Can we think our way to religion,
or does religious experience transcend cognition (i.e., thought)? Closely
related is the question of whether theology is just a special case of
philosophy or another domain altogether. The pivotal chapter 2 of the Bhagavad-Gita
saga in Hinduism can be interpreted in favor of the latter: gnostic vision
of the divine, such as of Krishna showing his fullness later in the myth to Arjuna,
may launch off from the intellect, but without continuing as an intellectual
pursuit once the threshold of religious experience is reached. By analogy, we
can see the edges of a black hole in space, but we can’t see beyond its
threshold, within the hole because light cannot bounce back out given
the magnitude of the intense gravity that a black hole has. Similarly, a deity
can be thought of as intense being—so dense that we mere mortals can
only gasp in wonder when we are presented with something so far beyond the
limits of human perception, emotions, and cognitions, hence the intellect too.
A trajectory from a person being
merely oriented to perceiving external objects, to having wisdom that goes
beyond the subject-object dichotomy, and finally on to gnosis exists in chapter
2 of the Bhagavad-Gita in the Feuersteins’ translation. The trajectory
is truncated, however, in two translations of Shankara’s commentary on the Gita.
Perhaps the difference is at least in part on whether (or to what degree) prajna
is distinct from, and thus “higher” than, buddhi or sattva. At
least to the Feuersteins, prajna is not only higher than sattva and buddhi,
but also qualitatively different than them (i.e., different in kind, not just
in degree or extent). It is in this
respect that theology enters and philosophy must give way.
To trace the epistemologically
ascending slope that arguably transcends epistemology itself in ending with
mystical sight, we first have to get past an apparent contradiction regarding
holding onto wisdom. On the question of whether the contradiction is actual or
only apparent, I go with the side that is in line with the fullness of the
trajectory, rather than with truncating it so it must stop with the
contradiction. Whereas the intellect has trouble getting past contradictions,
religious vision beholding a beatitude of divinity does not. In the Abrahamic
religions, God creates the world and thus cannot be bound by contractions, even
in the intellect, that are in the world—even of abstractions in the human mind.
In terms of knowing (i.e.,
epistemology), the domain of religion inherently goes beyond the limits
of reason (i.e., thinking). Moses doesn’t analyze the burning bush in
the Bible; rather, his reaction is experiential, and in a way that
renders the intellect still. Religion, grace á transcendence, is unique
because its essential nature includes that it goes beyond the limits of
human cognition as well as emotion and perception; Pseudo-Dionysius, a
sixth-century Christian theologian, wrote as much. In a way, you might say that
transcending even logical contradictions is part of the trajectory. A Zen Buddhist
wrestling intellectually with a koan does so precisely because the
device trips up the intellect so awareness without thinking can commence.
In Hinduism, Jiva Gosvami, in his
text, the Bhagavat-sandarbha, insists that the contradiction of identity
and difference renders the relation between Brahman and its powers (saktis)
incomprehensible (acrintya) to us. Even so, the relation “is of the very
nature of the Supreme.”[1]
In other words, in Caitanya Vaisnava theology, the “mystery of simultaneous
difference and nondifference is embedded in every aspect of divinity.”[2]
Rather than short-circuiting and thus invalidating religion, and thus faith
that is distinctly religious, contradiction and incomprehensibility (as well as
the sheer inexpressibility (anirvacaniya) of the world as neither real
nor not real in Advaita Vedantism) distinguish the domain of religion from
others and in fact are inherent to that domain.
In chapter 2 of the Gita,
the trajectory begins with one of the “Traigunya, or ‘triad of
primary-qualities,’ [which] refers to the three fundamental qualities (guna)
of cosmic existence (prakriti): the principle of lucidity (sattva),
the principle of dynamism (rajas), and the principle of inertia (tamas).
Through endless combinations, these three qualities—guna means
‘strand’—make up the myriad of phenomena in the manifest world.”[3]
In the Gita, Krishna says, “Become free of the triple primary-qualities,
free of the pairs-of-opposites, and, O Arjuna, abide always in sattva,
without (trying to) gain or keep (anything). (Be) Self-possessed!”[4]
In Warrier’s translation of Shankara’s commentary on the Gita, Shankara
omits any mention of abiding in sattva; instead, Krishna’s advice is
to have “mastered the self,” which is identical with Brahman as this
relationship is “beyond all dualities.”[5]
In making the omission, Shankara may have been oriented to upholding the
logical integrity of the verse.
