Showing posts with label monastic life. Show all posts
Showing posts with label monastic life. Show all posts

Wednesday, November 13, 2024

Transcending Seductive Masks of Eternity: Thérèse of Lisieux

Marie Martin (1873-1897), known to the world as the Carmelite nun, Thérèse of Lisieux as well as Thérèse of the Child Jesus and the Holy Face, was a mystic who centered her devotional love on Jesus. Pope Pius X called her “the greatest saint of modern times”[1] and Pope John Paul Il made her a doctor of the Roman Catholic Church. Nevertheless, it is worth investigating whether her devotional love sublimated (i.e., looking upward) with Jesus as the object of the love was in fact humble, and thus more like divine than human love. Although psychological analyses of Thérèse exist in the secondary literature on her, we can both acknowledge her psychological challenges and put psychological couch aside as it is exogenous to the domain of religion, which has its own criteria; I will focus on and critique from a religious standpoing the distinctly religious meaning that Thérèse continues to provide in the West during the twenty-first century even though the wider secular culture in the West saturates modernity under the supervision of the tall, steel, and bewindowed edifices to wealth and worldly power.

Although her mother’s death when Thérèse was four was deeply felt by the little girl, and she may have suffered from mental illness at least as a child, the religious meaning that can be grasped from her mystical devotion to Jesus is nonetheless valid in religious terms. This is not to say that the trauma of losing her mother did not leave an imprint on her religious faith. She wrote, for example, of a dream in which she sees the “glance and smile [which are] FILLED with LOVE” of Venerable Anne of Jesus, the Foundress of Carmel in France, whom Thérèse refers to as “Mother” both in the dream and in writing about it later.[2] Thérèse also refers to the Church as “my Mother.”[3] The other side of the mother-equation is of course the child. Writing to her Prioress at the convent, Thérèse states, “I am acting with you as a child because you do not act with me as a Prioress but a Mother.”[4] The instinctual need for a mother was doubtlessly very much in play. The mother-daughter leitmotif is also salient in the following: “You have told me, my dear Mother, of your desire that I . . . . I began this sweet song with your dear daughter, Agnes of Jesus, who was the mother entrusted by God with guiding me in the days of my childhood.”[5] Thérèse is not referring to her literal childhood, even though she entered the convent when she was a teenager; rather, she has sublimated from her unmet psychological need to describing and inhabiting a spiritual relation that is a microcosm of the relationship between a creature, such as Man, and the Creator, which is God. Thérèse refers to heaven in the dream being “peopled with souls who actually love me, who consider me their child.”[6] She obviously did not mean this in the sense of being a corporeal daughter. She also wrote, “O Blessed Inhabitants of heaven, I beg you to ADOPT ME AS YOUR CHILD.”[7] That she uses capital letters to highlight being adopted spiritually as a child in heaven leaves no doubt both as to the salience of the child motif in her mind, and of the distinctly spiritual meaning that she applied to the word.

Rather than psychoanalyze the young adult who lost her mother so early, I want to draw on her book to explore the unique connotations that the child motif has in Christianity, which is in opposition to the values in the  earthly city. “The heart of a child does not seek riches and glory (even the glory of heaven),” she wrote.[8] To be sure, her focus in applying the child motif was not on differentiating Augustine’s two cities. Rather, she was describing what a creature is like relative to God. Distinctively and valid religious meaning is possible even amid disturbing psychological issues; the former is not invalidated by the presence of the latter. “I am only a child, powerless and weak,” she wrote.[9] Elsewhere in her text, she highlights that she is a “poor little weak creature.”[10] This is of course relative to God. From creatures being little and weak, Christianity goes on to postulate certain qualities. On July 17, 1897, Thérèse wrote, “I feel that my mission is about to begin, my mission to make God loved as I love Him, to teach souls my little way.”[11] Of that way, she adds, “It is the way of spiritual childhood, the way of trust and absolute surrender.”[12] There is a certain innocence and willingness to trust in a childlike nature that is innately suited to entering the Kingdom of God. Writing of children whom she had known, Thérèse refers to “the souls of little children” as already having “the theological virtues” and being “innocent.”[13]

Speaking on Thérèse in 1921, Pope Benedict XV said, “In spiritual childhood is the secret of sanctity for all the faithful of the Catholic world” so as to “enter wholeheartedly into the Little Way which led Sister Thérèse to the summit of heroic virtue.”[14] The pope made reference to the Christian scriptures, such as in the Gospel of Matthew (18:3-4), where Jesus says, “Amen, I say to you, unless you be converted and become as little children, you shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven. Whoever, therefore, shall humble himself as this little child, will be greatest in the kingdom of heaven.” In the Gospel of Mark (10:14-5), Jesus says, “Allow the little ones to come to me and forbid them not, for such is the kingdom of heaven. Amen, I say to you, whoever shall not receive the kingdom of God as a little child shall never enter into it.”[15] In teaching her “little way,” however, Thérèse had drawn instead on text from the Old Testament, including, “Whoever is a little one, let him come to me” (Proverbs 9:4), “For to him that is little, mercy will be shown” (Wisdom 6:7), and “As one whom a mother caresses, so will I comfort you; you shall be carried at the breasts, and upon the knees they shall fondle you” (Isaiah 66:12-3).[16]

Thérèse did not mean childhood in the sense of being selfish and not assuming responsibility. It is in this sordid sense that Thérèse wrote, “It was December 25, 1886, that I received the grace of leaving my childhood, in a word, the grace of my complete conversion” because “Jesus desired to show me that I was to give up the defects of my childhood and so He withdrew my innocent pleasures.”[17] Referring to one such defect, she wrote, “My excuse is that I am a child, and children do not reflect on the meaning of their words.”[18] Paradoxically, Jesus made her as like a child in another way: “I felt charity enter into my soul, and the need to forget myself and to please others,” she later wrote.[19] Rather than selfish childishness, losing oneself in pleasing others—in Thérèse’s case, converting grave sinners—rendered her anew as a child of God. From selfishness to losing oneself is not, however, something I would associate with children. Moreover, although pleasing others is better than selfishness, the distinctly theological love (i.e., agape) that Jesus exemplifies (and ultimately is) can hardly be characterized as people-pleasing.

