is for people who do not know the Self, and is thus inferior to the renunciation for people who know the Self and even those people who seek liberation, Krishna’s urging of dispassionate action to Arjuna after Krishna has taught Arjuna on the Self contradicts Sankara’s philosophy. Shakara’s writings evince great intelligence, hence my theory that the explanation for the contradiction lies not with his reasoning, but that he was interested in using the opportunity of commentary on the Gita to state his philosophy of renunciation over yogic action—which is to say, knowledge of Self over ignorance and delusion.

 It’s interesting that even the non-violent Gandhi acknowledges in his commentary on the Gita that Krishna enjoins Arjuna to fight, whereas Shankara insists that knowers of the Self are prohibited from fighting. To impart a commentary on a text should be centered, and thus not depart from, the ideas that are in the text, especially if its central idea, rather than used as an unabashed opportunity to present one’s own philosophy, especially where it diverges from that of the text. It is nothing short of astonishing that Shankara characterizes the Gita as being oriented to removing “the cause of transmigratory life consisting of grief, delusion, etc., and not to compel anyone to initiate action of any kind.”[11] But compelling action is precisely what Krishna does in the pivotal scene! It is Arjuna’s decision to renounce action that is being castigated and strongly refuted. That an atman, being eternal—neither born nor subject to decay and death—cannot be slayed does not mean that Krishna is urging Arjuna not to fight. Arjuna is in fact compelled by Krishna to initiate action on the battlefield befitting the Vedic duty of a warrior, even though Krishna knows that Arjuna has become a Knower-of-Self.

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1. Shankara, Srimad Bhagavad Gita Bhasya of Sri Samkaracarya, Trans. A.G. Warrier (Madras, IN: Sri Ramakrishna Math), p. 62.
2. Gita 2.37. Quoted by Sankara in Srimad Bhagavad Gita Bhasya, p. 60.
3. Gita 2.38. Quoted by Sankara in Srimad Bhagavad Gita Bhasya, p. 61.
4. Interestingly, Samuel Hopkins, who studied under Jonathan Edwards (and even lived with the Edwards for some time), was so keen on disinterested benevolence that he castigates in his text even the desire for heaven; hence, the proper belief is that the soul ceases to be an entity when it is in union with God. Because Edwards studied comparative religion, whether Hopkins got his idea from the Hindu notion that an individual atman ceases to be an entity when it is liberated (moksa) from the cycle of reincarnations (samsara).
5. This is an interesting dual-track: righteous action, say if the “battle is for the sake of righteousness and people’s security, though the conquest [is] of the world,” can get person to heaven(“happy the warriors [who] encounter battle, occurring by chance and opening the gate to heaven”, Gita, 2.32); whereas renunciation can result in liberation. What is the difference here between heaven and liberation (moksa)?
6. Shankara, Srimad Bhagavad Gita Bhasya of Sri Samkaracarya,  p. 44.
7. Ibid., pp. 43-4.
8. Ibid.,  p. 49. The translator even puts the doctrine in italics.
9. Interestingly, Shakara claims that the essence of an individual atman is delusion and thus cannot be known (or, can be known to be an illusion). The knower of self thus even has insight (for an atman cannot be perceived or even pondered, and yet “the sruti teaches that ‘by the mind alone is the Self to be perceived’” according to Sankara (p. 47) that one’s own self exists but has no essence. Though is not beingness, taken as an adjective, the essence, and if so, being cannot be a delusion, for Brahman is being and consciousness writ large (and writ small).
10. Shankara, Srimad Bhagavad Gita Bhasya of Sri Samkaracarya,  p. 46.
11. Ibid., p. 39.