That sattva is one of the
three primary qualities and Arjuna should be free of all three renders it
contradictory for Krishna to then tell Arjuna, “abide always in sattva.”
To obviate the contradiction, the Feuersteins suggest that the word sattva in
the phrase, “abide always in sattva,” may “in this particular context be
translated as ‘truth’ or ‘reality,’ since it can hardly refer to the guna called
sattva, given that Arjuna was told to step beyond the gunas, if
only by implication.”[6]
So, liberation (moksa), being oriented to truth or reality, transcends not
only pairs-of-opposites (dvandva), “like heat/cold, dry/wet, which are
apt to cause distress,”[7]
but also even clear-mindedness (sattva), as no one can grasp Brahman
intellectually, for according to the Gita, “no one, verily (really)
knows this (Self),” which “is called unmanifest (avyakta), unthinkable,
unchangeable.”[8]
Lest it be thought such a matter can
so easily be settled, Krishna goes on to advise Arjuna, according to the Feuersteins’
translation: “Seek refuge in the wisdom-faculty!”[9]
The word “wisdom” is a translation of the Sanskrit buddhi, which in turn
is synonymous with our old friend, sattva (as a guna).[10]
Shankara, as per Warrier’s translation, has “the evenness of intelligence,” and,
“evenness of mind” in that of Aiyar, as alternatives to the Feuersteins’ “wisdom-faculty.”[11]
The effect of these alternatives is to emphasize the cognitive aspect, which is
not faculty that is distinctly religious.
In fact, Krishna goes on to say,
“The wise (who are) buddhi yoked, who have renounced action-born fruit,
who are liberated from the bondage of birth (and death)—they go to the region
(that is) free from ill.”[12]
Warrier’s Shankara again substitutes “intelligence of evenness,” this time for buddhi
(which is synonymous with sattva).[13]
Aiyar uses “evenness of mind” again, and adds “possessed of knowledge.”[14]
Those who “are liberated” from samsara are curiously not freed from the
confines of human wisdom and even knowledge. Even though a person’s
wisdom-faculty is understandably capable of traversing “the thicket of
delusion,” resulting in “disinterest in what will be heard and what has been
heard (i.e., mundane knowledge,”[15]
it is difficult to reconcile becoming free of sattva with being liberated
and yet still seeking refuge in the wisdom faculty and being buddhi yoked.
Something simply has to give way.
That the wisdom-faculty is to be
transcended before a person reaches liberation finds support in the next
verse of the Gita. Only after having been diverted by “revealed
tradition,” such as in how to perform the Vedic sacrifice ritual so as to gain
something (i.e., attachment, desire, fruits of actions), a person’s wisdom faculty
“will stand motionless and still in ecstasy,” at which time the person “will
attain to (the sublime state of) Yoga.”[16]
This is tricky: sattva or buddhi is being referred to, but not in
the sense of either being actively engaged. In fact, standing motionless
and in ecstasy may be thought of in terms of reacting to something akin to the
sacred, as in how Moses reacts to Yahweh at the burning bush or how Arjuna
reacts to Krishna’s display fullness later in the Gita.
Being motionless and still, the
wisdom faculty can be thought of as being transparent, like an unstained window,
so refuge is then being taken deeper, to something else, in the Self qua
Self, rather than as understood or filtered through the artificiality of human
cognition or reasoning. In his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant postulates
the impact of reason itself on how we perceive space and time. With sattva or
buddhi rendered still, something else is needed to close the deal for
liberation to occur.
Pivoting subtly off sattva and
buddhi to prajna, the next verse in Feuerstein’s translation of the
Gita has Arjuna asking Krishna, what “is the definition of the (yogin
who is) steadied in gnosis, abiding in ecstasy?”[17]
Whereas in previous verse it is the person’s wisdom faculty (buddhi or sattva)
that is in ecstasy, here it is a person who is steadied in prajna, which
the Feuersteins translate as the Greek work gnosis, which “is a higher kind of
(‘mystical’) knowledge” than is sattva or buddhi.[18]
He explains that to “use the Greek equivalent seemed more appropriate here than
to repeat ‘wisdom,’ which goes well with buddhi,” and therefore with sattva
too.[19]
Krishna’s answer is that when a person “relinquishes all desires (that) enter
the mind . . . and is content with the Self in the Self, then is he called
steadied in gnosis.”[20]
That prajna should not be thought of in terms of human knowledge or even
wisdom is made very evident in the next verse that ends with “steadied in
vision.”[21]
Vision here is not of sight literally, for, according to the Gita, when
a person “withdraws from every side his senses from the objects of the senses
as a tortoise (draws its limbs), his gnosis is well established. For the
non-eating embodied (dehin) (Self) the objects disappear, except for the
relish. (Upon) seeing the Supreme, the relish also disappears for him.”[22]
Seeing the Supreme—which can mean Krishna in full, thus transcending as a deity—is
not like the seeing of objects. In fact, it is from the latter that a person’s
wisdom faculty is destroyed.[23]
Prajna, or gnosis, transcends rather than destroys a person’s
faculty for wisdom, for “complete inner stillness” (prasada) is a
condition of that faculty, and in fact that condition renders a person
“qualified for the grace (prasada) of the Divine.”[24]
With that facility still, hence sattva or buddhi being
transcended, the experiential realization of Self as it really is (i.e.