Thérèse applied the positive qualities of a child to denote her inferiority in her love-relation with Jesus, and more to the point, that she was a mere creature whereas he is God. It is in coming from a subordinate position that, when “Jesus saw that the time had come for me to be loved, He entered into a covenant with me and I became His own.”[20] She even draws in the mother motif: “To be Your Spouse, to be a Carmelite, and by my union with You to be the Mother of souls, should not this suffice me?”[21] She even brings in the child motif, for she also viewed herself as “the Child of the Church and the Church is a Queen since she is Your Spouse, O divine King of Kings.”[22] Rather than intimating incest, she was using possession to denote the extent of difference between a creature and its Creator. “O Jesus, Your little bird is happy to be weak and little,” she wrote.[23]

Thérèse is also implying that Jesus’ love is superior to her own even in her capacity as a devotee of Jesus rather than of wealth or earthly power. She broadly sketches the distinctive nature of Christian divine love in writing, “Because I was little and weak He lowered Himself to me, and He instructed me secretly in the things of His love.”[24] Him lowering, or humbling himself, rather than being all high and mighty to someone who is weaker, constitutes the things of his love, and thus can be construed, moreover, as the self-emptying, agape love that God evinces in the Incarnation—that is, in God lowering itself to become joined (but not mixed) with earthly flesh in the person of Jesus Christ. The nature of God, which is divine love, gets poured into a human vessel without mixing with it. The theme of God’s love as humble rather than self-exalting carries through to how it is revealed. In the Gospels, Jesus says, “I thank thee, Father, that thou hast hidden these things from the wise and the prudent and revealed them to babes.”[25] Thérèse saw herself as such a babe. But did she love as Jesus loves or as people typically love? Was she really a child spiritually?

I contend that her piety was belied to a considerable, but not complete, extent by the epistemological arrogance of a creature presuming to know God and see God as it really is. In this way, Thérèse did not evince the innocence of a spiritual child and did not love as Jesus loves, for spiritual arrogance and agape love are antipodal. I submit that a mystic’s devotional love (i.e, caritas) is susceptible to the sin of pride because of the infusion and thus inclusion of eros and the likeness of the beloved to our world even in anthropomorphic terms. Beloved masks of eternity can thus be the final obstacle to further transcendence. If enough people master this insight in thoughts and worship, humanity would see a leap in the development of humaniry with respect to religion in the world comparable to the leap from animal sacrifice to the realization that religion has an interior aspect that antiquates the prior belief that gods demand animal sacrifices as a means of atonement for the sins of humans.

It is a mistake to assume that having an interior spirituality renders the divine within our grasp as creatures. Thérèse made this mistake. She wrote, “As the Imitation says, God communicates Himself at times in the midst of great splendor or ‘gently veiled, under shadows and figures.’[26] It was in this way He deigned to manifest Himself to our souls, but how light and transparent the veil was that hid Jesus from our gaze!”[27] In describing a vision she had of Anne, the founder of the order, Thérèse wrote, “The Carmelite raised her veil or rather she raised it and covered me with it.”[28] I submit that Paul and Augustine had been more accurate and less presumptuous, given the inherent limitations of finite, mortal creatures as qualitatively distinct from their Creator, which is wholly other, in characterizing the veil as more like a window darked by smoke, such as we can imagine from incense and candles in a Church. “Doubt was impossible, faith and hope were unnecessary,” Thérèse continues, “and Love made us find on earth the One whom we were seeking.”[29] Although Paul had written that without love, faith is for naught, to relinquish faith and doubt regarding that of God is to make a category mistake regarding belief and knowledge in regard to that which goes beyond the limits of human reason, perspective, and emotions. In writing, “Yes, Jesus did all this for me,” Thérèse demonstrates epistemological (i.e., about knowledge, and the reaches thereof) arrogance.[30]

Hyperextended epistemological certainty of divine matters runs throughout Thérèse’s book. One instance is especially revealing. After her Christmas conversion, when she prayed for Pranzini, a prisoner on death’s row, she was certain that God would show her a sign of Pranzini’s last-minute piety, because she “was absolutely confident in the mercy of Jesus.[31] Reading of Pranzini kissing a crucifix while he was on the scaffold to be hanged, Thérèse was certain that Jesus had answered her prayer. David Hume would retort that Thérèse had actually committed the naturalistic fallacy, wherein an instance of positive correlation, such as two things occurring in a temporal relation, is erroneously assumed to involve causation (i.e., that one thing caused the other).

Another implication is in line with William James’ criticism of a thirteenth-century nun, Gertrud of Helfta. James wrote of that mystic’s view of God as being “full of partiality for his individual favorites,” including Gertrud.[32] Although I have argued that criticism is not applicable to Gertrud, it is ripe by the time we get to Thérèse. Writing both of when she walked down the stairs like a queen on Christmas, having just been transformed by Jesus from fear to joy, and later, when Jesus mystically made her his own: “Then I became beautiful in His eyes and He made me a mighty queen,” Thérèse depicts herself as among Jesus’s favorites.[33] Humility belied by religious superiority over other people is evident in her statement regarding what Jesus did for her: “Because I was little and weak He lowered Himself to me, and He instructed me secretly in the things of his love. Ah! had the learned who spent their life in study come to me, undoubtedly they would have been astonished to see a child of fourteen understand perfection’s secrets . . .”[34] To understand perfection esoterically can be likened to having the divine attribute of omniscience, or perfect knowledge. Even the learned would indeed come to such a person, though in the Gospels the learned Jews generally are averse to Jesus and his message.

