Idealism may exist especially
in young adults because they have not experienced decade upon decade of the intractability
of a deeply flawed social, political, and economic world’s status quo, which typically
permits only incremental change. Zealous optimism can be expressed in a variety
of domains, including religion, social issues, and politics. For example, political
group-affiliation can stimulate a more intense devotion to religion, and vice
versa. Even a passion on social agendas can translate into increased religiosity,
and the latter can overreach onto the former. It can be asked of such instances
whether the religiosity is genuine, or merely transferred energetic enthusiasm
from another domain. The upsurge in religiosity among young Republican men polled
by Gallup in the mid-2020s may be more political than religious. Relative to
the growing numbers of non-religious-affiliated people in the U.S. as well as
the E.U., the uptick among young Republicans should be put into perspective.
In 1979, Ronald Reagan ran a presidential
campaign that brought in the “evangelical right” as well as blue-collar
democrats. Accordingly, the Republican group went from pro-choice on Abortion
to being against the procedure from a distinctly religious standpoint. The election
of Pope John Paul II in the same year furthered the turn to the right on social
issues as they took hold in the Roman Catholic Church and even went on to
displace attention to soteriological matters especially in the American Catholic
clerical hierarchy such that Pope Francis felt the need to suggest to his
fellow bishops that the moral/social issues be de-prioritized relative to preaching
on the vicarious sacrifice of Jesus Christ and his subsequent resurrection. In the
mid-2020s, as shown by Gallup polling, an upsurge in religiosity among young
Republican (American) men—the political context being explicit—may have begun,
resonating with Reagan’s incorporation of the Moral Majority in Republican
politics. What was behind the upsurge, and why weren’t young women enjoying an
upsurge in religiosity too?
Gallup’s data in 2024-2025 “shows
that 42% of men in the U.S. ages 18-29 said religion is very important to them,
a notable increase from 28% in 2022-2023. Over the same time, young women’s
attachment to religion . . . stayed low, at about 30%.”[1]
The percentages of men and women who claimed to be very religious had gradually
declined since the polling had begun in 2000, with the exception of the 42% in
2025-2025 going up from the 28% in 2022-2023 for young men.[2]
Moreover, the majority of young men and a supermajority of young women in the U.S.
indicated that religion was not important to them. Put another way, the uptick
in the religiosity of young men of 14% is dwarfed by the 70% of young women who
were not actively religious on a weekly basis. The uptick in Republican-related
religiosity among young American men should be viewed in the context of an
increasingly secular West.
In fact, the “very religious”
self-identification could stem from having the Republican political group-identity,
given the strong positive correlation. The question, in other words, involves
which domain was primary for the “very religious” respondents in terms of their
group-identifications. Each person has several such identifications, one of
which is usually primary.
For myself, my primary group
identification is cultural; I view myself chiefly as a native Midwesterner. For
me to allow this group identification to monopolize my self-identity, hence
excluding my political, religious, racial, gender, sexual, etc.,
group-identities would be highly artificial because in actuality all of them pertain
to me. I am conscious of my decision to make one primary. As an aside, a racist
could be defined as a person who has decided to allow racial group-identity to
monopolize the group-identities that are possible in all other domains, not only
pertaining to oneself, but to other people too, even if their primary
group-identities are otherwise. Imposing racial group-identities on a
person whose primary group-identity is in another domain produces tension,
given the dogmatic overreaching, and such imposing may be termed racist.
Overreaching is evinced in the
analysis of the poll by Ryan Burge, a political scientist and Baptist preacher,
whose claim that the uptick in religiosity of young Republican men “represents
a seismic change in society and the future of the church” is likely overblown,
given the fact that majorities of both young men and women were still refusing
to say that they were very religious.[3]
Burge also overreaches in bringing in race in claiming that young men were more
drawn to religion “because it is a space where they feel more accepted in a
world where other institutions are ‘less interested in white men compared to
women and people of color.”[4]
Given the salience of Caucasians still in corporations and Congress, it would
be interesting to learn of which “other institutions” Burge had in mind in
making his statement. His claim that the domain of religion is “the only place
where you don’t have to apologize for being a white man” demonstrates just how artificial
(and ludicrous) imposing race in a fundamentally non-racial phenomenon can be.[5]
Completely aside from race, it is possible that the “very religious” respondents in the Gallop poll tended to self-identity as Republicans primarily and as Christians in the religious domain only secondarily even though they viewed themselves as very religious because the latter was infused with political energy and idealism. The salience of religion in the Republican party since Reagan incorporated the social-issue-oriented Moral Majority could explain the paradox. In fact, to the extent that “religion” in the Republican party has actually been more about social issues such as abortion and homosexuality than theology, the respondents may have actually been “very social-issue-oriented” rather than theological. Pew Research Center surveys in 2025 “found about 4 in 10 men under 30 say divorce is morally wrong, compared to only 2 in 10 young women. Even more men under 30, about half, say abortion is morally wrong, compared to only about one-third of women the same age. Young men are also likelier than young women to say homosexuality is morally wrong, although both groups are substantially less likely than older men and women to hold this view.”[6] Higher numbers regardless of age would be more critical of homosexuality were more people aware of the profligate norm that gays in the Castro district of San Francisco were imposing on each other in insisting on rampant sex outside of relationships, including separate emotional/romantic attachments rather than just separate anonymous sex, which boyfriends and husbands are expected to accept. Monogamy and commitment, as well as fidelity, became dirty words in that sub-culture when the “woke” ideology took over sexual “ethics.” It is interesting that that sub-culture went in that direction even as the Republican group was becoming more socially conservative. Seeking meaning, whether in a political or a religious group, can be distinguished antithetically from the lack of emotional connection and the related loneliness that go with a refusal to channel momentary urges in ways that do not eclipse emotional intimacy and trust. It is indeed a tale of two cities.
Regarding the “very religious” young Republican men, I suspect that both social issues and theology were in the mix because of the overtly Christian-leanings, to say the least, that entered the Republican group in 1979. Pope John Paul II’s stance against the U.S.S.R., especially pertaining to his home state of Poland, combined with the pre-existent firm anti-Communist stance of the Republican party, contributed to the tight link between Christianity and the Republican group. In fact, the ideal of a “Christian nation” has not been uncommon in the Republican group since Reagan, who interestingly referred to America as a “city on a hill,” an expression that Augustine used to denote the Heavenly City as against the Earthly City. With the very earthly city of the Castro well-entrenched in San Francisco becoming increasingly primitive instinctually, it is no wonder that civilized Americans would envision a city on a hill above the degenerate, utterly selfish filth of unrestrained instinctual urges. Such an envisioning would not be exclusively religious.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