reality) can be said to be more mystical than epistemological in nature.
Shankara does not make the leap
from wisdom to gnosis. For in Warrier’s translation of 2.54 the Gita,
“stable wisdom” and “steadfast intelligence” are anchored in concentration, and
Aiyar’s translation of the verse has “established wisdom,” all of which are a
far cry from “gnosis” that is “abiding in ecstasy” and “steadied in vision.”[25]
In fact, the next verse, 2.55, in the Warrier translation is: “When one wholly
discards desires of the heart and becomes exclusively content with the Self,
one is called a sage of stable wisdom. O Arjuna!”[26]
Aiyar uses “established wisdom.”[27]
In effect, prajna is just sattva or buddhi that is stable
or established—neither of which sounds very vision-oriented to me.
I contend that gnosis, ecstasy,
and vision are qualitatively different than wisdom and intelligence. In fact,
only the former can be said to be distinctly religious, as is evident from the
applicability to devotion (bhakti) to a personal deity, which Shankara
eschews in favor of “the sage of stable wisdom who concerns himself with the
discipline of knowledge” being applied to impersonal being that is conscious.[28]
Stable wisdom here is essentially “right knowledge” as in knowing the
difference between right and wrong.[29]
Wisdom and understanding are both predicated on the subject-object dichotomy,
which falls away, according to Feuerstein’s translation, prior to liberation:
“For the non-eating embodied (dehin) [Self] the objects disappear,
except for the relish. (Upon) seeing the Supreme, the relish also disappears
for him.”[30]
For such an ascetic, even the mind’s basic subject-object structure or paradigm
dissolves. Hence when Krishna then refers to a person being “yoked (and) intent
on Me,” one’s “gnosis is well established,” which in turn connotes vision, as
in “seeing the Supreme,” rather than intelligence.[31]
Warrier’s translation Gita 2.61 substitutes the more cognitive “deeming
Me supreme” in stable wisdom.[32]
Even though Krishna, a personal deity, is speaking, Shankara claims that
“Deeming Me supreme” means that “Vasudeva, the inner Self of all, is supreme.”[33]
Although Aiyar’s translation of Gita 2.61 has “exclusively devoted to
Me,” the comment beneath the verse in the commentary describe Vasudeva as “the
Innermost Self of all.”[34]
Innermost renders the Self even more in terms of the impersonal Brahman,
and that Vasudeva is Krishna’s father rather than Krishna himself further
distances Shankara from interpreting the Gita in terms of devotion to
Krishna. In chapter two of the Gita, the absolute is depicted both as
Krishna (whose fullness Arjuna will eventually “see”) and the Self, as in: Be
“Self-possessed!”[35]
In conclusion, whereas the Feuersteins’
translation of the Gita gets past the inherent limitations of sattva and
buddhi with respect to distinctly religious transcendence by shifting to
gnosis, with its distinctly religious mystical and ecstasy/visionary qualities,
the two translations of Shankara’s commentary hold onto the more cognitive
faculties of intelligence and wisdom through the entire process of liberation,
which entails knowing not only “the whole sphere of objects to be nothing but
nescience,” but also “the Self” and thus reality.[36]
Although Shankara’s epistemology is arguably more conducive to philosophy than
theology, the transcendence of Brahman and the identity of atman with
Brahman as being not just being but conscious being is arguably distinctly
religious. Even though faith can indeed seek understanding, there are problems
with the claim that understanding is sufficient for faith. Ramanuja’s emphasis
on devotion to Krishna (bhakti) can be interpreted as a way to bridge
this gap.