Even though Thérèse admits that she was little and weak (and thus unworthy), the scent of arrogance wafts over her assumptions of being a queen and of superiority over older, learned Christians. She even extends the value (i.e., superiority) to include her “spiritual sister,” Céline, destined by Jesus “as the privileged one of His love!”[35] In writing to another nun, Thérèse observes, “How fortunate we are, dear sister, to understand the intimate secrets of our Spouse,” which is Jesus.[36] She makes the esoteric knowledge of the Gnostics look like front-page material of a well-circulated newspaper. Also, the exclusiveness of being married to Jesus is evident, as if that extent of union with the divine would not apply to anyone who loves distinctively in line with benevolentia universalis extended even and especially to one’s detractors and those who one regards as low, or outside. In the Gospel of Mark, the strangers catch on to Jesus’ message while his disciples don’t, and, moreover, Jesus says in Matthew (19:30; 20:16), Mark (10:31), and Luke (13:30) that the first are last and the last are first, and it is the meek whom Jesus says in his Sermon on the Mount will inherit the earth.[37]

Thérèse may have been in denial regarding the current undercutting her own intent to be humble. Rather than attribute this psychologically to the “nervous” illness that Thérèse had as a child or even the fact that her father referred to her as his “little Queen,”[38] it is more efficacious when in the domain of religion (rather than science) to focus on the distinctly religious meaning of divine, self-emptying love (agape) as it runs up against the sin of pride in a spiritual dynamic that does not reduce to psychology. Unlike all other domains, that of religion includes the belief and experiential yearning for a reference point that transcends the limits of human cognition, perception, and, yes Augustine, even emotion, as Pseudo-Dionysius argued in the sixth century. Similarly, Thérèse wrote, “I feel it is quite impossible for the human tongue to express things that the human heart can hardly understand.”[39]

Even though the religious meaning in Thérèse’s statement, “I wanted to love, to love Jesus with a passion, giving Him a thousand proofs of my love while it was possible,”[40] is laudatory, Jesus as Thérèse’s favorite mask of eternity may have paradoxically been the most intractable obstacle facing her to a more transcendent mystical experience of the divine as wholly other—as including mysterium. As David Hume claims in The Natural History of Religion, the human brain has difficulty holding onto divine simplicity, not to mention that which is utterly mysterious, for long without lapsing back to the familiarity of anthropomorphic masks. Her ultimate mask was Jesus, whose underlying paradigm is, “the heaven of our soul, made to His image, the living temple of the adorable Trinity!”[41] Rendering the divine in such familiar terms as a deity to whom a devotee can apply marital connotations to the relationship runs the risk of rendering the divine in human, all too human terms. Doing so unintentionally elevates the human being (and our realm) in religious terms, and thus may be partly why Thérèse unintentionally succumbed to spiritual arrogance.

This is not to say that no viable role exists in a person’s religiosity for divine form or religious ideas about God; much comfort can be had in devotion to a deity that has an easily-relatable form similar to those that inhabit our daily lives. Feeling love and directing the feeling to a personified ideal, as if to a tableau writ large, not only counts as extant love, but also puts the focus on the love itself, whether directly in being conscious of loving or indirectly in focusing on Jesus as essentially love. Ideally, however, the focus could be on theological love itself, unembodied and thus without distractions that are too familiar to be resisted by the mind.

My claim is that reality, and especially the source of reality, transcends even such masks of eternity because those masks compromise on the divine’s wholly other quality, which is to say that God, in not being bound by Creation, is qualitatively different, even in how being an "entity" applies. In short, devotional love is itself laudable, even though it is not the limit of religious experience. The mystic who stops at one’s favorite mask under the illusion that it is solid rather than a semi-permeable membrane can be seen as stopping needlessly short in yearning for the divine, which in Christianity is agape love itself. That is the ultimate value, and the real presence felt internally and yet still sought after in Christianity. Perhaps—just maybe—Thérèse unconsciously sensed on some level that even devotionally loving Jesus can be surpassed in spiritual terms: “Ah! Jesus, pardon me if I am unreasonable in wishing to express my desires and longings which reach even unto infinity,” she wrote.[42] Longing is a good word for yearning, and applied infinitely, the yearning for must itself be beyond the limits of human cognition, perception, and emotion. Interestingly, Thérèse wrote of her “measureless desires” (for God) in conjunction with raising the question of whether there is “PURE LOVE in my heart?”[43] Such love can be construed as self-emptying, wholly other divine agape rather than eros-related, anthropomorphic caritas love.

The instinctual-urge of the human brain to construe things in familiar terms, such as a deity being embodied in a familiar form, must contend with the distinctly spiritual instinct of the brain to transcend even its own limits in experiencing yearning for a distinctly religious object that is immanent yet transcendent and thus wholly other. The strength of the latter instinct doubtlessly varies, perhaps in part genetically. Even in those people in whom the gene is salient, it tends to be undercut by the former instinct of the brain to hang anthropomorphic ornaments on the tree of divine simplicity. Thérèse can be interpreted as illustrating that this undercurrent can be strong even under a strong riptide of water on the surface pulling her off-shore into the beyond. She is galvanized by her urge to love her Spouse, and yet her yearning is infinite and thus can go beyond even the face of God to its very nature, which, unlike the content of a mystical vision, is without limit. The questions I would ask Thérèse are: What of God lies beyond the contents of your visions and dreams and thus is not captured in them? How is theological love distinct from the various ways in which humans love?  For she asks, “How can I realize the desires of my poor little soul?”[44] She then unwittingly answers her own question. “To satisfy me I need all.” On the one hand, this sounds utterly human, all too human; on the other hand, it could intimate the urge in yearning as that of transcending ad infinitum, and thus beyond the alluring, familiar masks of eternity that may say more about us than God. Thérèse wanted a vicarious mother because her actual mother died of breast cancer so early. Deeper still, in spite of having a loving father, she desperately wanted to be loved, and Jesus fit that bill.

In approaching God with erotic-sourced love, or caritas, as Augustine did (drawing on the sublimated eros in Plato’s Symposium) and nuns such as Gertrud of Helfta and Thérèse of Lisieux also did as mystical devotees of Jesus, the distinctive, qualitatively different sort of love that is theological in type may go unrecognized. Like a garden’s native fauna long hidden by the overgrowth of exogenous weeds from other gardens, the distinctly theological love can easily be overlooked ironically in the garden of religion. Even devout mystics could stand to do some weeding.