If all this has your head
spinning, then perhaps it is best to return to the basic difference between
intellectual thinking and gnostic vision. Even though faith seeking
understanding can make use of human reasoning, and thus reason itself, religion
is such that it must go beyond the limits of reason alone. This does not
mean that a religious congregation should dismiss its more
intellectually-inclined members; rather, the point is that even they need to
let go of that of themselves that is human, all too human, and in fact even
themselves (and definitely their egos!) before they can jump off the
diving-board and go in the pool wherein visionary experience of the sacred lives.
Going on with this analogy, a person can’t experience being in water, and thus
knowing what that is like, if one doesn’t jump off the diving board. Shankara doesn’t jump off the board, and thus
he will be at a loss to explain Arjuna’s experience when Krishna displays his fullness
later in the Gita.
1. Ravi M. Gupta, Caitanya Vaisnava Philosophy: Tradition, Reason and Devotion
(Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2014), p. 56.
2. Ibid.
3. Georg
and Brenda Feuerstein, The Bhagavad-Gita: A New Translation (Boston:
Shambhala, 2011), p. 107n44.
4. Gita
2.45. In Feuerstein, The Bhagavad-Gita, p. 107.
5. Shankara, Srimad Bhagavad Gita Bhasya of Sri
Samkaracarya, Trans. A.G. Warrier (Madras, India: Sri Ramakrishna Math), p.
66.
6. Feuerstein, The Bhagavad-Gita, p. 107n46.
7. Ibid.,
p. 97n19.
8. Gita
2.29, 25. In Feuerstein, The Bhagavad-Gita, p. 101.
9. Ibid.,
2.49. In Feuerstein, The Bhagavad-Gita, p. 109.
10. The word wisdom “goes well with buddhi,” and sattva “is a
common synonym for buddhi.” Feuerstein, The Bhagavad-Gita, pp.
111n53 and 107n46. Completing this syllogism, wisdom is synonymous with sattva.
11. Shankara, Srimad Bhagavad Gita Bhasya (Warrier), p. 70; Shankara, Sri
Sankara’s Gita Bhashya, trans. C.V. Ramachandra Aiyar (Bombay: Bharatiya
Vidya Bhavan, 1988), p. 78.
12. Gita
2.51. In Feuerstein, The Bhagavad-Gita, p. 109.
13. Shankara, Srimad Bhagavad Gita Bhasya (Warrier), p. 72.
14. Shankara, Sri Sankara’s Gita Bhashya (Aiyar), p. 80.
15. Gita
2.52. In Feuerstein, The Bhagavad-Gita, p. 109.
16. Ibid.,
2.53. In Feuerstein, The Bhagavad-Gita, p. 109.
17. Ibid., 2.54. In Feuerstein, The Bhagavad-Gita, p. 111.
18. Feuerstein, The Bhagavad-Gita, p. 111n53.
19. Ibid.
20. Gita
2.55. In Feuerstein, The Bhagavad-Gita, p. 111.
21. Ibid.,
2.56. In Feuerstein, The Bhagavad-Gita, p. 111.
22. Ibid.,
2.58-9. In Feuerstein, The Bhagavad-Gita, p. 113.
23. Ibid.,
2.63. In Feuerstein, The Bhagavad-Gita, p. 113.
24. Feuerstein, The Bhagavad-Gita, p. 113n59.
25. Shankara, Srimad Bhagavad Gita Bhasya (Warrier), p. 75; Shankara, Sri
Sankara’s Gita Bhashya (Aiyar), p. 82.
26. Shankara,
Srimad Bhagavad Gita Bhasya (Warrier), p. 76. Italics added.
27. Shankara, Sri Sankara’s Gita Bhashya (Aiyar), p. 83.
28. Shankara,
Srimad Bhagavad Gita Bhasya (Warrier), p. 76.
29. Ibid., p. 80.
30. Gita
2.59. In Feuerstein, The Bhagavad-Gita, p. 113.
31. Ibid., 2.61. In Feuerstein, The Bhagavad-Gita, p. 113.
32. Shankara, Srimad Bhagavad Gita Bhasya (Warrier), p. 81.
33. Ibid.
34. Shankara, Sri Sankara’s Gita Bhashya (Aiyar), p. 88.
35. Gita.,
2.45. In Feuerstein, The Bhagavad-Gita, p. 107.
36. Shankara, Srimad Bhagavad Gita Bhasya (Warrier), p. 88.