To be sure, Thérèse was definitely onto something transcending her devotion to Jesus in understanding “that LOVE COMPRISED ALL VOCATIONS, THAT LOVE WAS EVERYTHING, THAT IT EMBRACED ALL TIMES AND PLACES. . . . IN A WORD, THAT IT WAS ETERNAL!”[45] Quoting from “Words of Our Lord to St. Margaret Mary,” which is in the book, Little Breviary of the Sacred Heart, Thérèse agreed that the “science of love,” which is in the book of life, is the key thing.[46] In so writing, she was going beyond, or, put in more distinctly religious terms, transcending her favorite mask to focus on the theological ether behind the mask that gives it its form and goes beyond even doing that. The mix of contending instincts, informed by her own psychological history without being reducible to that domain, is clear in what she wrote next: “Then, in the excess of my delirious joy, I cried out: O Jesus, my Love . . . MY VOCATION IS LOVE! Yes, I have found my place in the Church and it is You, O my God . . . ; in the heart of the Church, my Mother, I shall be Love.”[47] In this statement, she reverts back to her devotional love (i.e., caritas) directed to Jesus—a love that is somehow related to her emotional need for a vicarious mother—then she makes the move again transcending all that in yearning to be love itself (i.e., agape).

To be full, the distinctly theological sort of love in Christianity must, Thérèse wrote, “lower Itself, and that It lower Itself to nothingness and transform this nothingness into fire.”[48] Whereas devotional love is informed (or fueled) by garden-variety eros even when such love is sublimated in being directed toward a high object, according to Plato and Augustine, distinctly theological love whose source is the divine is directed to the powerless, weak, and imperfect creatures via universal benevolence. It is not clear to me that loving Jesus ever more intensely while in a convent satisfies this kind of love, for Jesus is not powerless, weak, or imperfect, and, as a god-man and God’s eternal Logos, Jesus is not a mere creature, even though, as a mask of eternity, Jesus has been interpreted by David Hume (albeit quietly, through analyzing Mary) as well as by Jews and Muslims as the epitome of anthropomorphized divinity.



1. Pierre Descouvemont, Therese and Lisieux (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdman’s Publishing, 1996).
2. Thérèse de Lisieux, Story of a Soul: The Autobiography of Saint Thérèse of Lisieux, Third edition, trans. John Clarke (Washington, D.C.: ICS Publications, 1996), p. 191.
3. Ibid., p. 197.
4. Ibid., p. 206.
5. Ibid., p. 205, italics added.
6. Ibid., p. 191.
7. Ibid., p. 196.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid., p. 195.
10. Ibid., p. 198.
11. John Clarke, “Introduction to the First Edition,” in Thérèse de Lisieux, Story of a Soul: The Autobiography of Saint Thérèse of Lisieux, Third edition, trans. John Clarke (Washington, D.C.: ICS Publications, 1996), p. xi.
12. Ibid., p. xii.
13. Thérèse de Lisieux, Story of a Soul, pp. 112-13.
14. John Clarke, “Introduction to the First Edition,”, p. xii.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Thérèse de Lisieux, Story of a Soul, p. 98.
18. Ibid., p. 196.
19. Ibid., p. 99.
20. Ibid., p. 101.
21. Ibid., p. 192.
22. Ibid., p. 196.
23. Ibid., p. 199.
24. Ibid., p. 105.
25. Matthew 11:25, quoted in Thérèse de Lisieux, Story of a Soul, p. 105.
26. The Imitation of Christ, III, 43:4.
27. Thérèse de Lisieux, Story of a Soul, p. 104.
28. Ibid., p. 190.
29. Ibid., p. 104.
30. Ibid., p. 102.
31. Ibid., p. 100.
32. William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1902), p. 262.
33. Thérèse de Lisieux, Story of a Soul, p. 102.
34. Ibid., p. 105.
35. Ibid., p. 107.
36. Ibid., p. 189.
37. Matthew 5:5.
38. Thérèse de Lisieux, Story of a Soul, p. 107.
39. Ibid., p. 187.
40. Ibid., p. 102.
41. Ibid., p. 104.
42. Ibid., p. 192, italics added.
43. Ibid., p. 197.
44. Ibid., p. 192.
45. Ibid., p. 194. The ALL-CAPS is in the original.
46. Ibid., p. 187.
47. Ibid., p. 194.
48. Ibid., p. 195. Elsewhere (p. 199), Thérèse refers to “the Eternal Fire of the Blessed Trinity,” which she then associates with “the Inaccessible Light.” So it can be concluded that it is in the nature of divine (agape) love ultimately to bring nothingness, or perhaps only apparent nothingness as it is in darkness and thus cannot be seen, into the light. To raise (or literally enlighten) the meek and the pure of heart, while humbling the proud; to bring in the outcasted to be placed even closer than self-declared inner circles; and to show compassion even (and especially) for one’s detractors and enemies when they need or could use some help: these are ways of operationalizing divine love by humans. Without this, faith is for naught, according to Paul.

Sunday, October 27, 2024

Faith Seeking Understanding: On Religious Experience

On October 24, 2024, Pope Francis released his encyclical, Dilexit Nos (“He Loved Us), on the Sacred Heart of Jesus. In the letter, he recounts “Saint Gertrude of Helfta, a Cisterian nun, tells of a time in prayer when she reclined her head on the heart of Christ and heard it beating.”[1] She wondered why the Gospel of John does not describe a similar spiritual experience, and concluded that “the sweet sound of those heartbeats has been reserved for modern times, so that, hearing them, our aging and lukewarm world may be renewed in the love of Christ.”[2] The pope concludes in the letter that this might hold for our times too. I contend that Gertrud’s spirituality can speak to the current modern age, in which that of Gertrud—the thirteenth century—hardly seems modern, but not in terms of focusing on Jesus’ resurrected heart; instead, Gertrud can point us beyond the limits of marital-union imagery with Jesus to experience that transcends the use of imagery that may say more about us and our world than that which transcends even the limits of the human imagination. Turning to the criticisms of Gertrud’s spirituality (and intelligence) by Thomas Merton and William James, I intend to salvage Gertrud in order to uncover her spiritual maturity.

According to Thomas Merton, Jesus said to Gertrud of Helfta, a nun in thirteenth century Europe, “I wish your writings to be an irrefutable testimonial of my Divine Love in these latter days in which I plan to do good to many souls!”[3] Jesus even dictated to her the title for her book: Herald of Divine Love. His rationale was that, as he told the nun, “souls will find in [the book] a foretaste of the super-abundance of my divine love.”[4] The inclusion of latter days flags the nun’s claim that it was actually Jesus who was talking with her, rather than her hallucinating, for in no sense can we say in hindsight that the thirteenth century could be characterized as the latter days of Christianity. This objection is only relevant, however, to the metaphysician (i.e., is Jesus a real entity?), the psychologist (i.e., was Gertrud hallucinating?), and historian (i.e., was Gertrud speaking to the resurrected historical Jesus of the Gospels?). The cost in making these category mistakes—taking religion to reduce to another domain and thus its criteria—is the missed opportunity (hence opportunity cost) to study the nature or essence of divine love, for that is the distinctly religious content in Merton’s report. Although academic study is obviously not necessary for a person to be religious, I, unlike Merton, applaud Gertrud’s intellectual forays into “secular” knowledge because intelligence plus knowledge can facilitate a person’s religious development.

Merton wrote of Gertrud as having been “an intelligent child with a taste for secular literature. Unfortunately, however, this taste became too absorbing. Although in itself it was harmless, or even good, it grew to such proportions and came to occupy such an inordinate place in her life that it choked the development of grace in her soul. . . . She was completely devoured by this one passion for the pleasure she found in reading the literature of the world. Psychologically speaking, what had happened was a completely unhealthy exteriorization of her whole self. She had developed a habit of pouring herself out, wasting her energies in the pursuit of her own satisfaction.”[5] But after some visions of Jesus, she “passed from tepidity to the closest mystical intimacy with the Sacred Heart,” which, being Jesus’s “infinitely perfect love for us,” became “the one big reality of her life.”[6]

Merton’s jejune and petty characterization of the intellectual life is hardly fair. At Yale’s divinity school, where I studied theology (while studying philosophy, history, film and education in the liberal arts college), faith seeking understanding was the mantra for both the students and the “scholarly priests” on the faculty. Of course, no Yale student could ever be accused of being an over-achiever, but this does not necessarily mean that God is thereby slighted by taking studying seriously, for God can be reckoned as the ultimate source even of the sliver of potential knowledge that a human being can learn in a lifetime. In fact, academic study can lead to a more mature religiosity.

William James criticizes Margaret Mary Alacoque (1647-1690), a European nun and mystic who emphasized the Sacred Heart of Jesus, as being “so feeble of intellectual outlook that it would be too much to ask of us, with our Protestant and modern education, to feel anything but indulgent pity for the kind of saintship which she embodies.”[7] So who is right on the religious verdict on intelligence—Merton or James? Surely it is not necessary to religiosity, and intelligence and accumulated knowledge can bolster arrogance if devoid of benevolentia universalis, or simple kindness, as is all too common at Yale and Harvard in New England—far indeed from the Midwest. Even so, to love ideas is not in itself to hate God or reckon oneself to be a deity among mere, stupid mortals. It may be said of intelligence applied to religion that Satan is cleaver and yet God is omniscient (i.e., all-knowing). For us mere mortals stuck in between, ideas about the world and especially about God and even religion as a distinct domain can facilitate our religious development toward maturation. As Paul wrote, “When I became a man, I put away childish things.”[8]

William James had no patience for stymied, or jejune spirituality. He contrasts Gertrud’s “proofs of Christ’s partiality for her undeserving person” through assurances “of his love, intimacy, and caresses and compliments of the most absurd and puerile sort” with the capability of the modern religious person to get past the idea of God as a dispenser of “personal favors.”[9] I don’t believe James was being fair to the pious nun, for she was very mature in terms of religious development.

Gertrud’s use of partiality in describing her relationship with Jesus does not mean that she felt superior or better off with respect to other people; rather, the favoring she perceived from Jesus allowing his “visible presence” to show to her has to do with her own unworthiness, given “such disorder and confusion” within her that “was no fitting dwelling for [Jesus].[10] Given her self-knowledge of her “stiff-necked obstinacy” and her “tower of vanity and worldiness,” favor had to do with the sheer grace that afforded her the privilege of having visions of Christ.[11] “I must confess in very truth that this was a grace given freely and in no way deserve,” she wrote before noting that “severe punishments” were what she deserved.[12] Her sense of being favored was that by grace alone such punishments were obviated and even replaced by visions of Jesus. This had nothing to do with being favored over other people, and as a self-declared wretch, she surely would not have presumed to be favored over anyone. James comes off as a cold and resentful or at least biased member of the faculty at Harvard, and thus hardly alone there, but very far indeed from Gertrud and other mature religious folk whose humility warrants partiality.

Secondly, James neglects Gertrud’s goal being to see God’s face and paradoxically to be in God and thus in God’s love, understood as agape, or self-emptying (divine) love, which goes beyond marital connotations associated with her yearning for Jesus. Circling back to Merton, we can say that Gertrud used her God-given intellect polished by years of study at the monastery, to transcend the bridal language she uses to describe the anthropomorphic marital love between her and Jesus by going on to characterize her goal of blissful union with God, which is mystically higher than merely being married to a manifestation of God.

Although Gertrud antedates David Hume’s seventeenth-century warning of the human mind’s inherent susceptibility to remaking God in our own image by anthropomorphizing familiar ornaments onto the pure idea of divine simplicity, I suspect Gertrud was able to use her studies and her innate intelligence to figure out the limitations of human analogies such as marriage and even erotic language, which compromise God being wholly other, and thus not even a being in the sense that we think of beings.[13]

Describing the liturgically-oriented fifth spiritual exercise in Gertrud’s program, two scholars distinguish Gertrud’s marital (and erotic) analogy wherein a nun “in a wedding dress [and] with a spousal dowry”[14] has is spiritually (and liturgically) married to Jesus, “the immortal spouse,”[15] from the telos, or ultimate goal in the following passage: “Having concluded the nuptial contract with the Lord, the mystic is burning for the kiss of her immortal spouse, for the wedding embrace in the innermost bedchamber of the heart. With the Lord as husband, the offspring of this marital union will be perfect love; it will mean becoming one spirit with God.”[16] I contend that the offspring transcends the marriage union as well as the marital and sexual language.

Gertrud was able to conceptualize her telos as an indwelling union in the divine, which is a closer and less humanlike union than is implicit in her vision of Jesus “leaning towards her like a sweet lover, and giving to her soul the softest kiss.”[17] It is important not to take even such sensual language too literally. According to two scholars, “When Gertrud thus focuses on Christ’s glorified human nature, she does not emphasize the belief that human nature in general is restored through the incarnation of Christ. She often distinguished between the ‘rotten body’ and the spirit. The body-soul dichotomy remains unreconciled in the Spiritual Exercises.”[18] This is only a relative or temporary problem, however, as Gertrud believed that at death, a person can flow back into God,”[19] which obviates even any relationship basis of union by transcending into God as love. Being in God transcends having a relationship with God, and it is precisely by one’s intellect and learning that a person can figure this out. Circling back to James, it can be said that whereas wanting to be married to Jesus can involve a desire for preferential treatment, though there is no evidence that Gertrud thought she alone could be Jesus’s spouse, indwelling in divine, pure (i.e., selfless) love transcends wanting preferential treatment.

With regard to the domain of religion as sui generis (i.e., distinct and of its own type of domain), although God by definition in being omniscient and transcendent is not limited to human systems of logic, it doesn’t hurt to be able to prune off wayward, human, all too human branches of even theological ratiocination as incoherent or really of another domain; otherwise, the human mind’s susceptibility to superstition and emotional enthusiasm in matters of religion could take over. As a prime candidate for pruning, Merton insists that the suddenness of Gertrud’s profound change “only emphasizes the fact that it was utterly beyond her own powers and was a pure gift of God.”[20] His assumption that a sudden change in a person cannot happen or has never happened before in a person without grace, or that sudden, momentous change is somehow contrary to human nature, is specious reasoning. It is similar to concluding that because a sick person prayed to John Paul II after his death and then gotten well without a medical reason (as if medicine were complete), the former pope must be a saint even though he did not act sufficiently on reports of child-rapes by priests and coverups by their respective bishops. Positive correlation is not sufficient to attest to causation. This logical point is often lost to the fervor of religious ideology.

It is also by intellect that we can come to realize the need to uproot the exogenous plants from the religious garden so we can see, understand, and experience the innately religious fauna that has been quietly growing underneath. Ignorance, superstition, and enthusiastic fervor can otherwise lead a person to claim to know rather than believe something that is a matter of faith. This fallacy, which involves reducing religion to some other domain (e.g., empirical science), involves an epistemological category mistake regarding what can be known. Subjecting a faith-claim to the verdict of what can be known from a historical account, or inferred from the result of an “arm chair” psychological analysis, for example, can be thwarted by previous study in logic and philosophy in general. Ironically, such “secular” studies protect the domain of religion from the encroachments of other domains as well as from overstepping onto other domains with an overriding arrogance of superiority based on a religious-domain-only belief claim.

From another shore, Merton saw fit to psychoanalyze Gertrud’s voracious appetite for knowledge, and William James claimed that “the revelations of Christ’s sacred heart” were Margaret Mary’s “hallucinations of sight, touch, and hearing.”[21] The modern mind will doubtless give credence to the rendering of religious experience into psychological terms. In 2023, I attended some lectures of a class at Yale on the results of empirical studies in psychology on religious beliefs. Generally speaking, empirical social-science tests can contribute to philosophy and the subject-matter of religious studies, though it is important to remember that the faith claims themselves do not suffer a consequent loss of validity in terms of religious meaning.

In the 1980s, in reaction to the historical critical method that had emerged in nineteenth-century Europe, Han Frei, a Yale professor of theology, claimed in his text, Eclipse of the Biblical Narrative, that historical questions of, and, one could add doing psychologically analysis on, characters and events in faith narratives such as the four Gospels comes at the cost of grasping the religious meaning in the stories. In other words, let the stories speak to you; don’t interrupt them to get behind the stories.

Just as Donald Trump was deemed an easy target by American psychologists when he was running for U.S. president in 2024 even though none of those “educated” psychologists had subjected him to psychological tests, let alone even met him in person, so too it must be easy as well as tempting to analyze the religious experiences of people whose religious sensitivity enables even elaborate descriptions of such experiences. Applying psychological analyses to nuns who lived many centuries back and claiming that the results trump their respective religious experiences is not only fraught with difficulties that could render the results invalid, but also superimposes another domain onto that of religion without justification. A good education in the liberal arts and a sharp intellect can critically examine such unsubstantiated assumptions in what has become known as critical thinking.

Religion, I submit, should be treated as a distinct domain, and thus with its own sort of meaning, experience, and criteria. This is not to say that the domain cannot intersect or has never intersected with other domains, such as history and psychology; James may be right about the specious ontological basis of visions; Jesus referring to the thirteen century as “latter days” belies Gertrud’s claim that an entity outside of Gertrud’s mind was speaking to her in her vision. Even so, for people interested in the religious domain, whether in regard to faith or a resulting experience or practice, religious meaning is the gold to be dug up, whether or not it is attached to a historical event has come out of a psychological state wherein the contents of a vision are not themselves empirical; the religious meaning is still real in its own sense, and thus such meaning can be related to religious creeds, doctrines, and systemic theologies by criteria innate to the religious domain rather than superimposed by another domain. Not only is it the case that secular knowledge and an analytical and logical intelligence need not be a threat to religion; a good liberal-arts and sciences education can actually facilitate a person’s religious maturation and prune off the dead wood in the religious domain as well as overhanging branches from trees growing in other domains. 



1. Pope Francis, Dilexit Nos, October 24, 2024, para. 98.
2. Ibid.
3.  Thomas Merton, “Saint Gertrude, Nun of Helfta, Germany,” Cistercian Studies Quarterly 38.4 (2003): 452. Merton cites  Héraut 2.10.5.
4. Ibid.  Merton cites Héraut, Prologue.
5. Ibid., p. 453.
6. Ibid., pp. 454, 457, 456.
7. William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1902), p. 262.
8. 1 Cor. 13:11. Paul writing about spiritual growth.
9. William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, p. 262.
10. Gertrude of Helfta, The Herald of Divine Love, Margaret Winkworth, ed. and trans. (New York: Paulist Press), p. 96.
11. Ibid., pp. 95-6.
12. Ibid., p. 97.
13. Pseudo-Dionysius makes this point in his sixth-century writings. Moreover, he wrote that God goes beyond the limits of human conception, perception, and sensibility (i.e., emotions). God, in other words, goes beyond the erotic language that Augustine applies to his yearning for God in Confessions.
14. Gertrud of Helfta, Gertrud the Great of Helfta: Spiritual Exercises, Gertrud Jaron Lewis and Jack Lewis, trans. Cistercian Fathers Series, No. 49 (Kalamazoo, MI: Cistercian Publication, 1989), verse 227.
15. Ibid.
16. Gertrud Lewis and Jack Lewis, “Introduction,” in Gertrud of Helfta, Gertrud the Great of Helfta: Spiritual Exercises, Gertrud Jaron Lewis and Jack Lewis, trans. Cistercian Fathers Series, No. 49 (Kalamazoo, MI: Cistercian Publication, 1989), p. 15.
17. Gertrud of Helfta, Gertrud the Great of Helfta: Spiritual Exercises, Gertrud Jaron Lewis and Jack Lewis, trans. Cistercian Fathers Series, No. 49 (Kalamazoo, MI: Cistercian Publication, 1989), p. 263.
18. Gertrud Lewis and Jack Lewis, “Introduction,” in Gertrud of Helfta, Gertrud the Great of Helfta: Spiritual Exercises, Gertrud Jaron Lewis and Jack Lewis, trans. Cistercian Fathers Series, No. 49 (Kalamazoo, MI: Cistercian Publication, 1989), p. 8.
19. Gertrud of Helfta, Gertrud the Great of Helfta: Spiritual Exercises, Gertrud Jaron Lewis and Jack Lewis, trans. Cistercian Fathers Series, No. 49 (Kalamazoo, MI: Cistercian Publication, 1989), verse 285.
20. Thomas Merton, “Saint Gertrude, Nun of Helfta, Germany,” Cistercian Studies Quarterly 38.4 (2003): 454.
21. William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, p. 261.

Wednesday, October 23, 2024

The Resurrected Body of Jesus: A Viable Launching Pad for Mysticism

Gertrud of Helfta (1256-1301) was a Christian nun whose sensitivity to mystical experience can be characterized as a bridal mysticism within a Christ mysticism. Think of Christ; turn yourself over to Christ. She brings in the related theme of light, which is salient in the Gospel of John, with Christ saying, I am the light of the word. Yet her mystical sensitivity was such that she could transcend even Christ’s resurrected body, which can be said to have been her favorite mask of eternity through which love, which, as Paul and Augustine had claimed, is God. This does not mean that the mask is finally tossed aside as somehow erroneous; rather, it is to say more generally that people who have an enhanced sensitivity to the mystical in a religious, or transcendent, sense, are oriented to going beyond God in our likeness to experience God as wholly other—as radically transcendent—and thus leave oneself behind.

Gertrud's guide to monastic prayer includes the following in the imperative form, “pray to the Lord to lead you into the school of love where you may learn further to recognize and love Jesus.”[1] Sight is implicit, if recognizing Jesus includes seeing his body. The theme of Gertrud’s third spiritual exercise (spiritual dedication) is “spiritual matrimony, wherein the nun is the bride and Jesus Christ is the bridegroom.  Eros is not excluded, the love being of caritas rather than agape for the nun even though “Christ’s desire is as great as the bride’s” and “this marriage of love” is rendered an “inseparable union” of “chaste love” by a “kiss of love.”[2] Clearly, Descartes’ mind-body dichotomy does not apply, as Christ’s resurrected body is transformed from being an earthly body.

In short, Gertrud’s language, which can be likened to Augustine’s erotic pining for God’s scent in The Confessions, includes even if as an illusion, sexuality and thus bodies rather than just souls.  Although Gertrud likens the “bond of love between the two spouses”—the nun and Jesus—to “the glue that unites the Father to the Son,” the “true spouse and wife, made fertile, brings forth the fruits of life.”[3] The sexual imagery, in which bodies are salient, simply cannot be ignored.

The likeness to the relation between the Father and the Son in the Trinity, however, should be taken with a grain of salt, given Augustine’s claim that likening the relation between the Father and the Son to that of a human father and son (or daughter) is an instance of idolatry. Augustine acknowledges that human weakness “can only think of what it has been accustomed to do or hear.”[4] And yet he warns that “no carnal thought creep up” when we think of Jesus’ line, “As the Father has taught me,” such as in thinking of how a human father teaches his son.[5] Thinking of the relationship in the Trinity as being akin to a human relationship is to “fashion idols.”[6] But then is not thinking of approaching Jesus by incorporating sexual language also idolatrous? Fortunately, Gertrud’s goal goes beyond such imagery, and, moreover, even Jesus’ resurrected body. Her attitude toward human bodies, no doubt informed from living in a monastery from the age of 5, would argue against her resting for eternity with even a transformed yet still corporeal (rather than gnostic) body (of Jesus).

Even though Gertrud “focuses on Christ’s glorified human nature, she does not emphasize the belief that human nature in general is restored through the incarnation of Christ.”[7] For example, distinguishing the “rotten body” from the spirit (e.g., Spiritual Exercises, VI, 612f) is consistent with mortification, “dying to oneself in order to live for God alone (III, 149), which is implied in the “process of inner liberation.”[8] This is also consistent with Gertrud’s leitmotif of death of the corporeal body in its earthly state constituting “a beginning rather than an end, a paradoxical reversal of death and life, which . . . goes back to the mystery of the Cross.”[9] Yet Gertrud holds that Christ’s “human nature” is retained “in his heavenly state.”[10] Moreover, her mysticism is “typically Christ-centered,” with “Christ in his humanity” forming “the basis and focus of all of Gertrud’s writing.”[11] Put another way, It is the “human nature of Christ as one with the Spirit and as part of the Trinity, while still, Gertrud writes, ‘in the substance of my flesh,’” that “represents the pivotal point of Gertrud’s mystical life.”[12] I submit that the likeness of “my flesh” involves, on the devotee’s part, a “rotten body,” and furthermore that it would be difficult for Gertrud to stay with the bridal language to characterize her goal of blissful union with God, which for her includes being in God.

Fortunately, Gertrud transcends the mind-body dichotomy altogether in writing of God as Goodness (bonitas), Love (caritas), Cherishing-love (dilectio), Compassion (misericordia), Peace (pax), and Loving-kindness (pietas).[13] These words for divinity obviate the pitfall from anthropomorphism in rendering the transcendent as human, all too human. This is avoided to an extent by “employing simultaneously both male and female attributes for God.”[14]

The same is done in Hinduism, in depicting the deity, Shiva, as both male and female—as conjoined bodily with his consort, Devi, as in (in Christian terms of marriage) made one flesh. Ganesha, the Hindu god that has an elephant head, goes even further in upsetting the convenient assumption that a deity resembles our human form externally.

Put in simpler theological terms, Christ’s transformed (rather than earthly) resurrected body is Gertrud’s centering pole that she grasps as though with one arm as she leans out yearning for mysterium divinum; “the mystical experience” being “per se ineffable.”[15] In Spiritual Exercises, the “desire to reach God sine impedimente (without any hindrance) is reiterated throughout as direct contact with the Divine remains her goal,” and of course her summum bonum, which Plato describes merely as eternal moral verities (truths).[16] “Ah! O love, may your cherishing-love consummated in me be my end and consummation.”[17] Although she adds her hope that she “may appear worthy in the presence of the immortal spouse, in a wedding dress and with a spousal dowry,” I contend that being in the divine that is love transcends even a bridal union with Christ’s resurrected body.[18] So here Gertrud can be interpreted as describing the means (i.e., being married with Jesus in his resurrected condition, including bodily) after having depicted the end, or consummation, with divine love itself. There is a danger, therefore, that devotees following Gertrud’s spiritual exercises in praxis may focus on the means too much, without even pondering what divine love is in itself as a distinct type of love. As distinct, illusions to sexuality and even bodies can only go so far on the way to divine love saturating the devotee from within in the end.

Gender, and even anthropomorphism are hindrances from the perspective of experiencing union with the source of the divine, which transcends the limits of human thought and perception, as Dionysius suggests. Relatedly, in Hinduism, the part of Purusa’s primordial body that extends beyond most of that body—that which becomes the world—is transcendent in that it lies beyond our realm. Only once even such basic obstacles as gender-identification and the tendency of the human brain to render radically “other” thoughts into familiar terms are transcended can a person like Gertrud of Helfta have “inner freedom” (Libertas cordis), which is Gertrud’s most “unique characteristic and her most important theme in general.”[19] According to Gertrud, a “mystical rebirth in God” entails “integrity of faith, triumph over the enemy, unyielding perseverance, and freedom of spirit.”[20] Such freedom is needed to see “God face to face for eternity.”[21] Ironically, the light showing God’s true face transcends the light of the world.



1, Gertrud of Helfta, Spiritual Exercises, Gertrud Jaron Lewis and Jack Lewis, trans. Cistercian Fathers Series, No. 49 (Kalamazoo, MI: Cistercian Publication, 1989): V. verses 311-12, p. 84, italics added.
2, Ibid., p. 14.
3, Ibid., p. 14.
4, Augustine, Tractates on John: Books 28-54, 40.4, trans. John W. Rettig, Fathers of the Church: A New Translation 88 (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1993), 126.
5, Ibid.
6, Ibid.
7, Gertrud of Helfta, Spiritual Exercises, Gertrud Jaron Lewis and Jack Lewis, trans. Cistercian Fathers Series, No. 49 (Kalamazoo, MI: Cistercian Publication, 1989), p. 8.
8. Ibid., p.9.
9, Ibid., p. 10.
10. Ibid., p. 7.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid. The use of the Latin word, caritas, rather than the Greek word, agape, is, I submit, misplaced in being an appellation for God. For Augustine, caritas is not selfless love, but is infused with, and thus not cut off from, garden-variety eros, albeit sublimated to the summum bonum. For the basis of this idea, see Plato’s Symposium. Calvin was more idealistic concerning the potential of human love in applying agape, which is divine selfless love, as evinced in God the Father allowing his Logos to be incarnated as His Son and even to suffer an excruciating death. Therefore, I contend that the sort of love that is divine is more accurately rendered as selfless (agape) rather than including human instinct (caritas).
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. “Gertrud’s text unequivocally defines the summum bonum in terms of the biblical ‘seeing God face to face.’” Introduction of Gertrud of Helfta, Spiritual Exercises, Gertrud Jaron Lewis and Jack Lewis, trans. Cistercian Fathers Series, No. 49 (Kalamazoo, MI: Cistercian Publication, 1989), p. 8.
17. Gertrud of Helfta, Spiritual Exercises, Gertrud Jaron Lewis and Jack Lewis, trans. Cistercian Fathers Series, No. 49 (Kalamazoo, MI: Cistercian Publication, 1989): V. verses 216-17, p. 81.
18. Ibid., verses 226-28, p. 81.
19. Ibid., p. 10.
20. Ibid., p.12, italics added.
21. Ibid.